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Abstract
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are one of the
key foundations of many utility industries and critical infrastructures. The
Distributed Network Protocol Version 3 (DNP3) is one of the non-proprietary
protocols used to facilitate substation communications within SCADA networks
via serial-lines or TCP/IP protocols. DNP3 is the defacto standard for power-
grid automation, however, standard-based interoperability among devices has
also made the protocol useful to other infrastructures such as water, sewage,
oil and gas. The DNP3 protocol provides a security mechanism called Secure
Authentication (DNP3-SA). DNP3-SA is a unilateral authentication mechanism
used to ensure that DNP3 messages transmitted between interconnected stations
are protected from rogue applications. The mechanism operates in two di↵erent
modes: Non-aggressive (NACR) and Aggressive (AGM) modes. So far, DNP3
is one of the first standardised SCADA protocol that attempts to provide an
embedded cryptographic security mechanism in its operations. However, the
specifications of the protocols are narrative and informally described.
An important issue in developing and integrating security protocols in an
existing protocol is the security verification of its behavioural correctness. For
industrial communication protocols such as the DNP3 protocol, integrating
another functionality such as DNP3-SA is extremely challenging. It is required to
ensure that the embedded security mechanism fits well and does not contain errors
that may weaken the security protection provided. To achieve this behavioural
correctness, in this thesis we apply a method from theoretical computer science
called Coloured Petri Nets (CPNs). CPN or CPNTools is a formalism used to
construct formal models of systems. This thesis uses CPN to model and evaluate
DNP3 and its security mechanism (DNP3-SA). The models created are based on
the specification of the DNP3 protocol and the use of real equipment. A CPN
analysis tool (state space) is used on these models to perform formal security
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analysis of the protocol. The formal security analysis involves both validation and
verification processes. The validation process is used to determine whether the
model accurately reflects the behaviour stated in the protocol specification. The
verification process involves the use of common Internet attack models within
the model to verify for security properties such as Availability, Integrity and
Authentication. Analysis using the models has revealed previously unidentified
flaws in the DNP3-SA protocol that can be exploited by an attacker that has
access to the network interconnecting DNP3 devices. The first flaw was found
in the DNP3 Non-aggressive protocol mode. This flaw allows an attacker to
successfully cause a Denial of Service (DoS) attack against the DNP3 protocol
through a modification attack. The second flaw was found in the DNP3 Aggressive
protocol mode. This flaw allows an attacker to launch a successful replay attack
on an outstation and execute commands without possessing any pre-shared keys.
Two sets of solutions are proposed in this thesis to remove the flaws in the
DNP3-SA protocol and prevent such attacks. Our first set of solutions propose
2 di↵erent approaches for the DNP3 Non-aggressive mode: (1) the use of a
digital signature to secure all messages within the protocol, or (2) generalising
the DNP3-SA protocol such that DNP3-SA can secure all messages rather than
securing specific NACR messages. Our second solution also provides 2 di↵erent
approaches for the DNP3 Aggressive mode that solve the second flaw identified:
(1) the computation of a MAC tag on the challenge message, or (2) restricting the
use of the challenge sequence number in the DNP3-SA mechanism to aggressive
mode only. We model, validate and verify the proposed solutions using the CPN
model.
Furthermore, the models are refined and provide a lightweight scheme (DNP3-
SAB) to secure broadcast communication. The DNP3 specification does not
define any security mechanism to secure communication over broadcast. Our
lightweight scheme (DNP3-SAB) uses the existing cryptographic primitives of
the DNP3-SA protocol and the concept of hash-chains from the TESLA protocol.
The hash-chain concept is used in the DNP3-SA mechanism to ensure that DNP3
messages communicate over broadcast mode are adequately secure from common
Internet attack vectors. Moreover, the proposed DNP3-SAB scheme is well
integrated into the DNP3-SA protocol, such that existing DNP3 devices will not
require major updates to operate it. Through using CPN, the proposed scheme
is validated and verified against the most common Internet protocol attacks such
iv
as modification, injection and replay. A comparative analysis on the DNP3-SAB
and the existing DNP3-SA modes (NACR and AGM) shows that DNP3-SAB
reduces the communication overhead significantly at the cost of a minor increase
in processing and storage overhead. This benefit is also maintained even when
DNP3-SAB is under attack.
v
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Chapter 1
Introduction
SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) systems are a set of systems
used to control, manage and monitor various industrial processes ranging from a
small scale, such as a single factory to large scale systems such as a state-wide
electrical grid. They encompass the exchange of data between a centralised
computer system, often called the master station, and a number of remote devices
called outstations. SCADA systems are predominant among various utility
industries and critical infrastructures such as water supply, power grids, sewage
management, telecommunications and oil and gas refineries to monitor and ensure
their continued e cient operations.
Traditionally, SCADA systems used to be virtually standalone systems that
relied on proprietary protocols, software, hardware and communication technology
such as serial line interfaces [Nor,McC03, CWY08]. The use of these vendor-
controlled proprietary protocols, software and hardware made SCADA systems
expensive to manage and prevented them from connecting to the outside world
or the Internet. This limitation further prevented the systems from distributing
data, or sharing operational and managerial information among peers.
The proliferation of ICT (Information and Communication Technologies) in
industries has profoundly influenced traditional SCADA to produce the SCADA
systems we have today. Modern SCADA systems have widely adopted today’s
open network specifications for communications as an add-on to vendor-controlled
and proprietary standards in industrial control systems (ICS). This adoption has
revolutionised the behaviour of traditional SCADA systems by strongly changing
1
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the manner in which today’s SCADA processes communicate data in critical
industries. Open standards have ‘upgraded’ traditional SCADA systems to a level
where many, if not all, of these previous limitations have been dealt with. Today,
some of the abilities SCADA presents include: sharing workload and prioritising
various tasks through LANs (Local Area Networks), communicating through
WANs (Wide Area Networks) by using TCP/IP protocols to geographically
control dispersed SCADA assets, using “o↵-the-shelf” software and commercial
operating systems, and sharing operational and managerial information among
peers through corporate networks. These advantages have made distance and
system survivability issues manageable through complex and sophisticated SCADA
networks.
As the survivability of today’s infrastructures rely on SCADA, a disruption,
either minor or major, deliberately or mistakenly caused to these infrastructures
can lead to damaging highly sophisticated devices, inflicting substantial economic
losses and posing life-threatening situations. Therefore, the security of SCADA
systems needs to be strengthened. Unfortunately, disrupting functionality in
critical infrastructures has now become the target area for many malicious
attackers. Reports [ICS15, Del15] and research [MR12, RKU09, ILW06] have
shown that despite the advantages of modern SCADA, today’s SCADA systems
have a number of security issues that cut across physical, network, hardware
and software domains [BF06]. As a result, many SCADA systems have proven
to be insecure to recent cyber attacks. The Stuxnet attack [Lan11] in 2010 is
an example of some of the attacks on critical infrastructures. In 2013, intruders
managed to shut down a key tunnel road (Carmel Tunnels, in Haifa, Israel) for
eight hours causing massive congestion [Pet13]. These incidents and attacks are
expected to increase in number and severity because SCADA systems are not
designed to work in insecure environments such as the Internet. A recent report
from Dell [Del15] has shown that attempts from cyber attackers against SCADA
systems have increased from 91,676 in January 2012 to 163,228 in January 2013,
and 675,186 in January 2014.
As disrupting functionality in critical infrastructures is a very important issue
to consider, a number of security controls, policies and guidelines have been
proposed, developed and deployed to secure SCADA systems [SEL06,A+06,TS08,
Wil08,SFS08]. One such security control is DNP3-Secure Authentication [Gil08]
(DNP3-SA), which is integrated in the Distributed Network Protocol Version
33 (DNP3) protocol [IEE12]. DNP3 is one of the standard SCADA protocols
used to facilitate communications in power grid automations. It is designed to
facilitate both unicast and broadcast modes of communication between master
stations and substations in an interconnected network. Though the protocol
is de-facto for power grids, DNP3 has also gained recognition in other utility
industries such as water, sewage, and oil and gas [Aub10,Wes08]. DNP3’s Secure
Authentication aims to secure messages transmitted between interconnect stations.
The mechanism operates in two di↵erent modes namely Non-aggressive and
Aggressive mode through a Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC).
DNP3 is one of the first standardised SCADA protocol that attempts to provide
an embedded security mechanism in its operations.
A key issue in developing and integrating security protocols in an existing
protocol is the security verification of its behavioural correctness [BLML01,
YTEM06]. For industrial communication protocols such as the DNP3 protocol
in particular, when integrating another functionality such as DNP3-SA, it is
extremely important to consider its correctness in critical infrastructures because
functionality, performance and behavioural correctness are crucial. This is to
ensure that embedded security mechanisms fit well and do not contain errors that
may weaken the security protection provided. Formal methods [MH03,WLBF09],
which encompass techniques that employ rigorous mathematical semantics and
computer-aided tools to reason and verify the correctness of a system, can be
applied in various phases of the design and verification of a security protocol. Thus,
formal methods are necessary for constructing unambiguous and precise models,
which can be used to analyse and verify the correctness of protocols [Tre99,Hal07].
Their application will lead to a more reliable and trustworthy security protocol
for SCADA networks, if not for the DNP3 protocol alone. This has been proven
in many related work [Low96,Low96,AADK05,SL07,HS08,SOF12] through the
use of Dolev-Yao attack model [DY83], which is one of the basic concepts in
formal methods to provide secure and reliable protocols. Moreover, this approach
e↵ectively assists in reducing the e↵orts usually required by designers to manually
investigate possible conditions of protocols that may lead to unexpected events.
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1.1 Problem Statement
The current state of the DNP3 protocol and its security mechanism, DNP3-SA,
are informally described in the DNP3 specification IEEE Standard for Electric
Power Systems Communications. Informal approaches have been known to be
very useful in designing systems, however, their narrative descriptions of system
specifications have made some part of many systems ambiguous, di cult to
comprehend and imprecise [Sun79,MM95,OKB02]. In Chapter 2, the literature
review on DNP3 and DNP3-SA shows us that there are no formal studies or
analysis on the DNP3-SA protocol. Given details of DNP3 as a protocol that
communicate through serial interfaces and TCP/IP protocols, and as a result can
support di↵erent forms of systems architectures (small and large scale systems),
the behavioural correctness of the DNP3-SA protocol may not be fully guaranteed
through informal or narrative descriptions [Sun79,Hal90,AB09a]. This is because
through informal approaches the protocol specification is likely to contain errors,
which may render the DNP3 protocol and its security mechanism (DNP3-SA)
vulnerable to a number of common attack vectors. Attacks on the protocol can
lead to devastating issues such as damaging sophisticated equipment and inflicting
substantial economic loses. The cost of such consequences can be extremely high
and have bad e↵ects on society, if care is not taken. Hence, the problem statement
of this thesis is: How can we formally verify that SCADA protocols are not
susceptible to known attacks and how can we formally verify that the DNP3-SA
security mechanism provides security properties such as Integrity, Availability
and Authentication on small and large scale SCADA systems using the DNP3
protocol?
1.2 Research Aims and Scope
The primary aim of this thesis is to perform a formal security analysis of the
DNP3-SA protocol. One of the techniques in ensuring the correctness of DNP3-SA
design and behaviour is to use a formalism from theoretical computer science, to
create formal models of the DNP3 protocol with its security mechanism, DNP3-
SA, at di↵erent levels of abstraction. Formal models of DNP3 and DNP3-SA,
which are based on the DNP3 specification and the behaviour of real devices, are
required because there are no existing models, or known simulations that are
available for DNP3-SA. Moreover, as building testbed systems for security testing
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can be costly and the production line of systems cannot also be used, manual
analysis cannot guarantee the behavioural correctness of the protocol. With
manual analysis, the protocol may be left open to a number of vulnerabilities that
can be exploited and cause severe damage to the systems. This creates the need
to construct formal models such that we can evaluate the protocol to determine
whether it provide security goals such data integrity, availability of service and
authentication. In performing the analysis, two processes are required: Validation
and Verification. The validation process requires determination of whether the
constructed models accurately reflect the normal behaviour of the protocol. In
other words, the abstracted model must do exactly what the protocol is designed
to do. For example, if a system is designed to protect information related to users
by encrypting their data such that confidentiality is provided, it is expected that
the abstracted model of such a system accurately reflect this behaviour. The
verification process is concerned with using the model to prove the correctness of
the protocol. This can be achieved through the use of attack models within the
abstracted model to provide a complete analysis of the correctness of the protocol.
In this thesis, Coloured Petri Nets (CPNs) [JKW07] are used for this security
analysis task. This is because CPNs can conveniently express properties such as
concurrency, distribution, asynchronous, non-determinism and di↵erent levels of
abstractions that are inherent in many protocols. Moreover, the e↵ectiveness of
CPNs is supported by a state space tool [JCK06], which is a tool used to perform
model analysis. Below, this thesis presents three main objectives that can be
reached in order to achieve the primary aim of this thesis.
1. To provide formal specification models to perform security analysis of DNP3
and its security mechanism. As the DNP3-SA protocol operates in two
di↵erent modes, there is the need to create models for each mode and verify
their behavioural correctness.
2. To provide a complete analysis of security properties such as Integrity, Avail-
ability and Authentication provided by the DNP3-SA protocol. Specifically,
this thesis aims to use each of the models to check whether the protocol ful-
fils its requirement by providing security goals such as Integrity, Availability
and Authentication.
3. To provide a security scheme that can extend DNP3’s security mechanism
to secure large scale SCADA systems. This thesis aims to use concepts
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from other security domains that can benefit SCADA protocols, particularly
protocol such as DNP3 protocol, which supports di↵erent system or network
architectures.
1.3 Research Contributions
Based on our research aims, scope, motivations and objectives presented above
in this chapter, the contributions of this thesis are presented below:
• Contribution 1: The first contribution has been to obtain a formal model
specification that represents the security behaviour of the Non-aggressive
protocol mode (NACR). This model, which is presented in Chapter 3 is
used to perform a formal security analysis of the mechanism to determine
whether the protocol mode provides data integrity and availability of service
on the DNP3 protocol. Aside from using the model for security analysis, the
model has also served as a framework where other features of the DNP3-SA
protocol have been added later to analyse other security goals.
• Contribution 2: The second contribution has provided a single model
that covers the two communication modes of the DNP3-SA: NACR and
AGM in Chapter 4. This model is provided because the AGM protocol
mode depends on the NACR for its operation. AGM cannot operate with
the NACR protocol mode. As a result, this model has captured the two
behaviours of the DNP3-SA protocol needed to check the authentication
property of the protocol to ensure that the protocol behaves as expected.
• Contribution 3: As the DNP3 protocol supports a broadcast mode of com-
munication in relatively small-scale SCADA system up to a full-grown large
scale system, there is also the need to ensure that the security mechanism
of DNP3 can protect other forms of system architectures. Unfortunately,
DNP3’s specification did not define any security measures for large scale
system communications. Hence, our third contribution, which is presented
in Chapter 5 has provided a security scheme that makes use of the existing
cryptographic primitives of DNP3-SA to secure broadcast communication.
This thesis ensured that the new scheme is lightweight, so that it can easily
be integrated into the existing security mechanism (DNP3-SA) of the DNP3
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protocol, such that existing DNP3 devices will not require major updates
to operate it.
1.4 Structure of the Thesis
To achieve the above research objectives, the general structure of this thesis is
presented as follows. Chapter 2 presents the literature review of this thesis. The
contributions of this thesis are presented in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. The conclusion
of this thesis is presented in Chapter 6.
Below, this section presents an overview of each chapter presented in this
thesis (starting from Chapter 2).
• Chapter 2 (Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition) provides the re-
search background of this thesis. This mainly gives out a generic view of
SCADA systems, its evolution, and protocols used in SCADA networks. The
DNP3 protocol and its security mechanism, DNP3-SA, are also presented in
detail. SCADA systems and their associated security issues such as vulnera-
bilities, threats and attacks are presented. Formal methods approaches and
their application to model, analyse and verify various security protocols are
also presented. The CPN formalism and why CPN and its corresponding
state space and Computational Tree Logic have been chosen in this thesis
are presented and discussed.
Finally, this chapter concludes with the research gaps identified from the
literature review.
• Chapter 3 (Formal Analysis of the DNP3-SA Non-Aggressive Mode)
presents our first contribution of this thesis. In this chapter, a CPN-based
approach is used to create a formal representation of one of two operational
modes of the DNP3-SA protocol called the the DNP3-SA Non-aggressive
mode. Through this model, this chapter shows the entire process involved
in translating a message sequence chart from a protocol specification to an
executable and show how some security primitives are model. This chapter
also explains how the state space analysis tool was applied to perform secu-
rity analysis, particularly analysis on security properties such as integrity
and availability of services in the constructed model.
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• Chapter 4 (Formal Analysis of the DNP3-SA Aggressive Mode) presents
the second contribution of this thesis. This chapter is concerned with the
second operational mode of the DNP3-SA protocol called the Aggressive.
A single parameterised CPN model is created to reflect the behaviour
of non-aggressive mode presented in Chapter 3 and the aggressive mode.
This is to perform a full security analysis on the authentication property
of the DNP3-SA protocol. This chapter ends up providing two security
solutions that can be used to strengthen the authentication mechanism of
the DNP3-SA protocol.
• Chapter 5 (Securing DNP3 Broadcast Communications in SCADA Sys-
tems) presents the third contribution of this thesis. In this chapter, this
thesis provides a lightweight security scheme that makes use of existing secu-
rity primitives of the DNP3-SA protocol to secure broadcast communication
in relatively small to large scale SCADA systems.
• Chapter 6 (Conclusion and Future Work) presents the conclusions by
presenting a summary of the contributions of this thesis and several other
directions suggesting areas for future work.
• Chapter 7 (Appendix) presents relevant documentations of the CPN decla-
rations for the DNP3, DNP3-SA and DNP3-SAB CPN model to interested
readers.
Chapter 2
Research Background
2.1 Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
The introduction of ICT (Information and Communication Technologies) in ICS
(Industrial Control Systems) have come to solve many limitations previously faced
by critical industries. Nowadays, it is possible to interconnect various industrial
nodes and computers, and create complex distributed networks such as SCADA
systems (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition). A SCADA system is a subset
of ICS, which consists a set of computer systems with software that interacts
with industrial equipment to enable an operator maintain and control dispersed
assets of either a part or an entire industrial operation [SFS08,DS99]. SCADA
systems are used in diverse industries ranging from discrete manufacturing sectors
such as automotive and aerospace to critical infrastructures such as power grids,
water supply, transportation, telecommunications, and oil and gas refineries. As
the name suggests, a SCADA system provides a supervisory level of control.
This implies that SCADA systems encompass the exchange of data between a
centralised computer system, often called the master station and a number of
remote devices called outstations, which may be interfacing with other field devices
such as actuators and switchboxes for data. For example, a number of IEDs
(Intelligent Electronic Devices) or PLCs (Programmable Logic Controllers) may
be controlling and monitoring a sewage leak or detecting the current flow and line
voltage defects that may have occurred from a base station. Information related
to the defect is transferred from the IEDs/PLC to a centralised system, where an
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Figure 2.1: A typical SCADA system architecture.
alert tag is further displayed on terminal screens to indicate that the situation that
has occurred is critical. A SCADA system can range from a relatively small-scale
system such as a single factory or an o ce block to a full-grown large scale system
such as an electrical grid. Figure 2.1 depicts a simple architectural structure of a
local SCADA system. A typical SCADA system comprises of the following:
• Master stations/Master Terminal Units: One or more centralised comput-
erised systems that interact with other devices by sending and receiving
messages either in the form of requests or responses.
• Outstations/Substations: One or more remote devices such as RTUs, IEDs,
PLCs, which may interface with other field devices such as switchboxes,
valve actuators and sensors. Outstations usually take requests from master
stations and get them processed. But they can also report data to master
stations concerning events that may have occurred in the field. This is
referred to as a report-by-exception or unsolicited response.
• Communication Network: One or more communication mediums such as
radio, cable, wireless, telephone or satellite that may be used to transfer
or exchange data to and from di↵erent sites between master stations and
outstations.
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• Human Machine Interface (HMI): A standard application that provides an
operator the interaction ability to communicate with master stations and
outstations. An HMI allows operators from the control station to visualise,
control and analyse a real-time operation of field devices.
• Communication Protocols: This provides various set of rules that enable
devices to connect and transmit data to one another in the form of re-
quests and responses. An example is the standard OPC (Open Platform
Communications) protocol which is often used for HMIs.
2.1.1 The evolution of modern SCADA systems
Literature shows that the 1960’s “SCADA systems” have certainly been revolu-
tionised to what we see today. Modern SCADA systems have evolved through
three generations of architectures. In each of these generations the architectural
changes in SCADA systems were embraced [McC03,DS99,Nor]. Thus, SCADA
systems were once known or referred to as “mainframe” during the first generation.
During this “mainframe” era, SCADA systems were virtually standalone systems
with no access to the outside world or the Internet. This implies that the flexibility
of real-time communication and controlling dispersed assets were not feasible.
Even if a connection was required for external purposes, the connection was
done through a low-speed serial connection such as the RS-232, and proprietary
protocols. Henceforth, network security was not an issue as the systems were not
internetworked.
It then came to a time where SCADA systems were considered as distributed
systems due to the fact that they began taking advantage of various developments
and improvements in system miniaturization [McC03]. This enabled SCADA
systems to engage in LAN (Local Area Networking) technology to share their
workload across multiple systems. The sharing of workload among various work-
stations with designated operations such as communication processors, databases
servers and HMIs enabled interaction between the devices to be in real-time. For
example, the failure of a HMI may not necessarily a↵ect the monitoring of remote
devices because another HMI could be substituted for such operation.
Today’s SCADA has widely adopted the open network specifications for
communications as an add-on to vendor-controlled and proprietary standards.
This has facilitated many serial communication systems and distributed systems
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to make use of WANs (Wide Area Networks such as the TCP/IP protocols) to
improve the connectivity of dispersed external systems. This has made SCADA
more scalable rather than being limited to LAN connection. Reaching dispersed
systems has made many vendors to compete among themselves by adding some
specific functionalities to SCADA equipment; making many devices ‘smarter’ and
e cient. For instance, many of today’s RTUs are capable of connecting to Ethernet
networks and communicating with master stations via serial communication
or Ethernet. The result of some of these technologies (equipment supporting
Ethernet) have enabled modern SCADA systems to become one of the core
foundations in the utility industries, particularly the energy industry sectors.
Open network specifications have also allowed current SCADA systems to interface
with many traditional third-party peripherals, “o↵-the-shelf” software products
and commercial operating systems; eradicating previous limitations that could not
the storage of large data, and the use of mobile phone to control systems [OK06].
2.1.2 SCADA Communication Protocols
The adoption of open network standards in industries have enabled various system
connectivity and a variety of functionalities in today’s SCADA systems. For
example, nowadays through the SCADA LAN and WAN, interconnected SCADA
devices are able to seamlessly interact with systems or corporate networks to
share operational data, reduce costs, remotely control and monitor field devices
that are geographically dispersed. Most of these functionalities, which were
previously unavailable, are now possible through the use of sophisticated devices
that support various open/standard SCADA communication protocols.
According to AGA-12 [A+06] (American Gas Association) standard, many
of today’s SCADA protocols were once proprietary. These proprietary proto-
cols facilitated communication between HMI and master stations, and between
master stations and outstations in the form of requests and responses through
serial interfaces. However, with acceptance of open standards many of these
protocols have evolved to become non-proprietary (standard protocols, refer to
Figure 2.2). Standard protocols are the most popular protocols used globally
among many industries. They include the International Electrotechnical Com-
mission (IEC) protocols such 60850, 60870 series and others, Open Platform
Communications (OPC) [San97], Modicon Bus (Modbus) [Mod04], Distributed
Network Protocol version 3 (DNP3) [IEE12], and Process Field Bus (PROFIbus
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Figure 2.2: A glimpse of SCADA protocols used in the industries.
and PROFInet) [Spe97]. These protocols are engineering protocols, and as a
result, they di↵er greatly from the general-purpose protocols such as File Transfer
Protocol (FTP) and Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) that are available for
public use [KR09]. SCADA protocols are designed by industrial vendors to take
advantage of the WAN connections as an add-on to existing serial interfaces and
interact with field devices within the SCADA network. Their deployment depends
on the nature or the purpose of the infrastructure in place. For example, many
electrical industries will prefer to use the DNP3 protocol over other protocols
because DNP3 is defacto for power grid system automation. This situation is
also similar to a manufacturing or processing industry, where the Modbus or
PROFInet protocol may be preferred over others. This thesis concentrates mainly
on the DNP3 protocol. This is because DNP3 is one of the first standardised
SCADA protocol to provide an embedded cryptographic security mechanism as
part of its operation (refer to Secure Authentication under the DNP3 protocol in
Figure 2.2).
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2.2 Distributed Network Protocol Version 3
DNP3 [IEE12] is a layered and non-proprietary SCADA protocol that is main-
tained by DNP3 Users group, though, originally developed by Westronic Incor-
porated between the years 1992 and 1994. DNP3 has been designed to mainly
facilitate controls, data requests, polling and report-by-exception (unsolicited
response) communication between master stations and outstations via the serial-
line or TCP/IP protocols through encapsulation. Figure 2.3 depicts a simple
sequence diagram of how the DNP3 operates normally. In Figure 2.3 the master
station sends request either to control the outstation or to request for data. Data
requested can either be binary, analog, counter or control etc..
Figure 2.3: A sequence diagram of the DNP3 protocol under normal operation.
The layers of DNP3 protocol is based on the Enhanced Performance Archi-
tecture (EPA) of the IEC 60870-5. However, the DNP3 protocol introduces
a ‘transparent’ layer called the “pseudo-transport function” as an additional
layer to the existing EPA structure. As a result, the DNP3 protocol consists
of the application layer, pseudo-transport, data link layer and physical layer.
In Figure 2.4, this chapter depicts the layers of the DNP3 protocol over serial
interface and the TCP/IP or UDP/IP protocols. Thus, in Figure 2.4, the DNP3
application layer is the topmost layer of the protocol. It is in this layer that
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the DNP3 user software resides to provide a variety of functionalities. Some of
these functionalities include creating requests and responses in di↵erent formats,
specifying the uniqueness of a device (i.e. either being a master station or an
outstation) through an internal software identifiers, providing internal database
for storage and providing a cryptographic security mechanism for secure com-
munication. The “pseudo-transport function” layer directly interfaces with both
the application and data link layer to primarily divide bulk data into pieces for
flexible transmission. The data link layer of DNP3 protocol is mostly used for
retrieving data such as polling for classes and object variations. But, it is also in
this link layer that functionalities such as source and destination addresses, frame
sync, flow control, link status, error detection and correction controls through its
16 bit CRC (Cyclic Redundancy Code) octets that are added to every 16 octets
of a payload are defined. From the application, pseudo-transport and data link
layer, a DNP3 data can either be transmitted through the serial interface or the
TCP/UDP IP protocols. Through serial interface, data from the DNP3 layers
are converted into bit of streams, where the stream is transmitted over physical
media such as the RS-232C, ITU-T cables. But over the TCP/IP or UPD/IP
interfaces, data from the application, pseudo-transport and data link layer are
encapsulated by adding a header to the packet.
Figure 2.4: DNP3 layers over serial and TCP/IP or UDP/IP protocols.
Taking other SCADA protocols into account, the DNP3 protocol is defacto for
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power grids. However, due to multi-vendor interoperability, ability to operate on
the TCP/IP protocol and high level of data integrity [IEE12], DNP3 has gained
wider market in the utility industry. As a result, utility industries such as water
and waste water management, upstream oil and gas operations and transportation
industries have embraced the protocol [Aub10,Wes08]. Because of some of these
distinct features (unsolicited response, message segmentation, support of events
data type) DNP3 supports di↵erent forms of system architectures. This has
enable the protocol to scale well among relatively small to large systems when
controlling and monitoring many dispersed SCADA systems than others.
2.2.1 DNP3 Network Architecture
Figure 2.5, 2.6 and 2.7 depict the system architectures of the DNP3 protocol.
The architectures consist of the following:
• Unicast Architecture: This architecture only supports one-master station
communicating to one-outstation. Figure 2.5 depicts the architecture.
Figure 2.5: The one-to-one architecture.
• Multi-drop Architecture: This architecture allows a master station to
communicate with multiple outstation devices or vice versa (sometimes
known as the Multi-master communication). Figure 2.6 depicts the Multi-
drop architecture. This architecture supports both unicast and broadcast
communication. In unicast communication, a master station can send a
request to exactly one outstation. But to reach multiple outstations, the
master needs to send multiple requests with each request addressed to a
specific outstation. This is the same situation for the Multi-master scenario.
On the other hand, using broadcast communication, the master station can
simultaneously send a request to all outstations to reduce delay and overhead
in large scale systems. In the DNP3 specification, broadcast communication
is supported by 3 di↵erent command types, where each command type
is represented with the address: ‘0xFFFD’, ‘0xFFFE’ and ‘0xFFFF’. Among
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these commands, the 0xFFFD command requires an ‘application confirm’
response from an outstation. The 0xFFFE command does not require any
response and the 0xFFFF command may require a response depending on
the condition set on the command.
Figure 2.6: The multi-drop architecture.
• Hierarchical/Data Concentrator Architecture: This architecture is a mixture
of both the unicast and multi-drop architectures. Figure 2.7 depicts the
hierarchical architecture.Thus, a centralised master station could be inter-
acting with a number of outstations, but at the same time, it is connected to
a sub-master station that is also interacting with other outstations for data.
This sort of architecture is usually suitable for non-DNP3 supported devices
that prefer to communicate through protocols converters. For example,
a non-DNP3 master station that is communicating with outstations that
support DNP3 protocol.
Figure 2.7: The hierarchical architectures.
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2.2.2 DNP3’s Application Layer Message Structure
This section provides details of the DNP3 application layer message structure.
The purpose of this section is to promote the understanding of the security
mechanism used in the DNP3 protocol, which is discussed in Section 2.5.
As presented in Figure 2.4, the DNP3 application layer is the topmost layer
of the protocol. A payload in this layer can result in either a single or multiple
fragments. Each fragment begins with an application header. The header contains
a set of instruction that governs the payload. Thus, depending on whether the
fragment is a request or response, the header may consist of an application control
data, a function code and an internal indicator and sometimes one or more
object headers. A typical application request header contains only the application
control data and the function code. A response header consists of the application
control data, the function code and an internal indicator. There is an additional
field, object header, that comes into play when the application header data alone
is insu cient to convey the complete message. Figure 2.8 depicts the complete
structure of a DNP3 message.
Figure 2.8: The application header structure of a DNP3 fragment.
• Application control data/Information (AC): This is an octet worth of data
that is used to build and reassemble multiple fragments. It is additionally
used to detect duplicate fragments and to indicate whether an acknowledge-
ment/confirmation message is required.
• Function code (FC): This is used to define the purpose of the fragment
sent. For example, a master station requests to read or write data on an
outstation. A function code can be considered as a critical or non-critical
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message. A critical message contains a mandatory code. A mandatory code
is any code that can potentially control a given station, by performing
set-point adjustments or setting parameters on a station. A non-critical
message is considered as ‘optional’, implying that it can not control or set
parameters.
• Internal indicator (IIN): This is a 2-octets data that only appears in response
messages. It is used solely within outstations to determine their functionality
status. For example, whether an outstation is up and running or it is in a
recovery mode.
• Object header (OH): This is a supplementary information, which is usually
found in responses. It is associated with the DNP3 objects from outstations.
DNP3 objects are index points within the protocol database software that
stores data such as binary input/output, analog data, and counters. For
example, a master station may request an event data from an outstation,
and expect the outstation to report the event in a certain format, specified
by the object header. However, the object header is sometimes used in
request to accompany a function code to create a complete message. In
requests, the object header to specify what format, type or group of data
an outstation must process and return as response.
2.3 Security issues on SCADA systems
Today, distance and system survivability issues are easily managed through
complex SCADA networks that have been created to control and monitor dispersed
assets’ operations. Despite these advantages serious security concerns have been
raised over the past decade. Thus, the security of legacy SCADA systems in
today’s society goes beyond the physical realm security, where fences, gates
and reinforced barricades measures were once used. Now, SCADA security cuts
across physical, software, hardware and network security [BF06]. This is because
SCADA systems have evolved from standalone with virtually no connectivity and
proprietary protocols to open network specifications, where o↵-the-shelf software
products and commercial operating systems as well as corporate network and
the Internet are used on a daily basis. This has extended the access of SCADA
systems beyond the physical perimeter; creating multiple access points on SCADA
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systems. This therefore implies that physical security can never guarantee network
or software security. As a result, many of today’s SCADA systems have proven
insecure to recent network attacks; paving numerous ways for critical industries
to be threatened and attacked [NWD+12,MR12,Wil13]. Although, the notion of
securing systems within the SCADA network has been highlighted, many network
engineers fail to address the burden of accounting for security risks. Moreover,
many industries feel reluctant to deploy appropriate security measures to protect
their systems because of the cost involved.
Disrupting services in critical infrastructures is a very important issue to
consider. This is because a disruption, either minor or major, deliberately or mis-
takenly caused to these infrastructures can lead to damaging highly sophisticated
devices, degrade system performances and inflicting substantial economic losses.
In addition, it could pose as life-threatening situations to the society. Unfortu-
nately, this situation has now become the target area for many malicious attackers.
That is, as long as SCADA systems continue to interconnect with corporate net-
works, the risk and consequences of threats and attacks also increase [ILW06].
A typical example is the popular ‘Stuxnet’ worm, which was discovered in 2010.
This worm targeted PLCs within the industrial control systems [Lan11]. There
is no ‘silver bullet’ to counter attacks on critical infrastructures than ensuring
that appropriate security measures are put in place. There is usually the false
impression that as the SCADA systems are separate from the corporate network,
the systems are safe and secure. However, literature [NWD+12] shows that an
increase in system connectivity implies that hackers’ activities are not the only
threats to watch out. Threats and successful attacks to SCADA systems can
originate from either the Internet through corporate network to the SCADA
network, or from within a corporate network. An example is the Maroochy
shire sewage spill in 2000 [SM], where a disgruntled employee from the Hunter
Watertech company caused pumps and alarms of the Maroochy shire sewage to
fail when needed, causing over 800,000 litres of raw sewage to spill out into local
parks, rivers and the grounds of a Hyatt Regency hotel in Queensland, Australia.
Other threats could also originate from within the SCADA network from either
the upstream (o↵-the-shelf applications, operating systems and open protocols),
or downstream paths (PLCs and IEDs and RTUs). A typical example of this
situation is also the Slammer worm in January 2003 [Pou03]. The worm infiltrated
Ohios Davis-Besse nuclear power plant and several other power utilities through
2.3. Security issues on SCADA systems 21
the corporate network, and managed to crash their power plants computerized
display panel as well as the monitoring system.
There have been several cases of attacks and incidents on SCADA systems that
have occurred over the past decade [Tsa10,Kes11,MR12]. Despite these incidents
and attacks, literature still shows that SCADA systems are still vulnerable [Cow15,
IC15,Del15]. This is because today’s SCADA systems are making use of “o↵-
the-shelf” products and commercial operating systems as well as the use of
open communication protocols. Many of these software products could have
bugs, which eventually render the systems vulnerable. For example, in 2008, the
Washington Post reported on a security incident where an entire nuclear power
plant station was shut-down as a result of a software update on the plant business
network [Kre08]. As SCADA systems were not designed with the security mindset,
it implies that most of the its communication protocols that have embraced the
open network specifications may become vulnerable to the traditional ICT network
security threats. For instance, it is believed that there are many industries that
are accessing their SCADA assets with ‘plaintext’ password that can easily be
intercepted by malware. In 2005, a survey report from Newtons-Evans [Eva05]
shows that a large number of their survey participants indicated that messages
or protocols used for communicating within their SCADA networks were not
secure. This makes the system vulnerable to a variety of threats and attacks.
Bradburry [Bra12] warns vendors of the vulnerabilities associated with SCADA
protocols. Moreover, Kyle Wilhoit [Wil13] shows that most ICS intruders try
to exploit vulnerabilities of SCADA protocols (i.e. according to the analysis of
an online honeypot that mimicked the behaviour of an ICS system). Andrew
West [Wes08] also pinpoints the fact that little attention has been given to
communication protocols used in the SCADA control centres.
As these protocols were not designed with the security mindset, many of
them are susceptible to many forms of attacks. Just to mention a few, Byres et
al. [BFM04] in 2004 presented the use of attack trees in assessing vulnerabilities
in SCADA systems. In their paper [BFM04], the authors applied attack trees to
the Modbus protocol. Modbus is a SCADA protocol used for industrial process
control automation [Mod04]. The authors identified 11 possible attacker goals
and security vulnerabilities that exploit the Modbus specifications, as well as the
deployments of the protocol in industries. Later in 2008, Huitsing et al. [HCPS08]
presented an attack taxonomy on the Modbus protocol that covered both Modbus
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serial and TCP. The authors identified 20 vulnerabilities on Modbus serial and
28 vulnerabilities on Modbus TCP, summing up to a total of 48 vulnerabilities
that could also be used to target or exploit a Modbus’ assets in 59 ways for the
Modbus serial and 113 ways for Modbus TCP, according to the authors. These
identified vulnerabilities (48) could intercept, interrupt, modify and even fabricate
messages sent across between stations. Similarly, in the subsequent year (2009),
East et al. [EBPS09] presented a taxonomy of attacks on the DNP3 protocol. The
authors (East et al.) concentrated more on attacks that exploited the layers of the
DNP3 protocol: the application layer, pseudo-transport and data link layer. In
all, they identified 28 vulnerabilities on the DNP3 protocol that can be exploited
to control a SCADA system. Moreover, in the same year (2009), Akerberg and
Bjorkman [AB09a] explored security vulnerabilities in the Profinet protocol. In
2011, Cheminod et al. [CPS11] presented a formal vulnerability analysis of the
fieldbus access protocol, where they presented weaknesses of the protocol that
might be susceptible to potential replay attacks.
2.4 Securing the SCADA Systems
Security solutions to address many of these vulnerabilities, incidents and attacks in
SCADA systems has accounted for the creation of various standard bodies. That
is, as securing SCADA systems in critical infrastructures have become a major
concern among many vendors, private and government sectors around the world,
standard organisations and industry partners such as NERC (North American
Electric Reliability Corporation) [NER], NIST (National Institute of Standards
and Technology), AGA (American Gas Association) [A+06], IEC (International
Electrotechnical Commission) [IEC07,Cle06], CIGRE (International Council on
Large Electric Systems), ISA (Instrumentation, Systems, and Automation Society)
and many others have been established. These bodies have published a variety
documents that range from recommendations to guidelines and regulations, cutting
across cyber security and risk assessments in SCADA systems. In addition, some
research bodies such as the Idaho National laboratory, which is in partnership
with other centres such as Pacific Northwest National lab (PNNL), have created
a national SCADA testbed for security research purposes as well as assisting in
developing industry policies and standards on critical infrastructures.
Moreover, literature shows that there has been a considerable amount of
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on-going researches that have carried out over the past decade to secure SCADA
systems. Among these literatures include security solutions that range from
‘bump-in-wire’ technologies to proposed and embedded solutions in protocols.
Some of the “bump-in-the wire” technologies include devices such as the SEL
3021 series [SEL06] (Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories), YASIR [TS08] (Yet
Another Security Retrofit), AGA-12 [A+06] and PNNL’s SSCP [Had10] (Se-
cure SCADA Communications Protocol). Some of the proposed and embedded
solutions include cryptographic solutions for the Modbus [LCLC08,FCMT09],
Profinet [A˚B09b] and OPC protocols [VTYY07]. However, none of these proposed
solutions are part of their standards, or have been deployed or tested on real
systems. One of the embedded solutions that have been standardised is the Secure
Authentication mechanism in the DNP3 protocol. This thesis focuses on DNP3’s
Secure authentication because DNP3 is one of the first standardised SCADA
protocol that attempts to integrate a cryptographic security mechanism as an
add-on to its existing operation. Therefore in the subsequent section, this chapter
will concentrate on Secure authentication.
2.5 DNP3 Secure Authentication
As previously stated Section 2.2, the DNP3 protocol is SCADA communication
protocol used, mainly in power grid automation. DNP3 provides a security
mechanism called Secure Authentication (DNP3-SA) in its application layer (refer
to Figure 2.2 in Section 2.1.2 and Figure 2.9 of this Section). The mechanism is
adapted from part 5 of the IEC 62351 [IEC09] standards, a standard that defines
various security controls for IEC SCADA protocols.
DNP3-SA is primarily an HMAC-based authentication mechanism that is
used to ensure that messages transmitted between interconnect stations are
securely protected from rogue applications. By HMAC-based, it implies that the
mechanism uses a cryptographic hash function, H, and a secret key,K, to calculate
a message authentication code (MAC) tag of a given message, m [BM03]. This
implies that without the cryptographic key, K, it is computationally hard to create
a valid MAC tag when given the message, m. This makes the DNP3-SA protocol
to provide security properties such as the availability of service, data origin
authentication and data integrity. HMAC algorithms used by DNP3-SA includes
the SHA-HMAC (Secure Hash Algorithm) and the AES-GMAC (Advanced
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Encryption Standard-Galois Message Authentication Code). In addition, DNP3-
SA employs an encryption scheme for updating session keys (this is outlined and
explained in Figure 2.11). This encryption scheme is out of scope in the analysis
of this thesis. This is because this thesis assumes that the keys are securely
pre-established for communication.
Figure 2.9: DNP3-SA in the application layer of DNP3.
The DNP3-SA protocol, though it is a unilateral mechanism, it operates
in two di↵erent modes namely: one-pass and two-pass authentication through
the HMAC. The two-pass authentication is known as the challenge-response
while the one-pass is the Aggressive mode (AGM). It is to be noted that the
AGM operation, which reduces the communication overhead, is dependent on the
challenge-response (two-pass authentication) operation and cannot be carried out
without the challenge-response. This implies that an AGM (one-pass) operation
can only be carried out if there has been at least one or more occurrences of the
challenge-response operation. This behaviour enables the AGM to make use of
a crucial component from challenge-response operation, thus, “the most recent
challenge message” (this behaviour is elaborated and illustrated in Figure 2.11).
To avoid confusion, this thesis will refer to the two-pass authentication or the
challenge-response operation as the Non-aggressive challenge response (NACR).
This is to di↵erentiate the AGM from the challenge-response.
2.5.1 The Operational Overview of DNP3-SA
Generally, the DNP3-SA protocol ensures that certain requests or responses,
particularly ‘critical requests or unsolicited responses’, invoked by either the
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master stations or outstations, are challenged and authenticated correctly for every
session before they are further processed. This behaviour is generically depicted
in Figure 2.10. Thus, Figure 2.10a of Figure 2.10 depicts the non-aggressive
model of DNP3-SA while Figure 2.10b shows behaviour of the aggressive mode.
As previously explained, a request is considered critical if the request contains
a mandatory code (refer to message sequence 3 in Figure 2.10a and 2.10b of
Figure 2.10). A mandatory code is any code that can potentially control a given
station, by performing set-point adjustments or setting certain parameters such
as power grid voltages and frequencies. This implies that any station that makes
use of mandatory codes in a given message shall be challenged by the receiving
device’s security mechanism to prove its identity.
(a) Non-aggressive mode
(b) Agressive mode
Figure 2.10: The behaviour of Non-aggressive and Aggressive protocol modes.
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Figure 2.11 depicts a message sequence chart (MSC) that presents the full
behaviour of DNP3-SA. The table is divided in 3 parts namely; KUP (the Key
Update Process), NACR and AGM. This chapter will first address the key update
process, followed by NACR and finally the AGM behaviour. But before the
details of the MSC are provided, it is important to note the following notations
used throughout this thesis. Here M and O are used to denote a master station(s)
and an outstation(s) respectively. Here UID denotes a User Identification Number
associated with the communicating entities. Here Skmo and Sk
0
mo respectively
represent an old and new session keys of a particular user, which are used to
provide entity authentication for the data transmitted in the control direction (i.e.
from master to outstations). Both session keys are derived from the long-term
secret key, UpK. By tradition, UpK is manually distributed to all the entities in
the control system. Here KS and KS
0
respectively denote challenge messages
that contain challenge data, Chalg (old challenge), and, Chalg
0
(new challenge).
Each challenge data contains a Challenge Sequence Number (CSQ), KSn, MAC
scheme or hash function, H and a Nonce, P . E and D denote symmetric key
encryption and decryption schemes, respectively agreed between all the entities. C
(ciphertext) represents encrypted Sk
0
mo. MACSkmo and MACSk0mo denote agreed
MAC schemes with keys. Here tag and tagA represent MAC tags generated
by the master station while tag
0
and tag
0
A represent MAC tags generated by
outstations. FC, OH and IIN are used respectively to denote the function code,
object header and internal indicator data that may be contained in a request, RQ,
or a response, RSP or RSPE. RSPE represents an error response. Here KSR
denotes a user key change request data that may contain one or a combination
of FC, OH. Similarly, KSC denotes a user change response that contains the
status of the user’s key update, RSP (FC), and a new challenge message, KS
0
.
Here KC represents the concatenated ciphertext, C and the MAC tag, tag.
Key update process: In Figure 2.11, Steps 1–8 presents the key update
process involved in DNP3-SA protocol. In this scenario, it is assumed that
the session key, Skmo is pre-established between M and O and it is outdated.
Therefore, M wishes to update the old session key to a new key. M sends a key
status request, KSR, to O to update the session key, Skmo, of a particular user
(step 1). O replies with challenge message, KS, which is a key status message
that contains data (H, P and KSn, from step 2). At the receipt of KS, M uses
the pre-shared secret key, UpK (long-term key), to encrypt the new session key,
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Sk
0
mo (step 3). Furthermore, M uses MACSkmo (H from KS, and the existing
(old) session key, Skmo) to compute the MAC tag, tag (step 4). Then, M sends
KC, which contains ciphertext, C, and the MAC tag, tag, to O (step 5). On
receipt of KC, O computes its MAC tag, tag
0
, by using the same computational
elements used by M (step 6). It then checks if the tags (tag
0
and tag) match. If
the tags match, then O decrypts C to obtain and store Sk
0
mo (the new session
key). O decrypts C by using the long-term secret key, UpK (step 7). O then
responds to M with KSC to indicate that the new session key (Sk
0
mo) is stored or
established (step 8). In KSC, a new challenge message, KS
0
, is included. This
new challenge (KS
0
) will be used by M in the future to re-authenticate itself to
O in case a new session key needs to be established after a certain period of time.
NACR: In Figure 2.11, Steps 9–14 presents the NACR operation. This op-
eration occurs after the session keys have been established. M sends a request,
RQ, to O (step 9). On receipt of the request, O issues Chalg accordingly (step
10). M uses MACSk0mo (i.e. H from Chalg and Skmo) to hash Chalg received,
RQ, and UID to compute tag (step 11). tag is then sent to O. On receipt of
the tag, O uses the same computational approach and elements to generate tag
0
(step 12). Then, O checks if tag
0
matches with tag. If there exists a match,
then authentication has been successful (step 13). O processes the request and
replies M with a response, RSP (step 13). Otherwise, an error, RSPE is sent
as response to M to indicate an authentication failure (step 14).
AGM: In Figure 2.11, Steps 15–18 illustrates the AGM mode operation. This
operation is also under the assumption that the session keys are pre-established.
Now, as previously stated, the AGM depends on NACR operation. Therefore, it is
assumed that M has obtained the “most recent challenge message” from the most
recent NACR operation. Taking this into account in this operation, M is always
required to increase KSn from the challenge by 1 for all AGM operations before a
legitimate AGM message can be composed (see ⇤let B = Chalg{KSn+1, H, P}).
In Figure 2.11, the AGM operation shows that before M can send an AGM
request, RQ, it first needs to compute tag on RQ about to be sent. M uses
the most recent challenge message, Chalg, and increased KSn by 1 to compute
a valid tag (refer to ⇤let B = Chalg{KSn + 1, H, P}). In computing tag, the
methodology employed in NACR is used here. That is, M uses MACSk0mo (i.e.
H from Chalg and Skmo) to hash the updated Chalg, RQ (about to sent), and
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UID to compute a valid tag (step 15). After tag has been obtained, M finally
sends the request, ARQ (which contains the request, RQ and tag), to O. On the
receipt of the AGM message, O stores the received tag from ARQ, and extract
RQ from ARQ to compute tag
0
(step 16). It is to noted that tag
0
is based on the
updated KSn on O (i.e. ⇤let B = Chalg{KSn+ 1, H, P}). After obtaining tag0 ,
O compares tag
0
to tag for a match. If there exists a match, then authentication
has been successful (step 17). O processes the request and replies M with a
response, RSP (step 17). Otherwise, an error, RSPE is sent as response to M
to indicate an authentication failure (step 18).
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Figure 2.11: A MSC depicting the generic behaviour of DNP3-SA.
2.5.2 Summary
SCADA systems and its associated security issues such as vulnerabilities, threats
and attacks have been presented. On going security solutions to protect SCADA
systems are still in its earlier stages. SCADA protocol, DNP3 has been presented
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and shown its versatility to industries. Moreover, it has been shown that the
DNP3 protocol supports unicast and broadcast mode of communication, as a
result various system architectures are supported by the protocol. Furthermore,
the DNP3-SA protocol which is used as the security mechanism in the DNP3
protocol to securely protect end-to-end communication in substations has been
informally presented and discussed thoroughly.
As DNP3 provides this cryptographic security mechanism, DNP3-SA, it is
important to note that integrating security controls such as authentication and
encryption are very important issues to consider in critical infrastructures. This is
because the systems functionalities in these infrastructures, their performances and
behavioural correctness are very crucial factors in modern indudtries. As a result,
it is necessary to ensure that embedded security mechanisms in protocols and other
systems fit well and do not contain errors that may weaken the security protection
provided. The current state of the DNP3-SA protocol is informally described in its
specifications. This implies that the mechanism has not yet been formally analysed
because no formal specification of the protocol exists. Informal approaches have
been known to be very useful in designing systems. However, they have also yielded
inadequate methods, which has led to ambiguities and incompleteness among
many systems [BLML01,Hal07]. Incompleteness among systems may introduce
disturbing flaws because they are more focused on functionality rather than
behavioural correctness. Moreover, literature also shows that the DNP3-SA
mechanism mainly supports the unicast system architecture over other known
architectures such as the Multi-drop and the hierarchical. This implies that there
is literally no security mechanism for broadcast mode communication, thus, either
the Multi-drop or hierarchical architecture is deployed.
To deal with such ambiguities in systems or protocol specifications, two known
methodologies can be used namely; Provable security and Formal methods. Prov-
able security [Pas11] is a common method used to prove security properties of
cryptographic and it is more e↵ective for proving the properties of cryptographic
algorithms. However, the approach lacks the support of computer-aided tools
and as a result of that it becomes more prone to error [NBN10]. Formal meth-
ods [WLBF09] on the other hand, refers to the use of rigorous mathematical
techniques and tools for specification, design and verification. It provides the
ability to construct precise and unambiguous models. These models are analysed
to reduce errors that are often introduced in systems [Tre99]. This approach
2.6. Introduction to Formal Methods 31
e↵ectively helps to reduce the e↵orts usually required by designers to manually
investigate possible conditions that may lead to unexpected events. The next
part of this thesis presents an overview of formal methods and tools used for
formal specification.
2.6 Introduction to Formal Methods
Formal methods are techniques that employ rigorous mathematical semantics
such as set-theories, logical reasoning and other concepts to specify, verify and
reason about the correctness of a system [MH03,Win90]. The application of
rigorous mathematics has made formal method techniques to provide a reliable
and robust framework, within which small and large scale systems as well as
complex system designs have greatly benefited in guaranteeing system correct-
ness [MH03,BLML01,Sin04]. Formal methods are predominant in areas such as
software specification and designs [FUKH96], hardware [McM00], networks [O¨T09],
security and cryptographic protocols [EL02,BM03,BCM12] as well as industrial
applications [CGR93]. For instance [BM03], Boyd and Mathuria have presented a
range of cryptographic protocols that have greatly benefited through the applica-
tion of formal method techniques. An example is the Needham-Schroeder shared
key protocol [NS78]. This is the same case for protocol engineering domains,
where techniques such as LOTOS (Language of Temporal Ordering Specifica-
tion) [BB87], SDL (Specification and Description Language) [ST87, ITU99], finite
state automata [LS90], Estelle [BD87], temporal logic [Got90], net and set theo-
ries [Bil98,Rei12,AP11,PTS96] have been applied to reason about the correctness
of many protocols.
There are several approaches in formal methods that are used to analyse the
correctness of a system. These include the modal logic, process algebra, theorem
proving and state exploration. Among these, the most approaches include theorem
proving and model checking, which is based on state exploration [RSG99,BM03].
Both of these approaches require the use of computer assistance to facilitate
analysis. The theorem proving approach uses rules of refinement based on
mathematics to verify and prove the theorems of an abstract requirement from
a given specification. Thus, theorem proving approaches are more focused with
the theoretical approach of proving the correctness of a system. Therefore, it
turns out to use less computer automation to aid for analysis. Model checking
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on the other hand, also uses abstract model derived from the specifications to
correspond to a property, of which the property can be exhaustively verified on a
relatively large, but finite domain. This, makes model checking to heavily rely
on computational automation because the exhaustiveness in exploring all states
and transitions in the model. As a result of exhaustively exploring states, model
checkers have become more suitable and e cient in finding attacks on a given
system over others approaches [Ros98,BM03,ABB+05,BMV05,YTEM06].
There exists a variety of formal method tools that are either based on the-
orem or model checking approaches to perform formal analyses. Among these
tools include; Scyther [Cre08], PVS (Prototype Verification System) [ORS92],
SAL (Symbolic Analysis Laboratory) [Sha00], Brutus [CJM00], NRL Analyzer
(Naval Research Laboratory Analyzer) [Mea96], Athena [Son99], ProVerif [B+01],
AVISPA [ABB+05], and CPN (Coloured Petri nets) [Jen91]. This chapter does
not provide a comparison to these tools and techniques because they are beyond
the scope of this thesis. However, for further reading, the comparison of some of
these tools can be found elsewhere [DSHJ10,PBP+10]. This thesis will mainly
focus on the use of the CPN tool to model and perform analysis of the DNP3
protocol and its services. The reasons as to why CPN is suitable and used
throughout this thesis are presented in Section 2.7.1. The next section of this
thesis presents and discusses the CPN tool as the formal method employed for
this study.
2.7 Coloured Petri Nets (CPN)
Petri nets are a formalism that is based on rigorous mathematics semantics for
creating graphical models. Petri nets models can be used to describe and study a
number of information processing systems that are characterised by being dis-
tributed, parallel, asynchronous, concurrent and non-deterministic. CPN [Jen91],
as a derivative combines these capabilities of Petri nets with a high-level pro-
gramming language, SML [HR97,MTHM97] (Standard Metalanguage) to provide
the primitives for defining data types, data manipulations and creating compact
graphical models. This makes CPN a high-level type of nets [Jen]. Literature on
CPNs can be found elsewhere [Jen91,Jen94,Jen98,Jen01,Jen13].
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2.7.1 Why CPN Formalism is Chosen
This section presents some of the main reasons why this thesis chose to use
CPN as the formalism to model and analyse the DNP3 protocol and its secu-
rity mechanism. Some of the reasons include: the ability to express various
systems properties such as concurrency, the graphical interface, hierarchical net
construction, parameterisation of behaviours in CPN models, model validation
and verification tools as well as time and performance analysis.
Taking other formal methods tools into account, one of the main reasons
why this thesis chose CPN is because of its ability to conveniently express
characteristics such as concurrency, parallel, distribution, asynchronous and non-
deterministic features that are inherent in many systems. With such abilities,
di↵erent level of abstractions of a given system can be capture within a model to
validate and verify the correctness of the system in question.
Another important reason why CPN is preferred over other formalism is,
its graphical interface and hierarchical net construction. Thus, the graphical
interface of CPN allows one to create a relatively simple net structure to large
and complex nets, all through a palette full of components or tools. Hierarchy in
models construction is a crucial feature when considering models for large systems.
Thus in CPN, hierarchical modelling is a technique used to hide the details of
modules in order to build large models and simplify their complexities [HJS91].
With a hierarchical model, a large model can be grouped into a number of pages:
top-level, second-level, thrid-level and so on. The pages contain modules that
represent net structures at a higher-level (abstracted). At the high level, the
modules are represented as rectangles with double outline, called substitution
transitions. They are to hide the detailed operation of the net structure. That is,
each substitution transition may have at least a sub-net structure within it that
describes the operation of the module. This make it possible to capture di↵erent
levels of abstractions in the same CPN model.
Furthermore, this thesis chose CPN because of CPN’s parameterisation tech-
nique. Thus, parameterisation in CPN is an approach used to construct a single
model with di↵erent behaviours of interest. As an approach, parameterisation
prevents the possibility of having separate models in order to obtain di↵erent
behaviours for analysis. It provides the ability to re-use existing model and
combine multiple instances of certain behaviours seamlessly. That is, it allows the
same model to behave di↵erently depending on the parameters provided for the
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analysis. Parameterisation is usually enforced on on arc inscriptions, transition
guards, or code regions.
Model validation and verification tools in CPN are tools that are used to
determine: 1) whether the model of a given system or protocol truly reflects
the actual behaviour of the system in place and 2) whether the model meets
the exact specifications of the system/protocol given. With CPN validation and
verification tools, it is possible to obtain a summary report after the execution of
the CPN model. The report presents a number of behavioural properties that are
useful to validate and verify the model in comparison to the system or protocol
specification. For example, the state space tool [JCK06] is one of the tools that
is used to perform both validation and verification analysis for CPN models. In
addition, the BRITNeY suite [WL06] is one of the tools that can be integrated
into CPN such that an MSC can be generated in real-time as the model gets
executed. This is useful for experts that design various protocols, though, they
might not be experts in the application of CPN.
Timed CPN and performance analysis also contribute to the reason why
CPN is chosen. With timed CPN, tokens and transition used in CPN can be
tagged with a discrete time to estimate how e cient a system under design can
perform its operation in real-time. In addition, as a side benefit, our knowledge
and experience has shown that depending on how a model is constructed, timed
tokens can be used to reduce nodes and arcs of the state space and SCC (Strongly
Connected Components). This helps reduce state space explosion (i.e. the inability
to explore an entire state space with limited resources of time and memory) as
well as reducing the challenges of investigation large states. Moreover, as the
performances of systems have become crucial issue, CPN’s performance analysis,
makes it easy to carry out lengthy simulation of models in order to calculate and
estimate performance measurements such as the average queue lengths, delays,
resource utilisation and so forth.
The next section will present the concept of CPN by elaborating on what
consists of a CPN model, and what some related analysis tools that are used for
validating and verifying the models.
2.7.2 CPN Applications
CPN has been extensively used as a formal method technique to model and
analyse many projects and systems. Some of projects and systems cut across
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the domains of protocols and networks [BH07,EKK08,Ouy04], software designs
and specifications [LTX02, JLvdA08] and military systems [FBD96]. A list of
some industrial use of CPN can also be found elsewhere [gro]. In the security
domain, CPN has also been very successful at analysing security properties of
cryptographic protocols such as the work of Aly and Mustafa [AM04], Al-Azzoni et
al. [AADK05], Wiebke Dresp [Dre05], Tritilanunt [TBFM06], Suriadi et al. [Sur10]
and Seifi et al. [Sei14].
To the best of our knowledge, related work carried out to model and analyse
SCADA protocols are limited to the work of Dutertre [Dut06], Cheminod et
al. [CPS11] and Edmonds et al. [EPS08]. Literature analysis of the DNP3 protocol
have shown several vulnerabilities [MPPW06,EBPS09,JNY11], however none of
these analyses have been performed on DNP3-SA mechanism. This is because
the DNP3-SA protocol was adapted from IEC 62351 [IEC07] after those protocol
analyses were carried out. As a result, the current state of the mechanism is not
yet analysed. As the security of many protocols rely on cryptographic primitives
to protect systems, it is equally important to ensure that those primitives are
verified of their correctness. The correctness of security protocols in SCADA
systems will guarantee the absence of disturbing flaws and incompleteness among
others that often found in systems [Sun79,Hal07,Sur10]. This will reduce rate at
which critical industries become vulnerable to threats and attacks.
2.7.3 Introduction to CPNs
As previously emphasised, CPNs are a class of high-level type of nets that enhances
Petri nets with primitives for defining data types, data manipulations and creating
compact models. A CPN model is tagged as bipartite graph that comprises of two
forms of nodes, places (drawn as ellipses) and transitions (drawn as rectangles),
and directed edges that are known as arcs. A place represents a state, and they
are assigned or typed with a colour set (colsets). A colour set is a data type such
as integer, string and record that enable places to store token(s) or multi-sets. A
token is data of the same data type. For example, a place called Values, which
has been assigned with the colour set, Number, of the data type integer can only
store numeric value such as 1 or 2 or 3 . . . as its token value. A multi-set on the
other hand, is simply storing more than one token of the same data type on a
place (e.g. storing 1, 2 and 3 on the Values place). A place with a token(s) is
known as a Marking. Transitions on the other hand, signify events. A transition
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may have a guard associated with it. A guard is simply a boolean expression
that is enclosed in a square bracket. Directed arcs are used to always connect
places to transitions and transitions to places. It is illegal to have a transition
connecting to another transition or a place connecting another place. This implies
that through directed arcs, places must always become either an input point to
a transition or an output point of a transition. Direct arcs are associated with
inscriptions that may comprise of variables, constants and functions. Variables
represent colour sets (typed-tied to colour sets). That is, the data type of a
particular colour set can become the data type of a particular variable. In other
words, data values that belong to a type of a variable can be bound to a variable.
An assigned variable on an arc is referred to as a binding element.
In CPN, a transition is said to be enabled if either of, or both of the following
condition(s) is or are satisfied: 1) the guard statement of the transition evaluates
to true for a given binding, and 2) there exists su cient token(s) in the input
place of the transition to match the respective input arc expression of the same
transition (i.e. when evaluated for a particular binding of its variables). An
enabled transition leads the transition to occur or fire. For a transition to fire
or occur, it requires an input and output. An input to a transition must always
be a place with an arc going to the transition, and the output must also be
arc coming from the transition to a place. The occurrence of enabled transition
removes token(s) specified by the respective arc expressions from its input place,
and dumps the tokens specified by the expressions on the output arcs into the
connected output place. The distributions of tokens on places are called Markings
as they indicate di↵erent states. Therefore, a marking in CPN is a state and an
initial marking is the initial state of the CPN net structure. Figure 2.12 depicts
the behaviour of a simple CPN model as well as its components.
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Figure 2.12: A simple example of a CPN net structure and its components.
2.7.4 CPN Validation and Verification Techniques
CPN supports a number of model validation and verification tools. This section
focuses on the state space tool and CTL which are used throughout in Chapters 3, 4
and 5.
SSA: State Space Analysis
State space analysis tool is one of the main tools used in CPN for validation and
verification. State space is based on the ‘state exploration’ technique. This thesis
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defines state exploration as a technique used to exhaustively and systematically
explore all states and transitions of a given model (i.e. model on abstracted
specification) in order to reason about the system. This implies state space in
CPN is capable of providing vital information such as the reachability of all states
and provide relevant information concerning how a model proceeded from one
state to another in consistent manner.
Analysis using the state space tool presents a summary report with a number
of behavioural properties. These properties are defined below. The properties
can either be obtained automatically after entering and calculating the state
space for the CPN Tools or they can be obtained through a standard or advance
SML queries; depending on the property to be analysed. Details of how to create
standard and advance SML queries can be found elsewhere [JCK06].
• Nodes and Arcs of State Space and SCC (Strongly Connected
Components): These form the statistics of the entire model. However,
SCC is considered as a property that is used to determine the reachability
of nodes and iterations involved in the model. An example of the standard
query for this property is: SccReachable (3, 34). This property is used
throughout our models in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 to determine the size of nodes
that exists in our model as well as identifying the possibility of having loops
in our models.
• Reachability Property: Is used to determine whether there exist a path
from the marking, M10 and the marking, M3. One of the standard query for
this property is: Reachable (10, 3). This property is used in Chapters 3, 4
and 5 to determine the reachability status of certain markings in various
models.
• Boundedness Property: Gives information about the maximum or min-
imum number of tokens that reside on a place. An example of the standard
query is: LowerInteger (Mark.System’Think 1).
• Home Property: This is a property states that is a home marking must
always be reachable from any node or every other markings. An example
of the standard query for this property is: InitialHomeMarking (). This
property is only used in Chapter 3 to determine whether there exists states
that are always possible to reach from any other reachable states.
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• Dead Markings Property: Is a property that indicate to one that there
exists no binding elements to make a given state active. In other words, a
marking or state is declared dead when it binding elements cannot enable
the state. An example of the standard query is: ListDeadMarkings ().
Throughout Chapters 3, 4 and 5, this dead marking property is used as key
component to determine termination points in our models.
• Dead Transitions Property: Is a property that indicate to one that a
given transition has no path from a reachable state to enable that transition.
An example of the standard query is: ListDeadTIs (). This property is used
as another key component in all the chapters of this thesis (Chapters 3, 4
and 5) to identify transitions that do not occur as a result of either an
expected or unexpected activity.
• Live Transitions Property: This property is used to indicate the con-
tinued occurrence of a transition(s). In other words, a live transition is
a transition that has paths from reachable markings that can always find
the occurrence sequence that contains that transition. An example of the
standard query for a live transition is: TIsLive [TI.Testpages’Values
5]]. This property is only used in Chapter 3 to determine whether there
exists an event (transition) that is always occurring or executing.
• Fairness Property: This property is concerned with how often a bidding
element can occur in an infinite occurrence sequence. The fairness of a
transition can be deduced into elements such as “fair, impartial, just, no fair-
ness”. An example of the standard query for this property is: TIsFairness
[TI.Testpages’Values 5]].
CTL: Computational Tree Logic
CTL is another form of state exploration which is based on temporal logic.
It is often referred to as a branching-time temporal logic because of its tree-
like structure (which has a non-deterministic future). CTL are mostly used in
model checkers like CPN and others to determine or verify if a model of a given
system possesses certain defined properties. For example, a CTL statement can
verify to determine whether it is possible to reach a certain marking, T3 from
a given marking S10. In Chapter 4, this technique is employed to formalise
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the authentication property of the DNP3-SA protocol presented in Chapter 2,
Section 2.5.1.
The CTL implemented in the CPN Tools is known as the ASK-CTL. ASK-
CTL is interpreted over the state space of the CPN Tools. This implies that
information about states and transitions in every CPN model (generated by the
state space) can be used in ASK-CTL to formulate statements to be checked
against the model. Furthermore, this also implies that ASK-CTL can be used
to adequately express properties concerning paths (i.e. the sequence of states
and transitions occurrences). In expressing properties about paths, ASK-CTL
uses two main logical operators: EXIST UNTIL and FORAll UNTIL to derive
other operators such as POS and EV. These main logic operators act on two
arguments, let’s say EXIST UNTIL(M1,M2) and FORAll UNTIL(M1,M2). As a
result POS and EV are also expressed as POS(M)⌘EXIST UNTIL(M1,M2) and
EV(M)⌘FORAll UNTIL(M1,M2), respectively. It is to be noted that there are
many other operators such as INV and ALONG that are derived from the main
logic operators. However, this chapter does not discuss them because they do not
contribute to this thesis.
EXIST UNTIL(M1,M2): A truth value is returned if there exists at least a path,
starting from the initial state whereby M1 is true for each state in the path until
the final state M2 is true.
FORAll UNTIL(M1,M2): A truth value is returned if all paths, starting from
the initial state whereby M1 is true for every state in the paths until the final
state in each path to M2 is true.
POS(M)⌘EXIST UNTIL(TT,M): TT refers to a truth value. In this operator,
a true value is returned if, there exists at least a path from an initial state that
leads to a state where M is said true.
EV(M)⌘FORAll UNTIL(TT,M): TT refers to a truth value. In this operator,
a true value is returned if all paths from an initial state, lead to a state where M
is said true.
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2.7.5 CPN for Security Verification
As previously stated CPN can be used to validate and verify the behaviour
correctness of a given system through an abstracted model specification. In
the security perspective, validating a model implies that the model constructed
must accurately reflect the normal behaviour of the system or protocol. In other
words, the abstracted model must exhibit the behaviour expected from the system.
For example, if a system is designed to protect information related to users by
encrypting their data such that confidentiality is provided, it is expected that
the abstracted model of such system does exactly what the system or protocol is
supposed to do.
In verification, there is usually an additional component required to complete
this process. This component is usually an attack model which is used to revalidate
the abstracted model. Thus, an attack model is nothing than an extension of a
given model that allows an intruder (third-party) to participate within the given
model and behave in a malicious manner. The Dolev-Yao attack model [DY83]
is a typical example in performing security analysis of cryptographic protocols.
Attack models are important in verifying a given model because they help in
determining whether a given property of a system is achievable. Hence, the
abstracted model truly behaves as expected and does not behave contrary to the
system specifications.
One way to achieve attack models in CPN is through CPN’s parameterisation
technique. As previously highlighted, parameterisation can allow a single model
to behave in di↵erent ways by encoding a set of parameters to steer the behaviour
of abstracted model. This technique is very useful for communication protocols,
particularly the DNP3 protocol because di↵erent behaviour of the protocol can be
captured in the presence of various attacks. Moreover, as through parameterisation
it is possible to enable or disable (i.e. set to true or false) part of a model to
focus on a particularly analysis, the core elements of the model (protocol) can
remain unchanged and various systems properties can verified by using the state
space tool.
This thesis employs various attack models to verify the correctness of the
DNP3-SA in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. The attack models created in these chapters
are attack behaviours that are stated in the DNP3 protocol specifications. The
attacks include modification, replay and spoofing. This thesis employs and model
these attacks purposely to verify the DNP3-SA protocol.
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2.7.6 Summary of the Research Gaps
This chapter has reviewed the fundamental knowledge that relates to SCADA
systems and its components such as communication protocols that are used within
the SCADA network. Security issues such as vulnerabilities, threats and attacks
revolving around SCADA systems have been provided and discussed. Moreover,
the DNP3 protocol, which is one of the SCADA communication protocols and its
associated security mechanism, DNP3-SA, which is used to secure communication
in SCADA networks have also been extensively presented and discussed. CPN,
which uses rigorous mathematics semantics to reason about the correctness of
systems have been provided and explained.
From this review, the security of many SCADA systems used in today’s criti-
cal infrastructures have become a domain that cannot be overlooked. Moreover,
integrating security controls in SCADA protocols, such as authentication and
encryption have become very important issues to consider in critical infrastruc-
tures since functionality, performance and behavioural correctness are essential.
Through this literature, this thesis has identified some concerning issues in the
DNP3 protocol that have become the focus of this thesis:
Research Gap 1: There is no formal specification of the security protocol,
DNP3-SA, in the DNP3 protocol. Despite the fact that among all standard
SCADA protocols the DNP3 protocol is one of the first standardised protocol
that attempt to provide an embedded security mechanism (i.e., cryptographic
solution) to secure communication in SCADA systems, it is equally important to
ensure that the embedded security mechanism behaves correctly. As stated in
Section 2.7.2 the mechanism is informally described in the DNP3 specification
because there are no formal specification in place to check the correctness of
the mechanism in the DNP3 protocol. Moreover, though the DNP3-SA protocol
employs a unilateral authentication through the HMAC mechanism to protect the
devices against certain attack vectors, the mechanism does not protect messages
that are not considered “critical”. In this thesis, CPN is used as the formal tool
to create an executable model that can be further used to perform an extensive
behavioural analysis of the protocol.
In Chapter 3, the first contribution of this thesis is provided: a CPN-based
approach to construct a formal representation of one of the features of the DNP3
protocol, namely the non-aggressive challenge response. Using this model, this
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thesis will verify security properties such as integrity and availability of service of
the DNP3 protocol, particularly on packet inspection at the reception level of an
outstation.
Research Gap 2: Formal analysis of the authentication property of the DNP3-
SA protocol. There is the need create a model to analyse and evaluate the
authentication property provided by DNP3-NACR and AGM modes for its
correctness. This is important because of the following reasons: First, creating
testbed systems for testing the correctness of the protocol can be very expensive.
This usually requires high cost of devices and specialised training on how to
set-up the equipments. Second, the production systems cannot be used to test the
correctness of the protocol. This is because the systems are live and they run the
daily operation of the control system. Third, adopting manual or informal analyses
to reason about the correctness of the protocol is risky. As stated in Section 2.5.2,
manual analysis have been known to yield inadequate methods, which has led
to ambiguities and incompleteness among system correctness [BLML01,Hal07].
As a result, they have introduced some disturbing flaws within systems. Fourth,
there are no known simulation available for DNP3-SA. Without simulation, the
correctness of protocol cannot fully be guaranteed. These reasons contribute to
why the protocol has to be modelled such that this thesis can formally analyse
and check the correctness of the authentication property in the protocol.
In Chapter 4 of this thesis, a single parameterised CPN model that covers
the two communication modes of the DNP3-SA, namely NACR and AGM is
constructed. The model is based on the specification and the experimental
observations of real device behaviour (Substation Modernization Platform /
Distribution Processor Gateway (SMP4/DP)). The model is analysed through
CPN state space analysis tool to validate the correctness of the model and to
primarily check the authentication property against various attack scenarios such
as modification, replay and spoofing. This thesis has identified that the DNP3-SA
protocol is flawed. Using the parameterised model, two security schemes have
been proposed, modelled and verified to show that the flaw identified is resolved.
Research Gap 3: The absence of formal analysis on complex large SCADA
systems such as the DNP3-SA on the multi-drop architecture. Often security
research carried out to protect systems are limited and focus more on simple
architecture such as a one-to-to system architecture. Large scale systems are
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often neglected to due to the complexities involved and the amount of work
required. As presented in Section 2.2.1 of this literature survey, the DNP3
protocol supports di↵erent forms of architectures. One of these architectures is
the Multi-drop architecture, which supports the broadcast mode of communication.
But, literature (Section 2.5) shows that the DNP3-SA mechanism can e↵ectively
protect unicast mode communication but not the broadcast mode communication.
However, as previously stated, DNP3 broadcast communication is supported by
3 di↵erent command types, where each command type is represented with the
address: “0xFFFD”, “0xFFFE” and “0xFFFF”. The command (0xFFFD) is known
to require a response from outstations, command (0xFFFE) does not require
a response and last command (0xFFFF) may require a response depending on
the condition set on the command. As the command (0xFFFE) is commonly
used in SCADA networks to reduce communication overheads, and because the
command does not require a response, many SCADA system could be left open
to threats. Moreover, because of the unidirectional nature of the broadcast
command, the command becomes more challenging to secure compared to other
command schemes.
In Chapter 5, this thesis uses CPN to create a scalable DNP3-SA model for
the Multi-drop architecture. The model is used to formally analyse the security
behaviour of the protocol on large-scale systems. As DNP3-SA is designed to
cater for unicast communication, and no authentication mechanism is specified for
the broadcast communication, this thesis proposes SAB (Secure authentication
for broadcast), a light-weighted broadcast authentication for the DNP3 Multi-
drop architectures that extends DNP3-SA by reusing its existing cryptographic
primitives.
Our next chapter, Chapter 3, presents the first contribution of this thesis,
which shows how this thesis achieved its first research gap stated in this Section.
Chapter 3
Formal Analysis of the DNP3-SA
Non-Aggressive Mode
As previously explained in Chapter 2, Coloured Petri Nets (CPN), state space
tool and Conmputational Tree Logic (CTL) are the main formalisms that will be
used throughout this thesis to create, validate and verify formal models of the
DNP3 protocol and its security mechanism. As stated in the introduction, one of
the contributions in this thesis is to create a formal model of the DNP3 protocol
with its security mechanism (DNP3-SA) such that we can analyse the correctness
of the protocol. This is because there are no formal model available to analyse
the correctness of the protocol as the current state of the DNP3 protocol and its
security mechanism (DNP3-SA) are narratively and informally described in the
DNP3 specifications. Henceforth, it creates the need to have a formal model to
perform security analysis. Our work so far is the first attempt to perform formal
security verification of a SCADA protocol using CPN.
To be more specific, the first contribution of this chapter uses CPN to construct
a formal representation of one of the communication modes in DNP3-SA, namely
the Non-aggressive mode (NACR). The purpose of this model (DNP3-NACR
CPN) is to provide a formal specification of the protocol mode such that a
formal security analysis can be performed. Also, an additional benefit of this
model is that it can serve as a framework, where other features of the DNP3-SA
protocol can be added to verify other security properties of interest. The second
contribution of this chapter uses the model to determine if the protocol adequately
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secures DNP3 messages. This is achieved by using CPN’s state space analysis
tool. Through the state space tool, we validate and verify data integrity and
availability of services of the DNP3 protocol against an attack through the model.
The verification of the model through the attack revealed a previously unidentified
vulnerability that can be exploited by an attacker to cause a Denial of Service
attack (DoS).
The contributions of this chapter has been published in the 2014 IEEE
International Conference on Communications (ICC) [ASCF14].
3.1 Modelling Approach
In this section, we establish some basic principles and approaches that are useful
to in creating or transforming virtually any communication protocol to a CPN
model.
In Chapter 2, it is presented that a CPN model consists of 2 nodes: places
and transitions that are connected through directed arcs. The place represents
a state, whereby the transition represents an event. For a transition to become
enabled and occur (state change), it needs an input (binding element) from a
place such that the transition can remove a specific token (data) from the input
place to a designated output place.
To facilitate of the understanding of this concept, we present a simple protocol
in Figure 3.1 that allows two entities, let say SenderA and ReceiverA to communi-
cate. This simple protocol allows SenderA to transmit messages to ReceiverA to
introduce its users. This protocol (Figure 3.1) is transformed into an equivalent
CPN model, which is presented in Figure 3.2. But before we dwell deep in the
transformation process, we establish some rudimentary and generic concepts or
principles to assist the transformation. These principles are basic and generic,
however, they are equally important and applicable to any communication or
network protocol, which considers using the CPN tool for modelling.
• Identification of Entities: One must identify the communicating entities
participating in the protocol. This is an important principle to consider
because it is at this level that one can or will make the e↵ort to know the
prime functionalities of every entity involved in the communication process.
In CPN, the entities can be represented with places and transition. In
addition, the functionalities of the entities can be modelled separately in
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modules (substitution transitions) and later be linked together.
• Identification of Message/Data Content: This is to identify the content of
messages or data to be exchanged between the communicating entities. This
is an important principle because one must know the exact messages or the
content of messages required to create an abstract model. As some messages
exchanged between entities can be cumbersome, capturing all messages may
not really depict how relevant some messages are in the abstracted model.
Therefore, it is important to precisely identify messages that are relevant
and reflect the importance of the protocol. For example, capturing every
bit of messages in the application request header of a DNP3 fragment may
not be relevant to the properties that this chapter is interested in.
• Data Declaration: Determining the appropriate data type for a given
message exchange between entities is an important principle to note. This is
because a protocol message is represented as token in a CPN model. Tokens
are transferred from one place to another through the use of variables
(binding element). Tokens and variables are created based on colour sets.
Colour sets are assigned with data type such as string, integer and boolean.
Knowing what data types to assign to given messages in CPN models are
very crucial. For example, the message “Hello, I am Alice” is made of
series of characters, in CPN one can assign this message (messages made of
characters) as a string rather than an integer.
• Communication Channel: Identifying and creating the channel for commu-
nication. The importance of this principle to allow one to be aware of how
to link the entities together.
The transformation of Figure 3.1 to a CPN model is as follows: In Figure 3.1,
SenderA and ReceiverA are represented by places in the CPN model (SenderA
and ReceiverA, see Figure 3.2). The events of sending and receiving messages
from SenderA to ReceiverA are represented by 2 transitions: Sending Messages
and Receiving Messages. The colour set Packet on all places is assigned with
the data type string. This allows the places to store or hold only data made of
string type. Messages on SenderA in the MSC are represented as various tokens
(multiset) on the SenderA place of the CPN model. The network part (which is
the arc that connects SenderA to ReceiverA in the figure) is represented by the
Network place in the CPN model. Finally, the transmission of each message from
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Figure 3.1: An MSG of a simple communication protocol between two entities.
Figure 3.2: An example of a simple protocol - CPN model.
SenderA to ReceiverA in the MSC is represented with the CPN variable (binder)
msg (see msg on arcs from SenderA to ReceiverA).
3.2 Transforming DNP3-NACR into a CPNmodel
The application of a formalism to transform SCADA processes or operations into
formal models such as a CPN model can be very challenging and complex. This
is due to the type of operations one needs to capture, the size of SCADA network
to model, or the properties considered to be analysed. This chapter focuses on
the NACR (non-aggressive), which forms the base for the other security operation
modes of the DNP3-SA protocol.
In Chapter 2 Section 2.5.1, NACR is presented as one of the modes used
to secure DNP3 messages between master stations and outstations (refer to
Figure 3.3 and 3.4). A DNP3 message, either a request or response has a header
with fields such as the AC (Application octet), FC (Function Code), IIN (Internal
Indicator) and OH (Object Header) (refer to Section 2.2.2). The FC field in
particular is the field that defines the purpose of the DNP3 message. Thus,
depending on the FC field, a fragment or message can be considered critical
or non-critical. A critical message is any message that has a mandatory code
while a non-critical message is a message with no mandatory code. A mandatory
code is a code that has the potential of controlling a station, perform set-point
adjustments and set parameters such as frequency values and so forth. A device,
either a master station or outstation that initiate communication with a critical
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message, is challenged by the receiving device NACR mechanism to prove its
identity (refer to step 1- 7 of the MSC provided in Figure 3.3 and Part B of
Figure 3.4). But, if the station sends a non-critical message, the receiving device
NACR mechanism is not trigger to act on the message. Hence, no challenge or
security is required (refer to Part A of Figure 3.4).
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Figure 3.3: The behaviour of NACR in the DNP3-SA protocol.
Figure 3.4: An alternative figure to depict the behaviour of NACR in the DNP3-SA
protocol.
As shown in Section 3.1, we employ the principles and approach to transform
our high-level description of the DNP3-NACR protocol into a formal CPN model.
But before we present the transformation process and the details of the model, it
is important that we first present the application fragment fields that are relevant
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to this chapter, the assumptions made when creating our CPN model as well as
the data structure or data declaration used in creating the model. It is to noted
that we do not consider all fields from the fragments because not all of them
contribute to the work in this chapter.
Table 3.1 presents the application fragment fields that are relevant to this
chapter. The table is divided into 3 columns: Fields, Interpretation and Status.
The field column presents fields of a DNP3 message. The interpretation column
presents the meaning of the fields. The status column emphasises whether the
field is considered as a critical message or a non-critical message. These fields
are presented because we would like to choose an appropriate data type as CPN
colour set to represent the protocol messages in our CPN model.
Table 3.1: DNP3 Message Components
Fields Interpretation Status
FC
- 0x01 (Read function) Non-critical
- 0x02 (Write function) Critical
- 0x81
(Standard Response)
Not Applicable (Non-critical)
OH
g20v1 / g20v7 - If paired with
non-critical FC then return feedback in the format of
XX|XX|XX, otherwise return in format XX-XX-XX
g20v1 / g20v7 - If paired with critical FC then return
feedback in the format of “gXXX”
IIN
00 IIN 1 - This is produced if an non-critical FC is received
00 IIN 2 - This is produced if an critical FC is received
Modelling Assumptions
These assumptions are made to reduce complexities and the possibility of gen-
erating large state space values, which may eventually lead to a state space
explosion.
• Unicast architecture: One master station communicates with one outstation.
In this architecture, the master station always initiates the communication.
This assumption is considered because of the possibility of generating large
state space nodes, which may further lead to a state space explosion.
• Single fragment size: Both stations (master station and outstation) transmit
requests and responses at a time that fit in a single fragment.
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• Underlying layers: The underlying layers of the protocol are reliable. The
purpose of this assumption is to ensure that communication failures are not
incurred during the analysis of the protocol via CPN model.
• Pre-shared keys: The long-term secret key and session keys are pre-established
between the communicating entities. This assumption is considered to limit
the complexities that may be involved during the modelling phase of the
protocol and also to avoid the possibility of generating large state space
nodes.
• The master station communicates with the outstation using the NACR
mode. This assumption is considered such that this chapter can solely focus
on security properties such as Integrity and availability analysis on the
NACR mode.
• Not all DNP3 data variations are captured. This assumption is considered
because not all the detailed content of some request or response messages
contribute to the security properties interested in this thesis.
Declarations
This section presents how DNP3 messages are represented in CPN. As previously
stated, tokens represent messages in CPN and they are created through colour set.
Therefore, to capture the various DNP3 messages, we model the representation of
FC, OH, IIN and all the dynamic states of the protocol as CPN colour sets, and
then we captured the operations of the protocol through using CPN standard
metalanguage functions (SML). In using this approach, modelling became less
stressful and inclusive as virtually any type of DNP3 message can be captured.
Table 3.2 depicts a declaration for the CPN model of the DNP3-NACR
protocol (DNP3-SA messages to CPN mapping) This is just a sample to depict
how we converted a DNP3 message to an equivalent CPN token. For interested
readers, the complete list of messages or colour set declarations can be found
in the Appendix of this thesis (see Table 7.1 and 7.2). The table consists
of three columns: Remarks, Components and CPN Declarations. Remarks
present the various types of messages used in the model. Components show
the elements that make up the various messages. CPN declarations present
the translation of DNP3 messages into the CPN language. For example, in the
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Requests row of the table (Table 3.2), we show that a request fragment is made
up of FC and OH components. These components have their corresponding
CPN declarations to be colset fcode & oheader. The colour sets (fcode
& oheader) have string as their data types. In addition, both colour sets
have also been assigned with token values: 1‘(‘‘0x01’’) ++ 1‘(‘‘0x02’’)
++ 1‘(‘‘0x03’’), & 1‘(‘‘g20v1’’)++ 2‘(‘‘g20v7") respectively. The tokens
values; 1‘(“0x01”), 1‘(“0x02”) and 1‘(“0x03”) represent DNP3 messages: Read,
Write and Initiate Application respectively. In summary, a completeNACR
CPN request from Table 3.2 is modelled as the product of Fcode and oheader;
(“0x01”,“g20v1”). The use of the CPN colour set type product (from the SML
language) enables us to combine and encode all vital information to represent
DNP3 messages from either the master station or the outstation and to simulate
their operations. An important point to remember is, SML functions used in CPN
are mostly symbolic rather than the real operation. For example, the outstation’s
way of generating appropriate messages based on a particular request from the
master station, does not perform the actual generation of response expected from
the protocol specification. Rather, the SML functions only mimic the behaviour.
Table 3.2: CPN Declaration for DNP3-SA
Remarks Components CPN Declarations
Requests
FC
Val allrqfc = 1‘(“0x01”)@1++ 1‘(“0x02”)@2++ 1‘(“0x03”)@3;
Colset fcode = string timed; Var f:fcode
OH
Val alloh = 1‘(“g20v1”)@1++ 2‘(“g20v7”)@2; Colset oheader =
string timed; Var oh:oheader
CPN Request Colset Request = product fcode*oheader
3.3 Formal Specification of DNP3-NACR
This section employs CPN’s hierarchical approach of modelling. This is to
simplify and presents the model in a high-level description. As previously stated
in Chapter 2, hierarchical modelling is a technique achieved through the use of
substitution transitions (Tsub) to hide details of the model (net structure) in net
pages. In this section, the DNP3-NACR CPN model consists of: top-level, second-
level and third-level pages. Thus, the top-level and second-level pages are used
to simplify the complexities of the model. The third-level pages present details of
the model, particularly the net structure within a substitution transition.
Top-level Page: Figure 3.5 shows the main page of the DNP3-NACR CPN
model. It presents an abstract view of the model on a single page. This page
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is equivalent to Figure 3.3 and 3.4, where the behaviour of the master station,
network and outstation are modelled on the left, centre and right of the figure,
respectively. Figure 3.5 consists of eight places for communication and 3 substi-
tution transitions (Tsub) that together model the master station interacting with
the outstation via a reliable network connection.
Figure 3.5: DNP3-NACR CPN model - Top-level page of the CPN model
Second-level Page: Figure 3.6 shows the multi-stage page of the DNP3-
NACR CPN model. This page shows all the internal structures of the master
station, network and the outstation. All substitution transitions in Figure 3.6
are marked with a number to indicate the flow of messages in the model. Thus,
starting from the left of the figure Tsub: SendRequests is marked 1, which indicates
the first step within the model. Tsub: NETWORK MITM marks the second step. Tsub:
OutRecv Send, CHGenerator, MasSecure, OutSecure, OProcess mark the third
to seventh steps respectively. Finally Tsub: MasterRecv marks the eight step,
which is the last step of this protocol mode. Figure 3.6 also show that the
behaviour of the master station is model with 3 substitution transitions namely;
Tsub: SendRequests, MasterRecv and MasSecure (refer to left of the figure).
The network is model with Tsub: NETWORK MITM (refer to centre of the figure).
While the behaviour of the outstation is also mode with 4 substitution transitions
namely; Tsub: OutRecv Send, CHGenerator, OutSecure and OProcess (refer to
the right-side of the figure). Each module presented in this second-level page has
details of its behaviour presented on a third-level page. For example, details of
Tsub SendRequests (1) is depicted in Figure 3.7.
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3.3.1 The DNP3-NACR Model
Figure 3.7 depicts Tsub SendRequests from the master station. It is the first
step involved in the model. In this figure, the master station composes a NACR
request, and transmits the request through the network to the outstation. Ini-
tial composition of requests is through place; Ready, Function Codes, Object
Headers and LPN. These places have markings that form the initial state of
DNP3-SA CPN model (Bubbles of Figure 3.7). The occurrences of the markings
create a token on place IniRequests. IniRequests is assigned with a colour
set Request. Colour set Request is a product of the data type fcode and oheader
(representing a DNP3 request, see Table 3.2). Similarly, when the incoming
arc of the transition SendPack is satisfied, tokens are created and respectively
distributed to various output places. For example, the presence of a token on the
place SendRq and Wait4Rsp indicate that the master station is sending a request
to the outstation via the network and as a result it is waiting for a response.
Figure 3.7: The master sending requests
Figure 3.8 presents Tsub Network MITM (2), a third-level page from Figure 3.6.
It presents details of the network as well as parameterised attack behaviours
carried out by an MITM (the attack part is elaborated in Section 3.4.2). For clarity,
this figure marks the second process after Tsub SendRequests from Figure 3.6
has occurred. It is divided into two parts; top and bottom to emphasise the
activities involved. The top part of the figure (starting from the left of the
transition ConnectA) depicts the transmission NACR requests from the master
station through SendRq and forward it to the outstation via sendRq. The bottom
part of the figure depicts the transition ConnectB between the place SendRsp
and sendRsp. They both model the transmission of responses from the outstation
to the master station.
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Figure 3.8: The network behaviour
Figure 3.9 depicts the third step of the specification; Tsub OutRecv Send 3.
From the middle-left part of this figure, the outstation receives NACR requests
from the master station through sendRq. The place WaitingRq models the
outstation waiting for a request while the place OPrcs models the outstation
processing a request. Thus, the outstation changes its state from waiting for
requests to processing (i.e. WaitRq to Processing) when a request is received.
The bottom part of the figure (the transition Forward AuthChlg data) models
the outstation sending an authentication challenge data to the master station.
Figure 3.9: Outstation sending/receiving challenge messages
Figure 3.10 depicts details of Tsub CHGenerator (4). It is the fourth process
involved in the specification. It presents the behaviour as to how the outstation
generates challenge messages. Transition Create Challenge Data is enabled to
create a challenge message whenever a token (request) is received through the
place Critical Operate. In creating challenge messages, the transition uses
following markings; MACalg, PseudoR & Seqnum to create challenge data and later
forwards it to the place AuthCH to be sent to network via the place sendChlg1.
The markings (MACalg, PseudoR & Seqnum) mark the MAC algorithm(H) agreed
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between the stations, the nonce (P ) and challenge sequence number (KSn) (refer
to surroundings of transition Create Challenge Data in the Figure 3.10 ).
Table 3.2 presents how we mimicked the behaviour of the nonce by defining the
CPN function PRandom. The function randomly generates a number each time a
challenge message is about to be issued. To be consistent with the specification,
expressions on the arcs between the place Seqnum and the transition Create
Challenge Data are defines to ensure that for every session, a challenge message
issued must have its KSn updated by 1.
Figure 3.10: Outstation generating challenge messages for the master station
Figure 3.11 presents details of the fifth process in the model, Tsub MasSecure
(5) (refer to Figure 3.6). In this fifth step, the master station receives challenge
messages from the outstation through place sendchlg (Lower-right of Figure 3.11).
From the challenge data, the KSn data is extracted and updated on the place
MPrvSeq. The place Algo extracts the MAC algorithm specified in the challenge
(refer to surroundings of SecureNACR). The place Chdata sends a copy of the
challenge message to the transition SecureNACR in order to compute a NACR
MAC tag. When all input place of the transition SecureNACR are satisfied, the
transition computes the MAC tag and transmits it via the network through place
SendARes to the outstation.
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Figure 3.11: The master station security mechanism
Figure 3.12 depicts details of the sixth step of the specification; Tsub OutSecure
(6) (refer to Figure 3.6). In this step, the outstation compute a MAC tag. By
default, every MAC tag received by the outstation is held in the place StoredMAC
until the outstation computes its tag and verifies the tags to authenticate the
master station (see middle and of Figure 3.12). The transition SecureO NACR in
this step or figure uses the same method employed by the master to compute its
MAC tag (i.e. when all the respective bindings of the transition SecureO NACR are
satisfied). Any MAC tag computed by the outstation is held in the place OHMAC
for verification. This eventually enables the transition Tagcheck to verify both
tags for equality. A CPN function is defined and used on the arc inscription of
the transitionTagcheck(i.e. Verifytags(Mtag,Otag)) to perform the verification
process (Refer to Table 3.2 for the declaration). During the verification process,
irrespective of the authentication status, a message is generated for the master
station through Tsub OProcess (where actual operations are carried out). This
leads us to step 7 (Figure 3.13, i.e. Tsub OProcess (7)).
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Figure 3.12: Details of the outstation security mechanism
Figure 3.13 presents details of the seventh step in Figure 4.3; Tsub OProcess
(7). In this step, the figure presents the details of the outstation processing
requests and generating responses for the master station; depending on either a
request is considered critical or non-critical. Thus, if an incoming request is not
a critical message, the request is received through the place NCritical Operate
for processing (refer to the labelled part “Process All Requests” in Figure 3.13).
On the other hand, if the request is a critical message, then the place AuthStatus
is triggered because it models the authentication status after the verification of
tags from the outstation security mechanism (refer to top of this figure). Thus,
from the place AuthStatus, a pass in authentication (i.e. Authpass) for a critical
request enables the transition Perform Critical to send authenticated requests
for processing. In the labelled part ‘Process All requests’, the outstation
may be instructed by a particular request to perform certain actions such as
reading or writing a current value to various IEDs or PLCs. These operations are
models with the transitions T ReadA and T write in this figure (Figure 3.13). On
the other hand, the part labelled “Authentication failure” of Figure 3.13 marks
the outstation generating an authentication error messages as responses for the
master station. This always occurs when authentication fails (unmatched MAC
tags). The place SendRsp models the output of messages (responses) from Tsub
OProcess to the master station via the network (middle-right of the figure).
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Figure 3.13: Details of the outstation processing requests received
Figure 3.14 depicts details of the final step in the model; Tsub MasterRecv
(8). In this figure, the master station receives and stores responses from the
outstation. Moreover, as the master station receives responses, it can also enable
itself and execute subsequent requests through Tsub SendRequests (i.e. after a
request has been processed by the outstation and a response is received). Tsub
MasterRecv corresponds with illustration depicted in Figure 2.3.
Our next section will present the validation and verification of this model.
This is determine the correctness of the DNP3-NACR mode protocol we modelled.
Figure 3.14: The master receiving responses
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3.4 Model Validation and Verification
The aim of this section is to validate and verify the correctness of the DNP3-
NACR protocol mode. We achieve this aim by making use of the state space
tool to investigate the functional behavioural of the DNP3-NACR CPN model.
We validated the DNP3-NACR CPN model to ensure that the model accurately
represents the behaviour of the DNP3-NACR protocol mode as described in the
DNP3 specification. The analysis in this section is twofold; Initial Behavioural
Analysis and Adversary Behavioural Analysis. The initial behavioural analysis
validates the model without any parameterised attacks enabled. We validate
DNP3-NACR CPN model to determine how the model behaves under normal
circumstances. We refer to the validation of the model as the ‘initial CPN model’.
With the adversary behavioural analysis, our main aim is to verify how the
initial CPN model behaves under an attack. This aim can only be achieved by
using an attack model to verify the protocol mode. Throughout this validation
and verification analyses, it is expected that we obtain the termination of all
requests when authentication succeeds or fails. Thus, a pass in authentication
will lead to the occurrences of all legitimate operations (read and write functions
in Figure 3.13 (Tsub OProcess)) on the outstation to occur, except the Gen
AuthError and Errfback transitions because they model the authentication
failure operations. Likewise, a failure in authentication will lead to the execution
of the Gen AuthError and Errfback transitions, leaving some transitions to
become dead. In Table 3.3, we present the expected dead transitions in our
analyses. This table is presented because during the validation process, we do
not consider any attack model and as a result of that, only 2 dead transitions
are expected. On the other hand, the verification process involves the use of an
attack model, which it is expected that we obtain 2 dead transitions. These 2
dead transitions are expected because we do not expect the outstation to execute
any critical operations apart from the authentication failure operation because of
the attack model.
Table 3.3: Expected Dead Transitions from DNP3-NACR CPN Model
Expected Dead Transitions
Dead transitions for Validation Dead transition for Verification
Gen AuthError
Errfback
Perform Critical,
T write
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3.4.1 Baseline Behavioural Analysis of our Initial Model
Table 3.4: State Space Report for the Initial DNP3-NACR CPN Model
State Space Report
State Space Nodes 922
State Space Arcs 1254
SCC Graph Nodes 922
SCC Graph Arcs 1254
Time 0
Home Markings None
Dead Markings 19
Dead Transitions 2
Live Transitions None
Table 3.5: State Space Report for the Modified DNP3-NACR CPN Model
State Space Report
State Space Nodes 121
State Space Arcs 130
SCC Graph Nodes 121
SCC Graph Arcs 130
Time 0
Home Markings None
Dead Markings 6
Dead Transitions 14
Live Transitions None
Table 3.4 presents the full state space report of the Initial DNP3-NACR CPN
model. The table shows identical values obtained for nodes and arcs of the state
space and that of the SCC (Strongly Connected Components). Obtaining these
matching values implies that every node in the model can be reached from at least
one other node. This further implies the model does not iterate and moreover
the model has a finite sequence of occurrence [JKW07].
In Chapter 2, Section 2.7.4, we defined a home marking as a state that can be
reached from every other state. In addition, we stated that a transition can only
be live, if the transition has paths from reachable markings that can always find
the occurrence sequence that contains that transition. Relating these definitions
to our report in Table 3.4, the report shows that we do not obtain any value for the
home and live transition properties. These results are expected because our model
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does not have markings that can be reached from any other markings. Moreover,
the model terminates after every request has been successfully processed by the
outstation. Henceforth, there are no home markings or live transitions.
Moreover, the table presents 19 dead markings and 2 dead transitions. A
dead marking is a state in our model, which has no binding elements to enable
it. A dead transition on the other hand, is a transition that does not execute
or get fired. We inspect all the occurrences of the dead markings through the
use of the CPN’s SML query function (ListDeadMarkings ()) and state space to
individually simulate all the dead markings identified. A close inspection on our
results confirmed that all the dead markings and dead transitions obtained are
expected. This is because all dead markings obtained represented various states
where every critical request was successfully authenticated and processed by the
outstation. Likewise, every non-critical request was also successfully processed by
the outstation. Moreover, the inspection also revealed that the 2 dead transitions
obtained were as a result of no authentication failure, as no attack model has
been enabled yet. This inspection shows that our expectation are consistent
with Table 3.3. Therefore, it implies that the DNP3-NACR protocol mode we
modelled is behaving as expected.
3.4.2 An Attack Model on DNP3-NACR CPN Model
This section elaborates the behaviour of the MITM attack in the network of
DNP3-NACR CPN model (refer to Figure 3.15). In Figure 3.15, a modification
attack behaviour has been modelled as part of the network (refer to the dotted
area of Figure 3.15). The aim of this attack model is to cause the outstation
process a request that is meant to be. In other words, the aim of the attacker is
to prevent the master station from executing certain operations on the outstation.
To achieve this, the adversary is allowed to tamper with or change the message
content of any requests, particular the FC in the request. By tampering with
the message, the adversary can change critical requests to non-critical request
since messages are in “cleartext”. This attack is solely considered because of the
flexibility to model it and its contribution to this chapter. However, this does not
also rule out the possibility of verifying the model with other attack models in
subsequent chapters (Chapters 4 and 5). Additionally, we do not rule out other
attacks on messages from the outstation to the master station’s direction. We
only focus on messages from the master station’s direction to the outstation solely
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because the master station always controls the outstation through requests.
In modelling the attack, we implement CPN’s modelling technique called
parameterisation to prevent the possibility of having two separate models for
di↵erent behaviours. Through parameterisation, we can either enable or disable
an adversary behaviour by simply using boolean values such as true or false,
respectively. Figure 3.15 presents the modification attack model within the
network net structure (refer to the dotted area of the figure). We modelled
the attack through the parameter Mattack1(f,oh) on the arc expression of the
Connect A transition. Through the arc expression MalFC, we can either enable
or disable the attacker from launching a malicious activity such as modifying
every requests coming from the master station. But as this section is interested
in verifying the behaviour of the model, we enable the attacker to actively modify
every message that is in transit from the master station to the outstation.
Figure 3.15: The network and adversary behaviour
3.4.3 Behavioural Analysis of our Modified Model
Table 3.5 presents the state space analysis of our modified model. It is to
noted that the modification attack parameter is set to true to enable the attack.
Table 3.5 presents some major di↵erences when compared to Table 3.4. First,
Table 3.5 depicts a reduction in the number of nodes and arcs that are present in
the state space and SCC Graph. This reduction indicates that there is an unusual
activity within the model when compared to Table 3.4. Second, in comparison to
Table 3.4, Table 3.5 presents a reduction in the dead markings (thus, from 19
to 6). Lastly, Table 3.5 presents 14 dead transitions in comparison to Table 3.4,
which depicts 2 dead transitions.
The decrease in the dead markings in Table 3.5 indicates that there are
certain instances in the DNP3-NACR CPN model that prevent the model from
terminating correctly (i.e. comparing to the analysis of the Initial CPN model). In
addition, obtaining 14 dead transitions signify that there are transitions (events)
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in DNP3-NACR CPN model that do not get activated or fired. These behaviours
(dead markings and transitions) are not expected in DNP3-NACR CPN model
when compared to our expectations in Table 3.3 (i.e. 2 dead transitions instead
of 14 dead transitions). Therefore, we must perform further investigations.
First-level Investigations: This investigation is to determine whether all
dead markings obtained from the report are expected. We firstly used the SML
query (ListDeadMarkings ()) to search throughout the model and list all the
dead markings. The result of the search listed: 99, 97, 96, 24, 121, 100. After
obtaining these markings, we simulated all the markings individually by using
the state space tool. This simulation was to determine if all the listed dead
markings were expected in our DNP3-NACR CPN model (comparing to our
initial dead markings in Table 3.4). The results obtained from the simulation
indicated that there are 3 dead markings (99, 97 and 121) that are not expected.
These unexpected dead markings represented unexpected responses received by
the master station instead of the expected ones. This leads us to perform further
investigation to determine why these unexpected dead markings have occurred.
Second-level Investigation: The motive of this investigation is also to
determine why unexpected dead markings were obtained in our previous inves-
tigation. In this investigation, 2 SML queries were created to have at least one
marking as its input. Thus, one of the SML queries had its marking from the
master station while the other query had its input from the outstation’s side.
The outcome of these queries are to provide states that can be used to determine
if there exists insecure states in our modified model. By identifying the existence
of insecure states, the model will confirm or indicates that the protocol mode
we modelled has a vulnerability. And as a result of such weakness, the master
station ended up receiving unexpected responses from the outstation (i.e. the
unexpected dead markings).
As it is shown in Figure 3.16, two SearchNodes queries are defined. The
first SearchNodes query is defined to have its input from the Request place on
the master station, while the second SearchNodes query had its inputs from
M WaitRsp, Xfcode, OPrcs and Ncritical Operate from the outstation (see the
first and second SearchNodes queries in Figure 3.16). The purpose for these
queries is to obtain tokens on the Critical Request and Critical Operate places
(refer to Figure 3.9). We expect these tokens on the Critical Request and Critical
Operate places because they mark the states for every critical requests. However,
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Figure 3.16: The state space analysis of the modified model
if there exists any other token on any other place other than the Critical Request
and Critical Operate places, then it indicates that there are insecure states in our
model (a vulnerability in the protocol).
Figure 3.16 shows the two queries have returned the node lists of (93, 21, 2)
and (54, 31, 110), respectively (see the comments for both queries). These node
lists are verified from each other to determine their reachability status. We verify
the reachability properties of these node lists to determine if the node list are
reachable from each other. Thus, if the node lists are reachable from each other,
then they indicate insecure states in the model. However, if the node lists are
not reachable from each other, then there are no insecure states in the model.
In the last section of Figure 3.16, the figure presents the use of SML query,
Reachable (), for pairing the node lists obtained. Results from the pairings
indicated that it is possible to reach node 110 from node 93, node 54 from node
21, and node 31 from node 2 (see the comments, where it is indicated true on
Figure 3.16). Reaching node 110 from node 93, node 54 from node 21, and
node 31 from node 2 indicate that there are instances in the DNP3-NACR CPN
model, where the Critical Request and Critical Operate places do not possess
tokens. Rather the Ncritical place gets a token. The presence of a token on the
Ncritical place indicates that there are insecure states in our modified model,
which eventually results in unexpected dead markings obtained above (i.e. 99, 97,
96, 24, 121, 100). This, indicates that the DNP3-NACR protocol we modelled,
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will not always terminate as expected due to undesirable dead markings identified
in the model.
A close inspection on the second-level investigation revealed that the presence
of tokens on Ncritical have contributed to the presence of the 14 dead transitions
in the report. Out of these 14 dead transitions, 2 of them were expected (i.e.
T writeB and Perform Critical, refer to Table 3.3). As previously stated these
2 transitions were expected because they are not supposed to be executed because
of the attack model, as they represented critical operations on the outstation.
The remaining 12 dead transitions consisted of transitions that were also expected
to have occurred but they did not. Thus, 2 (out of these 12) dead transitions
that marked the Gen AuthError and Errfback authentication failure transitions
were expected to have occurred because of the attack model, which was active.
However, these transitions did not occurred because the attack could not be
detected as the request in transits to the outstation were been actively modified
from critical to non-critical. This made the outstation to believe that every
request it was receiving were non-critical requests. Non-critical requests are
not challenged by the security mechanism and as a result of that, it led to the
execution of the Process, T ReadA and N critical Operation transitions (refer
to Figure 3.13) which are also not expected on the basis of this analysis. Moreover,
3 (out of the 10 remaining dead transitions) transitions denoted the outstation
not being able to generate challenge data. Furthermore, the lastly 7 transitions
out of the 10 transitions denoted both the master station and outstation inability
to generate MAC tags for verification.
In summary, for the fact that the authentication failure transitions; Gen
AuthError and Errfback could execute implies that the behaviour of the attacker
was not detected in the model because the security mechanism is concerned with
critical messages. Therefore, as every critical request sent from the master station
to outstation gets modified to a non-critical message (Ncritical), the security
mechanism fail to acts on the non-critical messages. Instead, it allows the modified
message to get executed on the outstation. This behaviour prevents the transition
T writeB on the outstation from occurring (refer to Figure 5.5) and leaves other
transitions that model the NACR security mechanism to be dead.
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3.5 Discussion
Through our model and its formal analysis, we were able to identify insecure
states that an attacker can exploit to cause a DoS attack (Denial of Service). DoS
is possible if the attacker continues to flip every critical requests from the master
station to non-critical requests to the outstation. This is because the NACR
mechanism is designed to only focus on requests that are considered critical
rather than all requests or messages in the protocol (refer the Critical Request
and Critical Operate places on Figure 3.9 and the Critical Operate place on the
left side of Figure 3.10). Moreover, as messages are communicated within the
protocol in “cleartext”, the protocol becomes vulnerable to modification attacks.
In the DNP3-NACR CPN model, the behaviour of the adversary causes the
master station to receive unexpected responses (i.e. unexpected dead markings
in our model) from the outstation. That is, as long the adversary continues to
flip the bit around, unexpected response will be delivered to the master station
at all times. And as the mechanism is focused on critical messages, non-critical
messages are overlooked (not authenticated) because the outstation believes that
the requests received are valid. Secondly, this behaviour also indicates that the
availability of a particular service needed by the master station is denied, as a
particular operation cannot be carried out on the outstation.
In the DNP3 protocol specification [IEE12, p. 206], it is stated that there could
be unexpected messages from a corresponding station. However, occurrences of
such behaviours are logged after a threshold. We argue that even though there is a
log for such behaviours, there are no mechanisms that verifies data integrity at the
receipt of messages on any of the stations. In other words, there is no assurance
that requests transmitted from the master station to the outstation have not
been tampered. Additionally, there are no mechanisms to ensure the protocol
takes appropriate actions against this unusual activity. This gives the attacker
the chance to continually ensure that the master station receives unexpected
messages. Moreover, as the availability of service is also compromised, there
could be serious inconveniences in the SCADA environment. A typical example
for instance can be the Maroochy Shire sewage scenario. In this scenario, if a
request that controls the flow of the sewage is constantly flipped or modified to
do something else, the sewage may be out of control. As the availability of this
service is compromised, controlling the flow of the sewage will not be possible and
may result in catastrophic situations. Our model has shown how this modification
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attack can make the master station receives unexpected messages and not getting
the desired operation executed on the master station.
A solution that may counter this behaviour is to introduce a digital signature
scheme for all requests or response messages exchanged between the stations.
This chapter proposes this solution primarily because the master station will be
able to digitally sign any request sent to the outstation with its private key. As
this private key is unique to the master station, any station that has the master
station’s public key can determine if a given request is authentic or the request
has been tampered with. Thus, if the initial request is digitally signed by the
master station and a change occurs to the message while in transit, the signature
on the message will be invalidated by the outstation. A symmetric key based
MAC can also solve the same problem. But the use of asymmetric cryptography
brings in advantage of non-repudiation meaning that a digitally signed request
from the master guarantees that the request is actually originated from the master
station and cannot be denied. Therefore, if a change occurs to the request or the
integrity of the request is compromised while in transit, the outstation can verify
to determine whether the master station indeed sent that request. Though, this
solution can fix this flaw, it may require asymmetric cryptographic, which are to
costly to deploy due certain requirements. A viable alternative to this solution is
to simply make the DNP3-NACR protocol mode open (general) such that the
mechanism will secure both critical or non-critical messages. Thus, by generalising
the DNP3-SA protocol, every request transmitted from the master station will
be challenged by the receiving device’s security mechanism, and appropriately
authenticated before it finally gets processed. By generalising the protocol mode
to secure all messages, it will eliminate the identified flaw (preventing a master
from executing certain operations on the outstation) because the integrity of
message will be preserved and so will be the availability of services.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter has presented the basic principles of modelling using the CPN
formalism. It has also shown the transformation of an MSC into a CPN model.
The NACR protocol mode, which is one of the communication modes of DNP3-
SA protocol has been presented, modelled and analysed through CPN and its
state space tool. The purpose of this analysis was to determine whether NACR
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adequately secures the DNP3 messages within the protocol, by verifying security
properties such as integrity and availability. The result of the analysis has
shown that NACR has a flaw that can be exploited to cause a DoS attack.
Henceforth, it cannot adequately secure DNP3 messages. We have illustrated
how these properties can be used in identifying unsecured states in the model,
which translates into an attack on the NACR CPN model.
In the next chapter, our motive is to refine NACR CPN model such that we
can create a single CPN model that will cover the two communication modes
of the DNP3-SA protocol. The purpose of this single model will be to validate
and verify the authentication property provided by the DNP3-SA on the unicast
architecture.
Chapter 4
Formal Analysis of the DNP3-SA
Aggressive Mode
Section 2.5.1 of this thesis has presented the two communication modes of the
DNP3-SA: two-pass authentication (challenge-response) and one-pass authentica-
tion. Both of these modes operate through a Keyed-Hash Message Authentication
Code (HMAC) to provide the authentication property. The two-pass authentica-
tion, which this thesis refers to as NACR (Non-aggressive), has been modelled
and analysed in Chapter 3. Although, Chapter 3 concentrates on the NACR
mode, its main focus has been to create a formal model that can be used to
validate and verify the correctness of the mode. As previously stated NACR is a
two-pass authentication, which implies that the mode can provide the authen-
tication property on its own. However, our concern in Chapter 3 was not on
the authentication property. This is because NACR provides authentication for
‘critical messages’ but not for non-critical messages. This implies that there exists
no mechanism to check whether messages in transit have not been tampered with.
In other words, one cannot guarantee that messages received on an outstation
are valid. This has led the work in Chapter 3 to create the NACR model and
focus on security properties such as Integrity of messages and the Availability of
the protocol. The analysis of the model in Chapter 3 revealed that the protocol
is susceptible attacks such as the Denial of service (DoS) attack since messages
communicated within the protocol are in ‘cleartext’.
In contrast, this chapter mainly focuses on adding the AGM behaviour such
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that the authentication mechanism of DNP3-SA protocol can be formally analysed.
Thus, this chapter extends our previous work in Chapter 3 by adding the AGM
mode. The contribution from this chapter has been published in the Journal of
Networks and Computer Applications (JNCA) [ACF16].
The contribution of this chapter is three fold. First, this thesis creates a
single parameterised CPN model that covers the two communication modes of the
DNP3-SA: NACR and AGM. The main purpose of this model is to capture the
two authentication behaviours of the DNP3-SA protocol as previously highlighted
in Section 2.5.1, such that the authentication property of the protocol on the
unicast architecture; one-to-one architecture, can be formally analysed. Thus, as
previously stated in Section 2.7.6, the DNP3-SA protocol lacks formal analysis
on its authentication mechanism. As a result, the behavioural correctness of the
mechanism cannot be guaranteed. The model created in this chapter is based on
the specification of the protocol as before, and an experimental observations of real
device behaviour (Substation Modernization Platform / Distribution Processor
Gateway (SMP4/DP)). The second contribution of this chapter identifies a
violation of the authentication property in the AGM mode. This violation is
identified as a result of a previously unidentified security flaw in the NACR
mode. The identified flaw in the model allows an adversary to manipulate certain
sequence of messages to execute commands. This flaw is identified through the
extensive usage of the state space analysis and simulation on the parameterised
model. The violation of the authentication mechanism has led this chapter
to propose two di↵erent approaches or schemes that can be use to resolve the
flaw identified. Hence, our third contribution. The proposals are modelled and
analysed as part of the existing CPN model (NACR and AGM) to show that
each of the solutions proposed is capable of resolving the identified flaw.
4.1 Overview of the AGM operation
Figure 4.1 depicts a message sequence chart (MSC) that presents the behaviour of
the NACR and AGM. But, before details of Figure 4.1 is shown, it is to be noted
that according to the protocol specification, the AGM operation depends on the
operation of the NACR mode (two-pass authentication) to reduce communication
overhead in place where bandwidth management is crucial. This implies that
the AGM mode cannot be carried out without the run of the NACR mode. An
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AGM (one-pass) operation can only be carried out if there has been at least one
or more occurrences of NACR operations. This behaviour enables the AGM to
make use of a crucial component from NACR operation, thus, “the most recent
challenge message”. For this reason, the behaviour of the NACR operation is
provided to facilitate the understanding of this chapter.
NACR: Figure 4.1NACR section presents the NACR operation. As presented
before in Chapter 3, Section 3.2, M sends a request, RQ, to O (step 1). On
receipt of the request, O issues Chalg accordingly (step 2). M uses MACSk0mo
(i.e. H from Chalg and Sk
0
mo) to hash Chalg received, RQ, and UID to compute
tag (step 3). tag is then sent to O. On receipt of the tag, O uses the same
computational approach and elements to generate tag
0
(step 4). Then, O checks
if tag
0
matches with tag (step 5). If there exists a match, then authentication has
been successful. O processes the request and replies M with a response, RSP
(step 6). Otherwise, an error, RSPE is sent as response to M to indicate an
authentication failure (step 7).
AGM: In Figure 4.1, AGM section illustrates the AGM mode operation. As
previously stated, the AGM depends on NACR. Therefore, it is assumed in
Figure 4.1 that M has obtained the “most recent challenge message” from the
most recent NACR operation. Taking this behaviour into account in this AGM
operation, M is always required to increase KSn from the challenge by 1 (i,
where i 1) for all AGM operations before a legitimate AGM message can be
composed. In Figure 4.1 AGM shows that before M can send an AGM request,
RQ, it first needs to compute tag on RQ about to be sent. M uses the most
recent challenge, Chalg, and increased KSn by 1 to compute a valid tag (step
1a). In computing tag, M uses MACSk0mo (i.e. H from Chalg and Sk
0
mo) to hash
the updated Chalg, RQ (about to sent), and UID to compute a valid tag. After
tag has been obtained, M finally sends the request, RQ, together with tag as
one packet to O (step 1b). On the receipt of the AGM message, O stores the
received tag, extract the FC and OH from RQ, and uses the same methodology
to compute tag
0
(step 2). It is to noted that tag
0
is based on the updated KSn on
O. After obtaining tag
0
, O compares tag
0
with tag for a match (step 3). If there
exists a match, then authentication has been successful. O processes the request
and replies M with a response, RSP (step 4). Otherwise, an error, RSPE is sent
as response to M to indicate an authentication failure (step 5).
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M (UpK, Sk
0
mo) O (UpK, Sk
0
mo)
NACR
(1)RQ = (FC,OH)
RQ  !
Chalg     (2)Chalg = (KSn,H, P )
(3) tag =MACSk0mo(Chalg, RQ,UID)
tag !
(4) (tag
0
=MACSk0mo(Chalg, RQ,UID)
Verify MAC Tags
(5) If (tag == tag
0
)then
(6) RSP = (FC,OH, IIN)
Else
RSP    (7) RSPE = (FC,OH, IIN)
:
AGM
(1a) tag =MACSk0mo(Chalg{KSn+ 1, H, P}, RQ,UID)
(1b) RQ = {(FC,OH), tag} RQ  !
(2) (tag
0
=MACSk0mo(Chalg{KSn+ 1, H, P}, RQ,UID)
Verify MAC Tags
(3) If (tag == tag
0
)then
(4) RSP = (FC,OH, IIN)
Else
RSP    (5)RSPE = (FC,OH, IIN)
Figure 4.1: The behaviour of NACR and AGM in the DNP3-SA protocol.
4.2 CPN Modelling Approach
This chapter employs two modelling approaches that are specific to the NACR
and AGM behaviours described above and are used to transform the both modes
into a CPN model. The approaches include Protocol Abstraction and Model Pa-
rameterisation with Adversaries. With the protocol abstraction, this thesis made
use of DNP3 specification, two Substation Modernization Platform / Distribution
Processor Gateway (SMP4/DP) devices from Cooper Power Systems1, and a
Linux-based computer and a switch (see Figure 4.2). The idea is to set up a
small SCADA network mimicking the behaviour of typical substation in a power
distribution network. SMP4 devices are used to convert almost any protocol
to another using various protocol libraries. For testing purposes, they can also
be configured to act as a master station or slave by using preloaded protocol
templates. In our case, we configured one of the SMP4 devices as a DNP3 master
and the other device to behave as a DNP3 slave. With preloaded templates, the
slave could conveniently generate DNP3 data objects internally for testing. Then,
we set up our Linux-based computer to continuously monitor tra c from the
master station and outstation. The motivation of this testbed is to obtain precise
1Coopers Power Systems, 2013. Reference manual, DNP3 master and slave protocol. Online:
http://www.cooperpower.com, Chicago, IL, Accessed: 11/06/2014
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protocol behaviour (i.e., relationship between NACR and AGM) such that an
appropriate executable model can be created. In other words, the SMP4 set-up
provides us the insight required to construct a precise model to represent the
behaviour of the DNP3 protocol.
(a) SMP4 set-up
(b) Logical represenation of the SMP4 set-up
Figure 4.2: Host PC to monitor tra c between the SMP4 devices
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To prevent the possibility of obtaining separate models for di↵erent behaviours,
this thesis uses CPN’s parameterisation technique. Parameterisation provides the
ability to combine multiple instances of di↵erent behaviours. This allows us to
manoeuvre between NACR, AGM, as well as other behaviours that may not be
part of the DNP3-SA specification. By doing so, it gives us the ability to control
when to turn ON true or OFF false certain behaviour of interest; depending
on the environment of testing. This chapter creates three parameterised attack
behaviours as part of the existing CPN model for NACR and AGM modes. These
three attack behaviours represent malicious behaviours that have been stated
in the DNP3 protocol specification. The purpose of these attacks models in the
NACR and AGM CPN model are to verify the correctness of the authentication
property in the DNP3-SA protocol. The attacks include modification, spoofing
and replay attacks. These attacks are considered and modelled because the
DNP3-SA protocol specification claims to address these attacks. In summary, the
parameterisation approach equips us with the flexibility to re-use the existing
model (NACR and AGM CPN model) to validate or verify the protocol with or
without the attack models.
4.2.1 CPNModelling Assumptions for DNP3-NACR and
AGM
Without loss of generality, the following assumptions are made:
• The system architecture is unicast. Thus, the master station communicates
with a single outstation. This is to avoid generating large state space nodes.
• The master station can use both security modes (NACR and AGM) in
communicating with an outstation. This is to capture the behaviour
• Master station will be the sole entity that initiates communication; sending
requests to outstation. As the outstation is the entity that processes requests,
in most cases, intruders would want to send commands to manipulate the
outstation’s functionality. Therefore, this assumption is considered such
that the behaviour of the outstation can be monitored.
• Both entities have their long-term secret keys as well as session keys pre-
established. As previously emphasised in Section 3.2, this assumption is
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considered to reduce the complexities involved in modelling the protocol
modes as well as reducing the state space nodes.
• Every request transmitted from the master station is considered as a critical
request. This assumption is considered mainly because of the authentication
security property. Thus, this chapter focuses on analysing the authentication
property of both NACR and AGM.
• The underlying layers of the network protocol are reliable. No communica-
tion failure expected during the analysis.
• This work does not capture all DNP3 data variations in this chapter. This
is because they do not contribute to the security properties interested in
this thesis. An example is the detailed content of some requests or response
messages from either the master station or outstation.
4.3 Model Description
4.3.1 Colour set Declaration
In Table 3.2 of Section 3.2, a sample of the CPN colour set declarations for
NACR model was presented. This sample from the NACR model is employed
in this chapter because the AGM operation depends on the NACR operation.
Therefore, this chapter makes use of the sample declaration (NACR) and adds
a declaration to show how the AGM request is model. The complete list of
messages or colour set declarations can be found in the Appendix (see Table 7.1
and 7.2) for interested readers. Table 4.1 presents a sample declaration for NACR
and AGM request messages in DNP3-SA CPN model. As previously shown, the
table consists of three columns: Remarks, Components and CPN declarations.
Remarks present the various types of messages used in the model. Components
show the elements that make up the various messages. CPN declarations present
the translation of DNP3 messages into the CPN language. In this table, we
define three (3) tokens for the function code (FC) and three tokens for object
headers (OH) instead of two for each as presented in Table 3.2 of Section 3.2. The
FC tokens are: 1‘(“0x01”)@1++ 1‘(“0x02”)@2 1‘(“0x03”)@3 and the OH
tokens are: 1‘(“g20v1”)@1++ 2‘(“g20v7”)@2 respectively. Both set of tokens
are of the colour set family fcode & oheader, which are of the data type timed
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string. We have assigned a timed token because we want to pair a particular
FC with a specific OH, such that we can reduce the number of states to occur
within our model. The token values; 1‘(“0x01”), 1‘(“0x02”) and 1‘(“0x03”)
represent DNP3 messages; Read, Write and Initiate Application respectively.
In the table, we show that as NACR CPN request is modelled as the product
of Fcode and oheader; (“0x01”,“g20v1”), an AGM CPN request is modelled
as the product of colour set Request and hmac, where the hmac colour set is
the key-hash of the request, the most recent challenge message and the user ID
sending that request (refer to Tables 7.1 and 7.2 in the Appendix for more details).
Table 4.1: CPN Declaration for DNP3-AGM Model
Remarks Components CPN Declarations
Requests
FC
Val allrqfc = 1‘(“0x01”)@1++ 1‘(“0x02”)@2++ 1‘(“0x03”)@3;
Colset fcode = string timed; Var f:fcode
OH
Val alloh = 1‘(“g20v1”)@1++ 2‘(“g20v7”)@2;
Colset oheader = string timed; Var oh:oheader
CPN NACR Request Colset Request = product fcode*oheader
CPN AGM Request Colset AGrequest = product Request*hmac
4.3.2 DNP3-SA: NACR and AGM CPN Model Specifi-
cations
Figure 4.3 presents an extension of the second-level (Figure 3.6) in Chapter 3.
Figure 4.3 shows NACR and AGM CPN model in a single page. To facilitate
readability, all substitution transitions in Figure 4.3 have been marked with
numbers just as before in Chapter 3, Figure 3.6 to indicate the flow of messages.
This is so because the AGM depends on NACR operation. As a result, we use
the NACR CPN model in Chapter 3 as a framework to add the AGM CPN
model to obtain the full operational modes in the DNP3-SA protocol. Therefore,
to improve readability while specifying NACR and AGM CPN model, we will
present third-level pages or modules that are relevant and contribute to this
chapter. Henceforth, we indicate the AGM operations.
Figure 4.4 depicts the first module of the NACR and AGM CPN model: Tsub
SendRequests. In this module, the master station can compose either a NACR
or an AGM request through place; Ready, Function Codes, Object Headers
and LPN. The AGM behaviour is modelled through the place AGMRqsts (see the
dotted area of the figure). The presence of a token in AGMRqsts indicates that
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the master station may be transmitting an AGM request after completion of the
NACR operation.
Figure 4.4: The master sending requests
Figure 4.5 presents the second module of the NACR and AGM CPN model:
Tsub Network MITM. As previously depicted on Figure 3.15 in Chapter 3, the NACR
network is modelled with 4 transitions; ConnectA, ConnectB, ConnectC and
ConnectD. That is, the transition ConnectA and ConnectB model the transmission
of NACR requests and responses between the master station and the outstation.
Transition ConnectB and ConnectD model the transmission of challenge messages
and MAC tags between the master station to the outstation. In this module, we
have extended the net structure (ConnectA, ConnectB, ConnectC and ConnectD)
to include the transition Sol ConnectC and ConnectAGM. Sol ConnectC mod-
els the transmission of challenge messages from the outstation to the master
in a secure manner (will be discussed later in this chapter). The transition
ConnectAGM models the transmission of AGM requests from the master station
to the outstation.
In extending the network module, we have also added a parameterised MITM
attack behaviour. The attacks include behaviours such as replay, spoofing and
modification that have been stated in the DNP3 protocol. These behaviours are
elaborated in Section 4.4.3 of this chapter.
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Figure 4.5: The network behaviour - Third-level page.
Figure 4.6 depicts the third module of NACR and AGM CPN model: Tsub
OutRecv Send. In this module, the outstation receives NACR requests from
the master station through sendRq. The middle part of the module depicts the
outstation receiving AGM requests from the master station. The far-right side of
the module models the outstation receiving MAC tags from the master station.
Figure 4.6: Outstation sending/receiving messages - Third-level page.
Figure 4.7 depicts the fourth module of NACR and AGM CPN model: Tsub
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CHGenerator. This module presents the behaviour of creating challenge message
for either the NACR and AGM operation. For NACR operation, the Create
Challenge Data transition used to create a challenge message whenever a token
(request) is received through the Critical Operate place. For AGM operations,
the most recent challenge message sent to the master station can be temporarily
stored on the RecentCH, NextCH1 or NextCH2 places; depending on the number
of AGM rounds that might be carried out. This is so because the AGM depends
on NACR. Tsub OSecureCH models a mechanism that is used to secure challenge
message transmitted from the outstation to the master station.
Figure 4.7: Outstation generating challenge messages for the master station -
Third-level page.
Figure 4.8 presents the fifth module of NACR and AGM CPN model: Tsub
MasSecure. This module has sub-modules that depict 3 behaviours Tsub; NACRSec,
AGMSec & ChalgAuth. Tsub ChalgAuth runs in parallel with Tsub OSecureCH in
Figure 4.7. They are both used to secure to challenge messages. It is to be
noted Tsub ChalgAuth and Tsub OSecureCH are not standard behaviours of the
DNP3-SA protocol. However, they have been modelled through parameterisation
to prevents the possibility of obtaining separate models (they will be discussed
in details later in this chapter). Tsub NACRSec and AGMSec model the NACR and
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AGM security operation, respectively. Details of Tsub NACRSec and AGMSec can
be found in Figure 4.9 and 4.10 respectively below.
Figure 4.8: Second-level of the master station security mechanism - Third-level
page.
Figure 4.9 presents the details of Tsub NACRSec. In this module, the master
station receives challenge messages from the outstation through the sendchlg1
place (Lower-left of Figure 4.8 & 4.9). From the challenge data, the KSn (refer to
step 3 of Figure 4.1) data is extracted and updated on theMPrvSeq place, while the
Algo place extracts the MAC algorithm (refer to surroundings of SecureNACR).
Then, the Chdata place sends a copy of the challenge message to the SecureNACR
transition in order to compute a NACR MAC tag. When all incoming arcs to the
SecureNACR transition are genuinely satisfied, SecureNACR computes the MAC
tag and transmits it to the outstation via the network through the SendARes
place. The right-hand side of the module captures updates of KSn in challenge
messages for AGM operations (i.e. in case the master wishes to transmits AGM
requests). It is to be noted that the AGM operation can only be used after
a successful completion of one or more NACR operation(s). This is achieved
through the CPN function NextSeq, NextSeq & NewSeq (refer to Table 7.1 for the
declaration). As previously emphasised, updating the KSn renders the current
challenge message received by the master to be considered as the “most recent
challenge message” (according to specification of the protocol). This leads us to
module Tsub AGMSec; depicted in Figure 4.10.
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Figure 4.9: Details of NACR security mechanism - Third-level page.
Figure 4.10: Details of AGM security mechanism - Third-level page.
Tsub AGMSec in Figure 4.10 presents the AGM behaviour. In this module, the
AGMRqsts place marks initial requests that the master station wishes to execute
on the outstation (top of the figure). The RecentCHM place (Lower-left of the
figure) marks the most recent challenge message (i.e. challenge message with an
updated KSn). Computation of MAC tags in AGM is similar to that of the
NACR computation. That is, after all incoming arcs (bindings) of the SecureAGM
transition are satisfied, the transition is enabled to compute an AGM MAC tag
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based on the request. Then, the AGMPack transition assembles the initial request
together with the MAC tag calculated and transmits both data as one packet to
the outstation via the network (refer to the SendAGMRq place in the middle but
far-right of the figure).
Figure 4.11 depicts the sixth module of NACR and AGM CPN model: Tsub
OutSecure. In this module, the outstation can either compute a NACR or AGM
MAC tag; depending on which request has been received and needs processing.
Thus, the SecureO NACR and SecureO AGM transition in this module capture the
NACR and AGM behaviour, respectively. The OHMAC place stores any MAC
tag computed by the outstation (i.e. either NACR or AGM). The verification of
the tags are carried through the Tagcheck transition. Just as explained before in
Section 3.3, Tagcheck uses the CPN function Verifytags(Mtag,Otag) to determine
if the tags match (Refer to Table 7.1 for the declaration). The outcome of
the verification generates a token on the AuthStatus place to indicate whether
authentication was successful or failed.
Figure 4.11: Details of the outstation security mechanism - Third-level page.
4.4 Validation and Verification of NACR and
AGM CPN Model
This section performs the validation and verification of the NACR and AGM CPN
model using CPN’s state space analysis tool. The validation and verification are
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performed to determine the correctness of authentication mechanism within the
DNP3-SA protocol. The interest of this analysis is the authentication property of
the mechanism. Thus, in validating the NACR and AGM CPN model, this chapter
is interested in determining whether the model reflects the normal operation
of the authentication mechanism in the DNP3-SA protocol. We perform the
validation by first considering the following cases because of their importance:
1) formally defining the authentication property using the Computational Tree
Logic (CTL), which is supported by CPN tools and 2) ensuring that the MITM
attacks in the model as well as other behaviours, which are not part of the
protocol specification are set to false. This is to help determine whether the
model reflects the protocol behaviour under normal circumstances.
In verification, the main objective is revalidate the model to determine whether
the model is fit for its purpose. Thus, whether the model behaves as expected by
providing the authentication property. This is achieved through the use of attack
models (i.e. attacks set to true) as part of the existing NACR and AGM CPN
model.
As previously stated, analysis using the state space presents a report with
a number of behavioural properties. These properties include home markings,
dead markings, live and dead transitions among others (discussed later during the
validation stage). In this chapter, we are particularly interested in dead markings
and dead transitions. Dead markings are states that do not have binding elements
to make them active [JKW07]. They represent termination points in the model.
Dead transitions on the other hand, are transitions that cannot be executed
because there exists no path from a reachable marking to enable them. These
properties are of interest due to their ability in e↵ectively simplifying the analyses
of large and complex models without loosing the generality of the concepts. For
instance, throughout these analyses we expect a single dead marking representing
the outstation processing all requests after authentication for each request has
been successful. We also expect 14 dead transitions during the initial validation
process; where out of the 14 transitions, 2 of them represent authentication error
transitions that could occur because of the absence of attack. The remaining of
the dead transitions represent parameterised behaviours such as attack models
and other behaviours that are not part the DNP3-SA’s specification, and as a
result, have been set to false in the model. All 14 dead transitions can be
identify because we do not expect them to execute as those behaviours are set
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to false. As a result they tend not to be active. However, in saying that it is
important to note that dead transitions are subject to change during all analyses.
This is as a result of some dead transitions such as attack models that might
later be set to true.
4.4.1 Formalising the Authentication Property
For all validations, verifications, and evaluation purposes, we define and later
formally represent the authentication property using CTL.
Definition of the Authentication condition: The outstation is able to
verify the identity of the master station, if the master station is able to produce
a valid MAC tag; where the tag is the same as the tag computed by the outsta-
tion. Thus, if the tags are the same, then authentication is successful, otherwise,
authentication fails.
A pass during authentication leads to a single state where IIN values;
‘‘00 IIN 1’’ or ‘‘00 IIN 2’’ are obtained on place M Internal of the Tsub
MasterRecv (8) (refer to Figure 3.14 in Chapter 3 for details). If for any reasons,
values other than the expected values are obtained on M Internal, then it implies
that authentication has fail. This requirement applies regardless of whether the
attack parameters are set to true or false, or the mode of operation employed
is NACR or AGM.
Definition of the authentication property corresponds to a subset of places in
Tsub OutSecure (6) and MasterRecv (8) in Figure 4.3. Interested readers can
also make reference to Figure 3.14 in Chapter 3, and Figure 4.11 of this chapter
for details. In Tsub OutSecure (6) (Figure 4.11 for details) three places were used.
That is, a place called StoreHMAC models the storage area for MAC tags from
the master station. The second place is called OHMAC. It models the outstation’s
storage area for its own MAC tags. Whiles the third place is called AuthStatus,
it models the authentication status (i.e. an authentication pass or fail). In Tsub
MasterRecv (8), a single place called M Internal models the storage area for
IIN values on the master station (refer to Figure 3.14).
The following are CTL statements that are used in formalising the property.
[Ev(A): FORALL UNTIL(TT, A), TT] refers to a truth value. This operator
returns a true value if all paths, from a given state, lead to a state where A is
true. [Pos: EXIST UNTIL(TT, A), TT] refers to a truth value. This operator
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also returns a true value if there exists at least one path, from a given state,
that leads to a state where A is true. This IMCPN denotes to our initial CPN
model without attacks. MITMCPN denotes our attack model in IMCPN. MDA, RPA, SPA
denotes modification, replay and spoofing attack models carried out by a MITM
respectively. MRSA denotes all attacks set to true in MITMCPN. M0 denotes the initial
marking or state in IMCPN, [M0i denotes the set of reachable markings from M0 and
(SAM(Mi, PPlaceName) denotes a place name at a marking Mi (Mi 2 [M0i). Furthermore,
Mtag and Otag represent the master station and the outstation calculated MAC
tags. MOTrue and MOFalse represent the match and mismatch of MAC tags. Tgtrue
and TgFalse represent authentication pass or failure. Finally, It and If denote the
IIN values to be obtained on the master station (M Internal on Figure 3.14).
Property - Authentication Property
Predicates for IMCPN :
- Mtag Mi = (SAM(Mi, PStoreMAC)) 6= ;
- Otag Mi = (SAM(Mi, POHMAC)) 6= ;
- MOTrue Mi = (SAM(Mi, POHMAC)) = (SAM(PStoreMAC))
- MOFalse Mi = (SAM(Mi, POHMAC)) 6= (SAM(PStoreMAC))
- TgTrue Mi = (SAM(Mi, PAuthStatus)) = 1‘"Authpass"
- TgFalse Mi = (SAM(Mi, PAuthStatus)) = 1‘"Authfail"
- It Mi = (SAM(Mi, PM Internal)) = (1‘"00 IIN 1") _ (1‘"00 IIN 2")
- If Mi = (SAM(Mi, PM Internal)) = (1‘"sysfail")
DNP3-SA is agreed to have an uncompromising authentication property, i↵ IMCPN
_ MITMCPN have the following behaviour:
- If all attacks carried out in MITMCPN are false, then
8 Mi 2 [M0i Ev(MOTrue Mi ^ TgTrue Mi ^ It Mi) ^
¬Pos(TgFalse Mi ^ If Mi)
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- Otherwise, if MDA _ RPA _ SPA _ MRSA in MITMCPN are true, then
9 Mi 2 [M0i Ev(MOFalse Mi ^ TgFalse Mi ^ If Mi) ^
¬Pos(TgTrue Mi ^ It Mi)
Table 4.2: State Space Reports - NACR and AGM CPN Model
State Space Report for NACR and AGM CPN Model
Initial CPN Model (IMCPN)
MITM Attacks (MITMCPN)
MDA RPA SPA MRSA
State Space Nodes 299 252 706 117 11733
State Space Arcs 338 289 921 239 34894
SCC Graph Nodes 299 252 706 117 11733
SCC Graph Arcs 338 289 921 239 34894
Dead Markings 1 1 1 6 72
Dead Transitions 14 17 17 28 12
4.4.2 Validation of NACR and AGM CPN model
We present the full state space reports of NACR and AGM CPN model with all
attacks stated in the specification. As previous stated, we validate the model
to determine whether the model reflect the behaviour of the authentication
mechanism. The table consists of two groups; Initial CPN model (IMCPN) and
MITM Attacks (MITMCPN). IMCPN implies that all attack parameters are set to
false. MITMCPN implies that one or more attacks can be set to true, henceforth
the attacks are switched on.
IMCPN in Table 4.2 depicts that the State Space Nodes and Arcs have matching
values with the Strongly Connected Components (SCC) Graph Nodes and Arcs.
As previously stated, SCC is a property used to determine the reachability of
nodes and iterations in models. Obtaining the same values for state space and
SCC indicates that every nodes in the model is reachable from any other node.
Furthermore, there exists no loops in the model that may render the model to
have infinite occurrences.
The report also shows that there exists one dead marking (i.e 299 instance)
and 14 dead transitions. These imply that the obtained values are consistent
with our expectations defined in Section 4.4. The reason is that the single
dead marking obtained represents a single state. This single state is where each
request transmitted by the master station is successfully authenticated by the
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outstation. Thus, leading to the occurrences of all transitions in Tsub Process
except Tsub AuthErr, which is a submodule embedded in OProcess (7) (refer
to Figure 4.3 and Figure 3.13). Tsub AuthErr marks authentication error in
module OProcess (7) (refer to Figure 3.13 in Chapter 3 for details). Moreover, a
closer inspection on the dead transitions revealed that all 14 dead transitions are
consistent as well. That is, two out of the 14 dead transitions were found to be
inactive, because no attack was turned ON. They reflected the generation points
for authentication error messages (Tsub AuthErr of Figure 3.13 in Chapter 3).
The 12 remaining transitions reflected other activities (not part of DNP3-SA’s
specification) and all attack behaviours that are set to false. Achieving this
behaviour concludes that the NACR and AGM CPN model behaves as expected,
as the model is able to verify the authenticity of the master station for every
request executed on the outstation.
4.4.3 Attack Models
Having validated the model, we can now verify the model for its behavioural
correctness through our parameterised MITM attack. The MITM attack in this
section is designed to perform various malicious activities, which include the
following:
• MDA denotes modification attack, where the attacker is able to modify packets
such as requests and contents of challenge messages.
• RPA denotes replay attack, where the attacker is able to replay any messages
from the master station.
• SPA denotes spoofing attack, where the attacker is allowed to masquerade
as the master station to the outstation.
• MRSA denotes all attacks are set to true. This allows the attacker to launch
all attacks.
The main goals of these attacks in our existing CPN model are to manipulate both
protocol modes messages and execute unauthorised commands on the outstation.
By doing this (i.e. using the attack models), we can revalidate the correctness
of the authentication mechanism in the protocol. But it must be noted that the
attack models considered in this section are not exhaustive. This is because we do
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not consider other forms of attacks such as eavesdropping and reflection attacks.
We consider the above attack models because they have been stated in the DNP3
protocol specification to be addressed by the authentication mechanism.
Figure 4.12 depicts details of the MITM attack behaviours within the net-
work. The attack behaviours are modelled as part of the ConnectA, LReplayA,
ConnectAGM, ConnectC and Sol ConnectC transitions (refer to the dotted areas
in Figure 4.12). That is, the modification attack in the figure is modelled as arc an
expression Mattack1(f,oh) on the ConnectA transition and AttackSeq(cd) and
AttackSeq2(ac) on the ConnectC and Sol ConnectC transitions. The spoofing
attacks has been modelled as the guard function Spoof on the Connect AGM
transition while the replay attack is modelled through the LReplayA transition.
Figure 4.12: The attack models within the network - Third-level page.
4.4.4 Verifying NACR and AGM against attacks stated
in the specification
MITMCPN in Table 4.2 presents the reports for all attacks that have been set to
true in DNP3-SA CPN model. From the table, MDA and RPA present a single dead
marking is obtained for each. A close inspection revealed that the dead marking
obtained for each attack represents the termination of all executed requests with
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all their authentication failing; leading to the execution of Tsub AuthErr. As a
result, 17 dead transitions were obtained for each attack. A close inspection on
the obtained dead transitions revealed that, out of 17, five (5) of them marked
various activities such as reading, writing or initiating an application in Tsub
OProcess that did not occur. This is as a result of the attacks. The remaining 12
dead transitions marked paremeterised transitions that are set to false. These
results are consistent with our expectations and implies that the authentication
property hold.
MITMCPN, SPA in Table 4.2 presents 6 dead markings and 28 dead transitions
obtained. This attack behaviour rendered the model to become inaccessible. This
behaviour is expected, as our attack model is under the assumption that session
keys between the stations are pre-shared before the attack. This behaviour leads
DNP3-SA CPN model to hang and not to complete successfully. This, does
not a↵ect the behaviour of the protocol nor does it renders the protocol to be
inaccessible in real life. In practice, a timer allows the protocol to drop a given
transaction after a threshold. We, however, carried out this analysis to further
investigate impacts and benefits it has on the DNP3-SA (i.e. used in conjunction
with other attack models).
4.4.5 Evaluation of DNP3-SA CPN model
In this section, we set all attack parameters to true. This combines all attacks
behaviours specified above. Then, we set place Tagcount of Figure 4.12 to the
value 1 and also set the modification attack parameter to manipulate the challenge
message from the outstation (refer to the middle part of Figure 4.12). These
settings are very crucial because: 1) it enables the attacker to gather enough data
after two initial requests have been successfully executed on the outstation during
NACR operation, and 2) the master station can consider the last challenge data
from the outstation as its most recent challenge data for AGM operations.
MITMCPN, MRSA in Table 4.2 presents 72 instances of dead markings and only
12 dead transitions. Results obtained in this report imply that the model has
certain unexpected behaviours. This is as a result of the high number of dead
markings obtained. This behaviour, therefore calls for further investigations. This
chapter defines three SML queries and uses the interactive simulation provided by
the CPN tools to conduct the investigations. The SML query functions include:
ListDeadMarkings(), SearchNodes and reachability. ListDeadMarkings() is used
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to list all dead markings identified in the model. SearchNodes is used to search
for all possible paths of a given marking. For example, identifying a marking
that represents the state of the attacker in the model. Reachability is a property
focused in determining whether there exists an occurrence sequence starting from
the marking of node A to the marking of node B. In the model, reaching at least a
single state from where the attacker can transmit request and the authentication
for that request fails; implies that the authentication property holds in DNP3-SA.
On the contrary (from the attacker’s state), if one can still reach a state where
the authentication is successful then, the authentication property is said to be
violated.
In the analysis, the ListDeadMarkings() query is used to obtained all dead
markings stated in the report and further simulate them individually. Simulating
all the obtained markings enabled us to classify the dead markings into two main
groups: expected and unexpected. According to the configuration of the model,
an expected marking is a state, where it is expected that only two of the initial
requests are being successfully executed on the outstation, but having subsequent
requests failing. However, for a state that has more than two of its initial requests
successfully executed on the outstation implies that, it is an unexpected dead
marking. From the simulation, 36 instances (which ranged from 11698  11733)
of unexpected dead markings were listed (not listed due of space limitations).
Obtaining these instances require a close inspection. The inspection leads to the
usage of the SearchNodes query. The SearchNodes query is used within a function
to search for all possible paths that issued requests from the attacker state. This
is to search and return at least one node value.
Figure 4.13 depicts our results. The top-side of the figure presents the
SearchNodes queries used within a function and its outcome. The node value
obtained from the query (96) is used against all the unexpected dead markings
(11698   11733) to determine if it is possible to reach them. At the bottom
of Figure 4.13, the reachability statements used are depicted. The statements
returned true values for all the unexpected dead markings instances; implying
that all instances are reachable from the attacker state. Relating this outcome to
the authentication property defined in Section 4.4.1 implies that the property has
been violated in the presence of this attack model. Even though, the attacker does
not possess the key to compute valid tags for authentication; a write command
has been successfully executed on an IED in the model (transition T writeB).
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Figure 4.13: Outcomes of SML queries used in DNP3-SA CPN model - Third-level
page.
Observations and Results: Inspecting the results through simulation re-
vealed that there exists instances where the attacker, without the knowledge of
any key, is capable of replaying valid AGM messages to execute commands on
the outstation; writing or reading values or even initiating an application on an
IED during the AGM operation. Since the protocol messages are transmitted
in ‘cleartext’, requests and challenge messages can be manipulated, which can
prevent relevant protocol sequences from completing during the NACR mode.
For instance, randomly manipulating all KSn or nonces in challenge messages
can cause loss of synchronisation and unexpected authentication failures (refer
to Figure 4.1 in Section 4.1). In the model the attacker instead, can choose to
sequentially manipulate the KSn in the challenge message to the next counter
value after observing that the KSn value increases by one for every session.
This is because the KSn value can be predicted easily; allowing the KSn value
to be set higher. In doing so, both stations are ‘fooled’ into producing MAC
tags, which result in an authentication failure during the NACR verification
process. Although, the tag verification fails in the NACR mode, the same (old)
tag becomes valid if the tag is coupled with a particular request and used during
AGM mode of operation. Thus, when an authentication fails during NACR, the
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outstation still continues to update its KSn for its next challenge. Understanding
this flaw enables the attacker to replay the old tag (previously captured from the
master station during NACR mode) to the outstation as an aggressive message.
In doing so, a successful execution of a command can be carried out via transition
T writeB (refer to Figure 3.13 in Chapter 3). In our model, this behaviour has
led to identifying 12 out 17 expected dead transitions. Therefore, this behaviour
violates the authentication property defined in Section 4.4.1.
4.5 Proposed Solutions for the Identified Flaw
NACR and AGM CPN model has shown a flaw when all attacks are enabled.
In the DNP3-SA protocol specification, it is stated that the aggressive mode
operation is “somewhat more secure against replay attacks”. Analysis from the
model has revealed a flaw in the protocol, which is inherited from the NACR
mode. The flaw allows an attacker, without possessing any key to replay a valid
MAC tag (old message) from one mode of operation to another, and execute
commands on the outstation. Impacts of such attacks on real-life critical systems
such as the smart grid can be extremely detrimental. An example of such impact
can be damaging highly sophisticated devices that are sustaining many critical
infrastructures. This chapter presents and models two approaches in this section
that can be used to fix the flaw identified. The proposed approaches are further
validated and verified using the model.
Solution 1: MAC for challenges data
Figure 4.14 depicts an approach that suggests the computation of an MAC tag
on the challenge message from either the master station or outstation; depending
on who the challenger is. Computation of the tag is based on user association ID
and MAC schemes (such as SHA-HMAC and AES-GMAC) already used in the
DNP3-SA protocol. Figure 4.14 illustrates the master station sending a critical
request to the outstation (step 1). On receipt of the request, the outstation
generates Chalg (KSn,H, P ) (step 2). Chalg is then used together with UID by
the outstation as input elements to compute Ctag. Ctag is computed by using
the MAC scheme, MACSk0mo , and the input elements (Chalg, UID) (step 3). The
outstation, then sends a message comprising of Ctag and Chalg to the master
station. On receipt of the message, the master station uses its UID and Chalg
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from the outstation as its inputs to compute Ctag
0
(step 4). Then, the master
station compares the tags for equality (step 5). If the tags match, the master
station is triggered to continue its normal operation by computing a MAC tag (i.e.
tag, step 3 of Figure 4.1) on its initial request (step 6). Otherwise, the protocol
logs the failure and aborts the operation (logError&Abort). This behaviour will
prevent the master station (responder) from being ‘tricked’ into computing a valid
MAC tag, which will later become beneficial to the attacker for a successful attack.
This approach also helps to prevent the outstation from automatically updating
its KSn when a reply (expected MAC tag on the ‘waiting to process request’) is
not yet received. This proposal does not require a major upgrade in the existing
modes to increase communication and storage overheads. It instead, reduces both
communication and storage overheads at a minor (asymptotically insignificant)
cost of increased processing because of an extra MAC tag produced by both
station to verify the validity of the challenge message (refer to the processing
part of AGMSol1 in Table 4.4, which will be later).
M (UpK, Sk
0
mo) O (UpK, Sk
0
mo)
NACR
(1) RQ = (FC,OH)
RQ  !
(2) Chalg = (KSn,H, P )
(Ctag,Chalg)          (3) Ctag =MACSk0mo(Chalg,UID)
(4) Ctag
0
=MACSk0mo(Chalg,UID)
Verify MAC Tags
(5) If (Ctag
0
== Ctag) then
(6) tag =MACSk0mo(Chalg, RQ,UID)
tag !
Else
logError&Abort
:
Figure 4.14: Solution 1: Implementation of MAC for challenge messages.
Solution 2: Randomisation for KSn / Limiting KSn to AGM
According to the DNP3-SA standards, KSn is a mechanism used to sequentially
maintain a match of replies (responses) between stations. That is, KSns in
stations are set to zero (0) at startup. However, the KSns increase by 1 each
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time a station challenges or requires authentication. Our experiments on real
devices (SMP4) has revealed that the mechanism (KSn) is not only used for
synchronisation but it also serves as a key element for implementing the AGM
mode of operation (i.e. transitioning from one mode of operation to another
(NACR to AGM) for less bandwidth usage [IEE12]). Analysis from DNP3-SA
CPN model has revealed a flaw associated with the KSn, because the attacker
could easily guess what the next KSn will be. As a result, a successful replay
attack was carried out. Randomising KSns during the NACR operation will
make it almost impractical for the attack to be successful. This is because, each
time the KSn is issued, the value is chosen at random; making it di cult for the
attacker to guess what the next value could be. This approach, although proves
promising, may lead on to increase in protocol overheads.
We recommend an alternative way over randomisation. We suggest that the
protocol will be better o↵ discarding the use of the KSn mechanism in the NACR
mode. Instead, we suggest the KSn mechanism to be introduced solely in the
AGM mode rather than being an active component of the NACR mode operation.
The presence of the KSn mechanism in NACR is seemingly redundant. As a
result, it leads to manipulation; launching successful attack on real-life systems.
We suggest that the pseudo-random number (nonce) and the MAC algorithm in
the challenge message will be e↵ective (su cient) components to run the NACR
mode without di culties. However, if for any reason the AGM mode is to be
carried out for operations, then we advise on the following: 1) integrating the
KSn mechanism as part of the AGM operation and 2) making use of NACR’s
challenge (‘the most recent challenge message’, which consists of the nonce +
MAC algorithm). This proposal does not require any upgrade in the protocol.
Instead, it requires KSn to be part of the AGM components such that KSn
will not manipulated by an adversary. This further implies that the existing
communication, processing and storage overheads are not a↵ected by the change
(comparing the communication, processing and storage overheads of the initial
AGM and AGMSol2 in Table 4.4). We illustrate our solution in Figure 4.15,
under the assumption that the KSn mechanism is part of the AGM and not
the NACR operation. Figure 4.15 shows that after a request is received by the
outstation (step 1), the outstation issues Chalga to the master station (step 2).
It is to be noted that Chalga is composed of only H,P (MAC algorithm and
nonce). However, for the AGM operation, computation of the MAC tag is based
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on Chalga (H&P ) but includes KSn (represented as Chalgb). This approach (i.e.
introducing KSn in AGM) still provides synchronisation among other stations.
However, the real benefit is that the computation of the MAC tag for the AGM
request will be completed before an attacker will be able to guess the KSn. This
approach deters tricking stations during the NACR operation to compute valid
tag; which later can be replayed with a request to carry out an event. Finally,
this approach also helps to prevent challengers (outstations) from updating their
KSns automatically when authentication fails during a NACR operation.
4.5.1 Specification of New DNP3-SA CPN model
Through parameterisation, we implement new behaviours (our proposed solutions 1
and 2) in NACR and AGM CPN model. The parameters of our solutions were set
to false by default during the initial validation of NACR and AGM CPN model.
In this section, we present them and set their parameters to true to validate and
verify the new NACR and AGM CPN model with the flaw identified.
The behaviour details of proposed solution 1 is presented in Figures 4.16 & 4.17.
Explanation of these figures are aligned with the MSC provided in Figure 4.14
(MAC for challenges messages). The Secure Challenge Data transition in Tsub
OSecureCH in Figure 4.16 uses the elements of the challenge data together with
the session key and the current user ID to create a MAC tag on the challenge data.
After the tag has been obtained from the Ctag1 place, the tag is later coupled
with the challenge data and sent to the master station via SendChlg2 place.
In Figure 4.17, the RecvCH transition of the master station receives the secure
challenge message (i.e. challenge data and MAC tag on the challenge). Using
the same methodology, the master station computes a tag on the challenge data
through the ChlgAuth transition for verification, via the tagCheck transition.
From tagCheck, if the tag match, a pass token is sent to enable the master
station to reply to the challenge, as the outstation is waiting to process the
request. Otherwise, the protocol generates a security log indicating unmatched
tags for the challenge data and aborts the operation as a result of an attack.
Figure 4.18 & 4.19 illustrate the behaviour of the proposed solution 2 in NACR
and AGM CPN model. Explanation of these figures are also aligned with the
MSC provided in Figure 4.15. In Figure 4.18, the CSQ place is independent of
the NACR operation (refer to top left of the figure). But the RecentCHM place
is an active element of both NACR and AGM. The reason as to why RecentCHM
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Figure 4.16: Outstation secures the challenge data by generating an MAC on the
challenge data before it is transmitted to the master station - Third-level page.
Figure 4.17: Master station receives the challenge with the MAC from the
outstation, generates MAC tag based on the challenge for verification - Third-
level page.
is serving both modes of operation is because, RecentCHM enables the AGM
operation to make use of the most recently received challenge data from the
outstation (refer to bottom left of Figure 4.18). In the same figure (Figure 4.18),
the SecureAGM transition becomes enabled through its incoming arcs only if, an
AGM request is about to be sent to the outstation. This causes the SecureAGM
transition to compute a MAC tag on the request. It is to be noted from the
figure (Figure 4.18), the tag is computed by consuming tokens from RecentCHM,
CSQ and the surrounding places of the SecureAGM transition. Then, when the
incoming arcs of the AGMPack transition are satisfied, an AGM request (request
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to be sent and the computed MAC tag) is sent to the outstation. In Figure 4.19,
the outstation extracts and stores MAC tags from the master station on the
StoreAMac place. Then, when tokens from the surrounding arcs of the SecureO
AG mode transition are consumed, an MAC tag is created. In this process, it is
also important to note that the CSQ place is part of the computation of the
AGM tag (refer to lower-left of Figure 4.19). The final step of this process is the
verification of the tags. The tag verification is achieved with a CPN function
AGMverifytags on the Tagcheck2 transition. That is, if the tags match or fail,
a pass or fail token is generated to place AuthStatus. The status of verification
is then sent to Tsub OProcess (Figure 4.3) for processing.
Table 4.3: State Space Reports - Refined DNP3-SA CPN Model
State Space Report for Refined NACR and AGM CPN Model
Initial CPN model (IMCPN) MITM Attacks (MITMCPN)
Sol1 Sol2 Sol1-MRSM0 Sol2-MRSM0
State Space Nodes 317 434 72 411
State Space Arcs 356 642 71 472
SCC Graph Nodes 317 434 72 411
SCC Graph Arcs 356 642 71 472
Dead Markings 1 1 1 1
Dead Transitions 8 15 20 9
4.5.2 Validation and Verification of the Proposed Solu-
tions in NACR and AGM CPN Model
This section presents the analysis of our new NACR and AGM CPN model. Here,
we validate the solutions as before to determine if the proposed solutions are
reflect the behaviours proposed. Furthermore, we also verify each of the solutions
against the attack model, MRSM0 . It is to be noted that throughout this analysis,
it is expected that we obtain a single dead marking just as previously stated in
Section 4.4.
Validation of Solution 1 and 2
IMCPN in Table 4.3 depicts the reports of our proposed solutions (refer to Figure 4.16
and 4.17, and Figure 4.18 and 4.19). For solution 1, a single dead marking with 8
dead transitions were obtained. The report of solution 2 also presents a single dead
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Figure 4.18: Master station computes AGM request using the KSn as well as
the most recent challenge message received - Third-level page.
Figure 4.19: Outstation computes MAC tag by using the KSn and the previous
most recently issued challenge data - Third-level page.
marking with 15 dead transitions. Close inspections on both reports revealed that
the obtained dead marking and transitions are consistent with our expectations (as
MRSM0 is to set false). This is because we expected a single dead marking for both
solutions to reflect the correctness of the model. In addition, we expected 8 and
15 dead transitions for both solutions because we have enabled the parameterised
behaviours (i.e. parameterised solutions that were previously set to false) in the
model.
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Verification of Solution 1
MITMCPN, Sol1 in Table 4.3 presents the report generated for solution 1. The report
depicts a single dead marking and 20 dead transitions. As previously stated in
Section 4.4.5, 72 instances of dead markings were obtained and later categorised
in two main groups: expected and unexpected. For this revised model, we have
obtained a single dead marking. Using the previous definition of the expected
dead markings in Section 4.4.5, we conduct an investigation on our current results.
This is to determine whether the marking obtained in this analysis is expected
or not. Thus, in this analysis we expect a true value from our reachability
statement. A truth value from the statement will imply that the model does not
allow the attack models to execute any command on the outstation, after one or
two initial requests have been issued by the master station. But, if it is possible
for the attacker to execute a command after the expected initial requests from the
master station, then it implies that the obtained dead marking is not expected.
Henceforth, the authentication property does not hold. Figure 4.20 presents the
results from the queries used. A function with the embedded SearchNodes was
used to capture the state where the attacker is potentially able to ‘fool’ the master
station and send AGM requests to the outstation. The query returned the node
value of 62 as the state of the attacker (refer to the query in Figure 4.20). We
then use the obtained value (62) with the single dead marking obtained in this
report to determine their reachability status. The reachability query has returned
true; emphasising that an attacker cannot reach a state where it can launch any
command to the outstation (hence verifying solution 1). This behaviour indicates
the authentication property holds because the model has detected the attack
behaviour. Moreover, as a result of detecting the attack, the model aborts any
further operations that will lead to the successful execution of a command on an
outstation. As a result of this behaviour, 20 dead transitions were identified not
to have occur (including solution 2 because its parameters have been set to false).
Verification of Solution 2
MITMCPN, Sol2 in Table 4.3 presents the report of our second solution against
MRSM0 . The report presents a single dead marking (411) and 9 dead transitions.
In this analysis, we use the simulation approach to conduct further studies on
the obtained results. The sequential execution of the simulation revealed that
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Figure 4.20: Outcomes of SML queries used in our Refined DNP3-SA CPN model.
the single dead marking (411) is consistent with our expectation (hence verifying
solution 2). The single dead marking obtained represents the successful execution
of legitimate requests from the master station to the outstation; leading to
execution of operational transitions on Tsub OProcess (refer to Figure 3.13 in
Chapter 3 for details). Other NACR or AGM requests issued by the attack
rendered Tsub AuthErr to execute; leading to authentication error messages
(refer to Figure 3.13 for details). Thus, every attempt to guess or manipulate
the challenge data leads to a failure during authentication. The execution of
Tsub AuthErr as a result of attempts from the attack model accounts for the
identification of only 9 dead transitions in the analysis. These dead transitions
represent behaviours of solution 1 (Figure 4.16 and 4.17), which have been set to
false in the NACR and AGM CPN model.
4.5.3 Performance Analysis and Comparison
In this section, we provide the overhead analysis of the fixed protocol to show that
our approaches indeed maintain communication, processing and storage overheads
at the cost of a minor (asymptotically insignificant) increased cost in processing.
To be more specific the increase in processing only occurs in our proposed
solution 1. The overheads of solution 2 stay the same and untouched as the
normal AGM behaviour. This section presents a comparison of communication,
processing and storage overheads between the normal communication modes
(NACR and AGM) and the solutions proposed. It is to be noted that the
comparison is based on the total counts of messages within the DNP3-SA protocol
but not in byte size. This is because most of the messages have similar byte
sizes. Before Table 4.4 is explained, this section will presents the notation used
in the table. Here n is used to denote the approximate number of commands to
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be exchanged between a master station and an outstation per user and during
a time interval between two key updates. Here AGMSol1 and AGMSol2 denote
our proposed solution 1 and solution 2 in Section 4.5. Here MRSN , MRSA
represent the modification, replay and spoofing attacks NACR and AGM modes,
respectively. Here MRSSol1, MRSSol2 denote modification, replay and spoofing
attacks in our proposed solutions. The cryptographic primitives of the NACR and
AGM modes, which include the MAC scheme and MAC tags are represented as
C (i.e. C={MACSk0mo , Ctag, Ctag
0
, tag, tag
0}. Similarly, the stored parameters
in NACR and AGM modes are represented as K (i.e. K={KSn, H, P , UpK ,
Sk
0
mo}. The probability that a command will be attacked by using one of the
attack methods such as modification, replay and spoofing is denoted by Pa.
To understand Table 4.4, one must take two things into consideration for
the communication and storage overheads. First, there is a key update process
that occurs before the NACR or AGM operates. The key update process has 4
headcount of messages per round and per user (refer to Figure 4.1 in Section 4.1).
Second, before AGM can successfully operate, there must be at least a run of
the NACR operation, which implies the number of communicated messages in
NACR will also be considered in AGM.
In Table 4.4, NACR row, the total messages involved the NACR mode of
operation is shown as 4(n+1) ⇡ O(n) (the key update process). That is to
say, assuming there are n commands in each key update round, then total
communication overhead for NACR is 4n, plus 4 messages for the key update
process. Asymptotically, this value corresponds to O(n). In processing NACR,
the overhead of both the master station and the outstation corresponds to n ⇡
O(n). This is because each of the master and outstation compute a single MAC
tag. In storing parameters in NACR, 4 values are expected to be stored on both
master and outstation. This is because both store value like the keys (update
and session keys), MAC scheme, content of the challenge message. Additionally,
the table shows the communication overhead of the AGM operation as 2(n+4)
⇡ O(n). This is value (2(n+4) ⇡ O(n)) is derived because there are 4 messages
from the key update process, 4 messages from the NACR operation and two 2n
messages from the AGM itself (i.e. NACR must run before AGM) for n commands.
The processing overhead in AGM is similar to NACR except that in AGM there
is the requirement that there must be a prior NACR session, meaning that both
master station and outstation perform an additional MAC computation (i.e. n+1).
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Table 4.4: Performance Analysis and Comparison
Communication
(#messages)
Processing (*)
(# Crypto Operations C)
Storage
(# Parameters K)
Master Outstation Master Outstation
NACR 4(n+1) ⇡ O(n) n ⇡ O(n) n ⇡ O(n) 4 (Constant) 4 (Constant)
AGM 2(n+4) ⇡ O(n) n+1 ⇡ O(n) n+1 ⇡ O(n) 4 (Constant) 4 (Constant)
AGMSol1 2(n+4) ⇡ O(n) n+ 2 ⇡ O(n) n+ 2 ⇡ O(n) 4 (Constant) 4 (Constant)
AGMSol2 2(n+4) ⇡ O(n) n+1 ⇡ O(n) n+1 ⇡ O(n) 4 (Constant) 4 (Constant)
MRSN 4nPa ⇡ O(n) nPa ⇡ O(n) nPa ⇡ O(n) - -
MRSA 2nPa ⇡ O(n) nPa ⇡ O(n) nPa ⇡ O(n) - -
MRSASol1 2nPa ⇡ O(n) nPa ⇡ O(n) nPa ⇡ O(n) - -
MRSASol2 2nPa ⇡ O(n) nPa ⇡ O(n) nPa ⇡ O(n) - -
Asymptotically, this value corresponds to O(n). For storage overhead in AGM,
4 values are expected to be stored on both stations. This is because the AGM
operation make use of the existing primitives of NACR.
In comparing the proposed solutions 1 and 2 (AGMsol1 and AGMsol2) to the
normal behaviour of NACR and AGM, the table shows that the communication
and storage overheads of AGMsol1 are the same to that of the AGM operation
but at a minor increase in processing overhead. This is because AGMsol1 requires
two times (2x) MAC tags produced by both stations a priori in the NACR
session (refer to the Figure 4.14). The overheads of AGMsol2 stays the same when
compare to the normal operation of AGM. With the attack models, the table
presents that a command can be attacked with Pa. The table shows the expected
additional overhead required when these attacks occur either in NACR or AGM
modes. In summary, the expected additional overhead is the overhead of AGM
or NACR multiplied by Pa. The table presents the highest overhead that may be
caused by any one of these three attacks.
4.5.4 Discussion
The work in this chapter has presented detailed behavioural analyses of the
authentication mechanism provided by NACR and AGM model using Coloured
Petri Nets. Analysis of the model has revealed a flaw, which was previously not
identified during the design phase of the DNP3-SA protocol. The model has shown
us that it is possible to exploit the AGM mode of the DNP3-SA protocol through
a NACR flaw that was previously unidentified. That is, messages communicated
in the protocol are in ‘cleartext’, as a result a MITM attacker is able to intercept,
modify and masquerade as though the master station and replay messages to the
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outstation. By modifying messages, the attacker is able to trick the master station
to compute a legitimate MAC tag for a given request. The tag is later used by
the attacker to trick the outstation into believing that the message received from
the attacker’s state is originating from the master station and therefore, it is
legitimate. This further allows the outstation to execute the command for the
attacker (replay attack). This flaw identified can lead to serious consequences
as it allows an attacker to ‘fool’ the outstation to perform previous commands.
For example, assuming during NACR mode of operation, a write function is
executed to either set the time on an outstation for synchronisation of certain
crucial data or set an analog deadband value on the outstation. An attacker
who is successful in ‘fooling’ the master station into producing a valid tag for
that operation can perform the same set of functions in the aggressive mode on
the outstation and even write arbitrary values. In e↵ect, the flaw violates the
authentication property during the AGM operation.
Through the CPN’s parameterisation technique, we have been able to combine
multiple instances of di↵erent behaviours into one model. This has enabled us
to test for various attack scenarios and develop countermeasures against the
flaw identified. This has shown the feasibility and power of formal methods in
identifying and verifying a SCADA protocol flaws. The complexities of initially
building the model may be seen as a drawback, however, the model needs to be
developed once and can be reused for di↵erent purposes (just as presented in this
chapter and Chapters 3 and 5). In addition, another benefit of this model is that
it can be used for performing tests before interacting with the actual production
systems or deploying expensive testbeds. The use of models often reduces the
e↵ort required by protocol designers to manually check all possible conditions
that may lead to undesirable behaviours. Having said that, this chapter has also
shown that through a CPN model, developers can formally reason about systems
and check their behavioural correctness as well as implement the most e↵ective
and e cient countermeasures. This further implies that through CPN and its
parameterisation technique, various SCADA protocols used in control systems
can be modelled and analysed as the technique facilitates the ability to combine
di↵erent behaviours of interest. This will benefit designers that may want to
analyse diverse systems properties such as security and safety.
108 Chapter 4. Formal Analysis of the DNP3-SA Aggressive Mode
4.5.5 Conclusion
This chapter has presented the formal analysis of the authentication mechanism
in DNP3-SA protocol based on its specification and the use of real devices.
This chapter has shown how the authentication property of the mechanism is
violated through the AGM mode because of a flaw identified in NACR. It has
also shown how the flaw can be formally fixed through two di↵erent approaches:
1) calculating MAC on the challenge message and 2) implementing the KSn as
the sole component of the AGM operation. These solutions have been modelled
and evaluated against the same attack vectors used in this chapter to show that
the flaw is fixed.
While the proposed solutions in this chapter have shown to resolve the flaw
identified in the mechanism, this chapter emphasises that the mechanism is only
considered for unicast communication. Henceforth, the unicast architecture. This
implies that the mechanism may not be suitable for broadcast communication in
the Multi-drop, as presented in Section 2.2.1. In the next chapter (Chapter 5), this
thesis will consider scaling the evaluation of the DNP3-SA over the Multi-drop
architecture, where a single master station may be communicating with multiple
outstations. The purpose of this is to determine how one can improve the security
of the DNP3-SA protocol on the large scale architecture or large production
systems.
Chapter 5
Securing DNP3 Broadcast
Communications in SCADA
Systems
In the previous chapter (Chapter 4), we extended the work in Chapter 3 to add
the AGM mode, such that we can analyse the full behaviour of the authentication
mechanism in the DNP3-SA on the unicast architecture. As DNP3-SA CPN
model was achieved, we validated and verified the protocol against attack models.
The verification of the DNP3-SA CPN model revealed a vulnerability in the NACR
CPN model that allows the use of the AGM operation to be flawed by common
attacks such as modification, replay and spoofing. As a result, it compromises
the authentication property of the protocol. This flaw has been resolved through
2 di↵erent approaches that were modelled and evaluated. Although, the flaw
has been resolved, it is also important to note that the DNP3 protocol support
di↵erent forms of architectures. So far, the analysis of the protocol has been
carried out on the unicast architecture because a master station can send a request
to exactly one outstation.
The focus of this chapter is on one of the two architectures called the Multi-drop
architecture. This architecture supports two di↵erent modes of communication
namely; unicast and broadcast. This chapter is more concerned on broadcast
communication mode, whereby a master station can simultaneously send a single
request to all outstations to carry out a given task and reduce delays and overheads
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in large scale systems. This chapter concentrates on broadcast, because a single
command can reach many outstations. Broadcast is an important feature for
cases of emergencies. For example, an emergency shut-down of stations may
be required due to an electrical incident. The DNP3 broadcast mode does
not have any security mechanism described in the protocol specification as to
how the DNP3-SA protocol secures broadcast communication. This gap in the
protocol can lead to devastating problems as the protocol can be vulnerable to
a number of attacks. For example, an attacker who has access to the network
may modify commands or execute unauthorised commands simultaneously on
multiple outstations to interrupt the services.
Moreover, even though there are no documentation on how DNP3-SA se-
cures broadcast communication, the DNP3 protocol specification draws a clear
distinction on three command types or addresses that are used for broadcast
communication. The addresses include ‘0xFFFD’, ‘0xFFFE’ and ‘0xFFFF’. The
command, 0xFFFD, requires an application confirmation response from outstations,
which is usually a single bit turned on in the AC (Application Control Octet)
field. The command, 0xFFFE, does not require any response from the outstations.
The last command, 0xFFFF, may require an AC response depending on the con-
dition of the command. In the absence of a security mechanism for broadcast
communication, an attacker could easily exploit the protocol by launching attacks
using these 3 addresses. The worse command if attacked is the 0xFFFE command
because it does not require any response. This attack may be di cult to detect
because of the command’s unidirectional nature. In addition, it may also become
more challenging to secure the systems compared to other command schemes.
This chapter considers to concentrate on the command (0xFFFE) which does
not require responses from the outstations. We focus on this command because
they are commonly used in SCADA networks to reduce communication overheads,
particularly large scale systems. Moreover, the unidirectional nature of the
command make it a more challenging issue to secure. The contribution of this
chapter is currently under review with the IEEE Transactions on Industrial
Informatics.
Specifically the contribution of this chapter is two fold. First, we use CPN
to create a DNP3-SA model for the Multi-drop architecture. This model is to
formally analyse the security behaviour of the protocol on large-scale systems.
As previously explained, a Multi-drop architecture supports either a unicast or
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broadcast communication. In broadcast communication, a single request can reach
many outstations, where responses from the outstations are not always guaranteed.
As DNP3-SA has been designed to cater for unicast communication and there
exist no documentation that specify the security of broadcast communication,
this chapter provides a new security scheme for broadcast communication called
Secure Authentication for Broadcast (SAB). The scheme secures DNP3 broadcast
through the use of a one-way hash function (hash-chain) that can only be generated
and distributed by the master station and not by any of the outstations. All that
the outstations do are to verify the parameters provided by the master station
by using initial pre-distributed credentials. To our knowledge, this is the first
proposal for DNP3 broadcast authentication for Multi-drop architectures. The
proposed SAB scheme extends DNP3-SA by reusing its existing cryptographic
primitives together with a hash chain concept from the TESLA protocol [PCTS05].
By using DNP3-SA’s cryptographic primitives, DNP3-SAB does not require a
major upgrade in the existing platforms. We validate and verify the proposed
DNP3-SAB scheme through CPN’s state space tool to show that it closes the gap
of DNP3 broadcast authentication, and improves the communication overhead at
the cost of a minor increase in processing and storage overhead.
5.1 DNP3-SA with Key Update Process
This section presents the full behaviour of DNP3-SA as presented in Section 2.5.1.
By full behaviour, we mean presenting all cryptographic primitives that were
previously omitted in Chapters 3 and 4. The cryptographic primitives were
omitted because they were not relevant to the contributions of those chapters
(Chapters 3 and 4). The main purpose of presenting all cryptographic primitives
of DNP3-SA in this chapter is because this chapter proposes a scheme for the
multi-drop architecture that make use of DNP3-SA features. Figure 5.1 presents
an MSC that provides all cryptographic primitives of the DNP3-SA protocol. The
figure is marked with steps (numbers) starting from KUP (Key Update Process)
to indicate the flow of messages within the protocol. It is divided into three parts;
KUP (Key update process), NACR (Non-aggressive) and AGM (Aggressive).
KUP: Figure 5.1 (step 1-8) presents the key update process involved in DNP3-
SA protocol. In this scenario, it is assumed that the session key, Skmo is pre-
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established between M and O and it is outdated. Therefore, M wishes to update
the old session key (Skmo) to a new one. To achieve that, the figure depicts that
M sends a key status request, KSR, to O to update the session key, Skmo, of a
particular user (step 1). O replies with challenge message, KS, which is a key
status message that contains data (H, P and KSn, from step 2). At the receipt
of KS, M uses the pre-shared secret key, UpK, (long-term key) to encrypt the
new session key, Sk
0
mo (step 3). Furthermore, M uses MACSkmo (H from KS,
and the existing (old) session key, Skmo) to compute the MAC tag, tag (step 4).
Then, M sends KC, which contains ciphertext, C, and the MAC tag, tag, to O
(step 5). On receipt of KC, O computes its MAC tag, tag
0
, by using the same
computational elements used by M (step 6). It then checks if the tags (tag
0
and
tag) match. If the tags match, then O stores the new session key by decrypting,
C, using UpK, (long-term key) Sk
0
mo (step 7) and responding to M with KSC
to indicate that the new session key (Sk
0
mo) is stored or established (step 8). In
KSC, includes a new challenge message, KS
0
, which M is required to use to
authenticate itself to O in case a new session key needs to be established after a
certain period of time depending on the configuration of the protocol.
NACR: Figure 5.1 presents NACR presents the NACR operation. M sends a
request, RQ, to O. On receipt of the request, O issues Chalg accordingly. M uses
MACSk0mo (i.e. H from Chalg and Sk
0
mo) to hash Chalg received, RQ, and UID
to compute tag. tag is then sent to O. On receipt of the tag, O uses the same
computational approach and elements to generate tag
0
. Then, O checks if tag
0
matches with tag. If there exists a match, then authentication has been successful.
O processes the request and replies M with a response, RSP . Otherwise, an
error, RSPE is sent as response to M to indicate an authentication failure.
AGM: In Figure 5.1, AGM illustrates the AGM mode operation. As previously
stated, the AGM depends on NACR. Therefore, it is assumed thatM has obtained
the “most recent challenge message” from the most recent NACR operation.
Taking this into account in this operation, M is always required to increase KSn
from Chalg by 1 for all AGM operations before a legitimate AGM message can be
composed. In Figure 5.1, AGM shows that before M can send an AGM request,
RQ, it first needs to compute tag on RQ about to be sent. M uses the most
recent challenge message, Chalg, and increased KSn by 1 to compute a valid tag.
In computing tag, the methodology employed in NACR is used here. That is, M
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uses MACSk0mo (i.e. H from Chalg and Sk
0
mo) to hash the updated Chalg, RQ
(about to sent), and UID to compute a valid tag. After tag has been obtained,
M finally sends the request, RQ, together with tag to O. On the receipt of the
AGM message, O stores the received tag, extract the FC and OH from RQ, and
uses the same methodology by M to compute tag
0
. O computes tag
0
based on its
last most recent challenge sent to M . After obtaining tag
0
, O compares tag
0
to
tag for a match. If there exists a match, then authentication has been successful.
O processes the request and replies M with the response, RSP . Otherwise, an
error, RSPE is sent as response to M to indicate an authentication failure.
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Figure 5.1: An MSC depicting all cryptographic primitives of DNP3-SA.
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Figure 5.1: An MSC depicting all cryptographic primitives of DNP3-SA.
5.2 CPN modelling of DNP3-SA on Multi-drop
As previously highlighted, this chapter’s interest is to build a DNP3-SA CPN
model for the Multi-drop architecture; one master station concurrently communi-
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cating with multiple outstations. However, as depicted in Figure 5.2, communi-
cation on the Multi-drop architecture can be either unicast or broadcast. This
implies that in the Multi-drop architecture, a control system using the DNP3
protocol can have three types of communication scenarios. Thus, (1) a master
station communicating with exactly one outstation using unicast communication
secured by DNP3-SA, (2) a master station communicating with each one of
many outstations in sequence using unicast communication secured by DNP3-SA,
and (3) a master station communicating with many outstations at once using
unsecured broadcast communication. With the second scenario of the multi-drop
architecture, the sequence of unicast communications will greatly cause more
delay and overhead compared to the third broadcast scenario for large scale
control systems. For this reason, this chapter will present a CPN mode for the
DP3 broadcast communication for the Multi-drop architecture to validate and
verify DNP3-SA.
In constructing the model, the modelling approach used to achieve DNP3
CPN model on the Multi-drop architecture includes CPN’s hierarchical and
parameterisation techniques. These techniques are used to simplify complexities
in large scale models as well as helping out to construct a single model that can
be used for di↵erent purpose of analysis.
Before, this chapter progresses with the details of the CPN model for DNP3
broadcast communication, it is important to note the following assumptions that
were considered whiles creating the CPN model. These assumptions (Section 5.2.1)
may not vary much from the previous assumptions mentioned in Chapters 3
and 4. This is because the CPN models in those chapters contribute to the CPN
model about to be created in this chapter.
Figure 5.2: DNP3 communication on the Multi-drop Architecture.
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5.2.1 Modelling Assumptions
• The master station concurrently communicates with 3 outstations through
the Multi-drop architecture.
• All stations have their long-term secret key and session keys pre-established.
• The underlying layers of the protocol are reliable to ensure that there no
communication failures within the protocol.
• Not all DNP3 data variations are captured in this chapter. One of the
example is the various binary, analog inputs and outputs data. These data
do not contribute to the security analysis of this thesis.
• The master station use can both security modes (NACR and AGM) in the
Multi-drop architecture.
5.2.2 DNP3-SA CPN model for the Multi-drop
In this section, the DNP3-SA CPN model of the Multi-drop architecture is
presented. The model consists of three di↵erent pages; top-level, second-level and
third-level pages. The pages are all created through CPN’s hierarchical technique.
This section will presents pages that are relevant and contribute to this chapter.
This is because some of the modules in this model are similar to the previous
model in Chapters 3 and 4. Figures that directly contribute to this chapter
include the top-level (Figure 5.3) and third-level pages (Figures 5.4, 5.5, 5.8
and 5.9).
Figure 5.3 presents the top-level page of the DNP3-SA CPN model for the
Multi-drop architecture. As depicted, the behaviour of the master station is
presented on the left, the network behaviour is in the middle and behaviours of
all outstations (Primary Outstation A, B & C) are on the right.
5.2. CPN modelling of DNP3-SA on Multi-drop 117
Figure 5.3: DNP3-SA CPN on Multi-drop - Top-level page.
Figure 5.4 presents the third-level page of the network in our CPN model
(Tsub Network in Figure 5.3). Figure 5.4 presents two behaviours; network and
parameterised attack models. The network behaviour specifies the way that the
master station and the outstations exchange messages. The network behaviour is
modelled with the SendA and sendRq places and the ConnectA transition just
as before but with di↵erent colour set (i.e. colset Packet and PacketRsp, refer
to All requests in Table 7.1 of the Appendix for details). Additionally, the
labelled part “Receiving Responses” forms part of the network behaviour.
The parameterised attack models in Tsub Network are adversarial behaviours on
the network such as replay, injection and modification. These attack behaviours
are set to false (turned OFF) and will be discussed later in this chapter.
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Figure 5.4: The network and attack models - Third-level page.
Figure 5.5 presents the third-level page of all the outstations processing
requests. Previously, we highlighted the fact that the DNP3 protocol supports
3 di↵erent command types (addresses) for broadcast communication: ‘0xFFFD’,
‘0xFFFE’ and ‘0xFFFF’. In this figure (Figure 5.5), we model the 0xFFFE command.
This is because the 0xFFFE command is commonly used in SCADA networks to
reduce communication overheads as the command does not require responses
from the outstations. Moreover, the command’s unidirectional nature makes
the command more challenging to secure when compared to other commands.
We model the broadcast behaviour for the 0xFFFE command with the T write
transition from the Tsub Sub Processes together with the SenSor and Enabler
transitions, and the Actuator1 and Binary places on all outstations. These places
and transitions (T write,SenSor, Enabler, Actuator1 and Binary) capture the
executions of all broadcast operations using the 0xFFFE command. For example,
the SenSor transition must execute the token value “Rlsed Pressure” three times
(3x) when the appropriate request for this operation is received on all outstations
(refer to the SenSor transition at the left bottom of Figure 5.5).
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Figure 5.5: Processing requests on all outstations - Third-level page of Outstaton
A, B and C.
5.3 Formal Analysis: DNP3-SA CPN on the
Multi-drop Architecture
This section presents the validation and verification for DNP3-SA CPN model
on the Multi-drop architecture using CPN’s state space analysis tool. The
model is first validated without adversaries to determine whether the model
reflects the broadcast behaviour of the Multi-drop architecture as specified in the
standard. Next, the model is verified against a set of attacks to determine if the
authentication property is provided.
As previously in Section 2.7.4, the state space tool provides a report with
a number of behavioural properties. In this chapter, we are interested in dead
markings and dead transitions as previously used in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. This is
because dead markings and dead transitions simplify the analysis of our model
without losing the generality of the concepts. As stated before, a dead marking
is a state that has no binding elements to make the marking active. It signifies a
termination point. Similarly, a dead transition is a transition that cannot execute
or has no path from reachable states to enable it. A dead transition in our model
may imply that an expected or unexpected action may have occurred. The dead
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transitions in this model are subject to change. Thus, depending on the behaviour
to be validated or verified, the number of dead transitions might vary because
certain parameterised behaviours might be set to true or false. For instance, all
attack models in our DNP3-SA CPN model for the multi-drop architecture will
become dead during this validation. But this may not be the same situation
for verification of the model. Therefore, the validation of the model without
any attack models turned on, we expect to obtain a single dead marking. This
single dead marking is expected to be obtained because of an initial marking from
the master station. The marking will indicate that every request issued by the
master station, is received and processed simultaneously by all the outstations.
Additionally, 68 dead transitions are expected to be obtained for this validation.
These transitions will consist of parameterised attack models and SAB behaviours
that have been set to false, inactive DNP3-SA behaviours such as NACR and
AGM operations, and authentication failure transitions such as Errfback and
Gen AuthError that could not execute as there are no attacks enabled.
Table 5.1: State Space Analysis of Broadcast on Multi-drop
State Space Report for CPN Broadcast Model without SAB
Initial Broadcast Model
Attack Models on Broadcast
Injection Modification Replay
State Space Nodes 733 13,116 220 6,482
State Space Arcs 1,948 41,752 544 18,633
SCC Graph Nodes 733 13,116 220 6,482
SCC Graph Arcs 1,948 41,752 544 18,633
Dead Markings 1 2 1 2
Dead Transitions 68 61 68 61
5.3.1 Validating Broadcast on Multi-drop
Table 5.1, Initial Broadcast Model, presents the full state space report of the
broadcast mode on the Multi-drop architecture without any active attack models.
The report presents identical values obtained for nodes and arcs of the state
space and that of the SCC. Achieving these matching values for both properties
implies that our model has no loops and moreover the model has a finite sequence
of occurrence. Furthermore, the report presents a single dead marking and 68
dead transitions. These values (single dead marking and 68 dead transitions) are
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consistent with our expectation in Section 5.3. This is because a close inspection
of the model revealed that the single dead marking represents the state where a
broadcast request from the master station has been successfully processed by all
outstations. This led to the execution of the Sensor transition which eventually
led to obtaining the token value of ‘3’ on the Actuator1 place on all outstations
instead of the default value (token ‘0’, refer to Figure 5.5). Additionally, the
inspection also revealed that all 68 dead transitions were consistent with our
expectations. This is due to the absence of attack models and SAB behaviours,
and security transitions such as Errfback and Gen AuthError that could not
execute as there are no attacks enabled.
5.3.2 Attack Models
This section provide details of the attack models used this chapter. Thus, the
attack models considered in this chapter are similar to the attacks in Chapters 3
and 4. Except that this chapter takes into account an injection or a drop attack on
top of the existing attack models: modification and replay. The overall objective
of these attacks are to broadcast a request on the Multi-drop architecture and
get it processed on the outstations. For example, in the injection phase of the
attack model, the attacker has the ability to inject or forge broadcast messages
and transmit it to the outstations. The modification attack allows the intruder to
actively modify initial messages from the master station to outstations. Finally,
in the replay attack, the intruder re-transmits messages that have been previously
communicated with the outstations.
In Figure 5.6, we present the attack model considered in this chapter. The
attacks are modelled with places, transitions and parameters as before (see dotted
area of Figure 5.6). As previously stated, these attack behaviours were set to
false during the validation of the model. To verifying our model, we enable these
attacks such that we can revalidate the security of the model. In Figure 5.6, the
replay attack is modelled through the Capture Reqs and TrigRep places and the
Replay transition. The injection attack is modelled through the InjectR place and
the ExcM1 transition. The modification attack is modelled through the function
MoDAttack1. The function is defined as a parameter on the arc inscription binding
the ConnectA transition and the sendRq place (refer to Modification Attack
function in Table 7.2 in the Appendix for details of MoDAttack1).
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Figure 5.6: The attack models in the network module - Third-level page.
5.3.3 Verification of Broadcast on Multi-drop
Broadcast attack models in Table 5.1, show 2 dead markings and 61 dead
transitions obtained for each of the Injection and Replay attack models. These
2 dead markings represent termination points in the model. Moreover, all 61
dead transitions mark parameterised transitions of SAB that have been set to
false as well as security transitions such as Errfback and Gen AuthError that
could not be executed. A close investigation for each attack revealed that each of
the 2 dead markings marked 2 di↵erent states; 1) a legitimate broadcast request
from the master station and 2) a broadcast packet from the attackers’ states.
The legitimate broadcast request from the master station led to the execution of
the SenSor transition on all outstations; obtaining the token value of ‘3’ on the
Actuator1 place (Figure 5.5). This behaviour is expected because it corresponds
to the initial validation of the broadcast model without adversaries. Thus, the
initial request from the master has been successfully executed. The replayed
request from the attackers’ state led to an additional execution of the SenSor
transition, increasing the previous token value from ‘3’ to ‘7’ on all outstations.
This second behaviour (increase from ‘3’ to ‘7’) is not expected. This is because
the token value on the Actuator1 place on all outstations has increased to ‘7’.
This implies the replay attack was successful. Similarly, the injection attack
enabled the T write transition from the Tsub Sub Processes to output a token
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value of ‘STOP VALVE’ on the Binary Input place (Figure 5.5). Obtaining the
token value ‘STOP VALVE’ on the Binary Input place implies that the SenSor
transition can no longer become activated to fire and produce the token value
‘3’ on the Actuator1 place on all outstations. This has occurred as a result of
the attacker injecting a request that stops the SenSor transition from operating.
This behaviour is not expected because from the attacker’s state, the attacker
has the ability to interrupt services provided by the all the outstations.
The report in Table 5.1, also presents a single dead marking and 68 dead
transitions obtained for the modification attack model. This single dead marking
represents the initial state where the master station transmits a broadcast request
to the outstations. Investigation of the modification attack in the model showed
that, the Actuator1 place on all outstations has the token value of ‘0’ (default
value) instead of the expected value of ‘3’. This implies the expected command
was not executed. The investigation revealed that the token value ‘0’ was retained
because the SenSor transition became a dead transition and could not get
executed. Instead, the Binary Input place received the token value ‘CloseValve’
from the T write transition (from the Tsub Sub Processes, refer to Figure 5.5).
This behaviour is not expected because the SenSor transition could not obtain
the right token from the Binary Input place to allow it to execute and output
the token value ‘3’. As a result, 68 dead transitions were obtained for this attack
comprising of inactive injection and replay attacks, SAB behaviours and security
transitions such as Errfback and Gen AuthError that could not be executed.
In summary, the above analyses have shown that the broadcast mode of
operation in the Multi-drop architecture is susceptible to a number of common
attacks that can easily manipulate the protocol and execute all commands that are
being supported by all outstations in an interconnected network. This is because
there is no security mechanism used to protect the broadcast mode operation.
As analysed in the previous chapters (Chapter 3 and 4), the DNP3-SA protocol
works well only on the unicast type of communication [ASCF14,ACF16], where
the master has to communicate with a single outstation. DNP3-SA does not
scale well on the unicast communication, where the master has to communicate
with each of many outstations. This is because the master station will need to
store, remember and exchange a number of challenge and response messages with
each outstation in the Multi-drop architecture using the unicast communication.
This is expensive in terms of bandwidth management and will increase delay and
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overhead in the protocol, which will eventually a↵ect performance. However, in
the absence of an appropriate broadcast authentication mechanism, a number
of attacks as shown above can easily exploit the protocol by simply modifying
address, function codes or user ID fields within the messages. This may cause
unauthorized commands to be performed by all outstations at once. This leads us
to providing a new security scheme, SAB, as presented in Figure 5.7. The scheme
makes use of existing cryptographic primitives within the DNP3-SA specification
to secure broadcast communication mode.
5.4 Secure Authentication for Broadcast (SAB)
The concept of SAB is derived from the TESLA protocol presented by Perrig et
al. [PCTS05]. TESLA (Timed E cient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentication) is
a broadcast authentication protocol that depends or uses hash chains and time
delayed (loose time synchronisation) key disclosure. TESLA generates a key chain
by using the relation of H(Ski) = Ski 1. A sender uses Ski to authenticate a
broadcast message Mti sent at time interval ti. The broadcasted message also
includes the key used in the previous time interval (e.i., Mti||Ski 1). That means,
the key Ski will be disclosed along with a message in the coming time intervals,
e.g., time interval ti+1, and the message Mti must be stored until then. Disclosed
key Ski can then be used to authenticate the stored message Mti. Moreover,
the disclosed key Ski can be checked for its validity using its relation with the
keys disclosed earlier (e.g., H(Ski) = Ski 1 or H(H(Ski)) = Ski 2). TESLA is
considered secure because it allows all receivers of a given broadcast or multicast
message to verify its integrity and authenticity. Moreover, it is considered e cient
because of its low communication and computational overhead. It scales well on
a large number of receivers. However, these benefits of TESLA come at the cost
of storage overhead because received messages must be stored until the relevant
keys are disclosed and validated.
In this chapter, identifying the gap of missing authentication for DNP3
broadcast communication in multi-drop architecture leads us to employ TESLA’s
hash chain concept to secure DNP3 broadcast messages in SCADA systems. We
employ the hash-chain concept because TESLA and its derivatives [PST+02]
cannot be directly applied to the DNP3 protocol due to domain di↵erences and the
nature of the DNP3 protocol. That is, TESLA and its derivatives depend on time
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synchronisation and the revelation of keys. Additionally, TESLA authenticates
its initial packet with a digital signature, which can be seen as costly for SCADA
systems. Though, time is a crucial factor in SCADA systems, our approach
to secure SCADA systems using the DNP3-SA protocol does not depend on
strict time synchronisation as TESLA does. Moreover, our scheme does not need
the revelation of keys because the DNP3-SA protocol (as shown in Figure 5.1)
makes use of certain cryptographic primitives and key management scheme that
is based on a user. For these reasons, TESLA and derivatives cannot be applied.
Instead, we provide SAB as a minimalist broadcast authentication protocol
that is designed only to use the hash chain concept and existing cryptographic
primitives of the DNP3-SA (i.e., SHA-1-HMAC, SHA-256-HMAC, AES-GMAC
and AES-128 key wrap), so that existing DNP3 devices can be made compatible
with minimal software upgrades. That is, in using the existing cryptographic
primitives of the DNP3-SA protocol and its user key management process, our
proposed scheme does not require a major upgrade in the existing DNP3 security
primitives. Moreover, it enables the DNP3 protocol to securely scale-up using
DNP3’s multi-drop architecture.
Intuitively, SAB operates through a hash-chain, which is a linked hash values
known to master station only. Using the redistributed credentials, the outstations
can only verify the current hash value released with the current broadcast message
but they cannot produce the hash value before it is released. Limiting this feature
to only the master station implies that broadcast messages are generated by the
master station and they are correct. This therefore, e↵ectively secures DNP3
broadcast communication against modification, spoofing, replay, and injection
attacks. This approach is better than some existing schemes because our scheme
solves the key management problem associated with the HMAC mechanism. Thus,
instead of the HMAC mechanism using di↵erent keys for each broadcast message,
our scheme uses a hash-chain with a single symmetric key. Moreover, our scheme
is not constrained by time like other schemes based on TESLA and most of its
derivatives. Moreover, SAB does not require infrastructure like a Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI), where processor intensive algorithms like RSA are used.
A comparison of performance and functionality of SAB using other alternative
methods is presented in Section 5.7 of this chapter.
Figure 5.7 illustrates the behaviour of SAB. The following are notations used
in Figure 5.7. R is a random bit-string with su cient length, such as 128 bits, to
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prevent trivial pre-image attacks. H represents the hash function, and is used
to compute the hash chain tags: S1 = H(R), S2 = H(S1), . . . , Sn = H(Sn   1)
which represent hash chain tags that are produced from a single random value
(R). Here, Sn represents the last hash tag of the hash chain while n represents the
index of Sn. C (ciphertext) represents encrypted (Sk
0
mo, Sn, n). BM represents
a broadcast message that contains a request, Req(FC,OH), a hash tag, Si, the
index of the hash tag, i and the MAC tag, tagA. Sstored, Nstored, Sreceived,
Nreceived, Scalc respectively store value from Sn, n, Si, i (where 1  i < n) and
Scalc. Here, Scalc represents a variable that is used to find the next hash tag of
the hash-chain (i.e. trying to compute the correct hash value)
Figure 5.7 presents a summary of the steps involved in SAB corresponding
to a user issuing a command through a master station to a set of outstations.
First, the master creates hash chain tags and their respective indexes using a
random number (Step 1). Second, the master sends the last hash tag of the
hash chain and its index value to the outstations by using the existing DNP3-SA
key update process (Step 2-9). Third, after the hash tag and index are stored
on the outstations, the master can now send broadcast messages (Step 10-11).
Fourth, at the receipt of every broadcast message, the outstations are required
to extract relevant data from the messages to perform 2 tasks (Step 12-14):
MAC tag verification for message authentication and hash chain verification for
freshness, respectively. The hash chain verification is sub-divided into 2 parts:
hash-index verification and hash tag verification. That is, before the outstations
are required to perform the 2 tasks, we propose the outstations to first check
whether the receiving hash-index is valid (line 12). The purpose of this action
is to verify whether the index of a given hash tag is valid or not. There are
two main reasons why this action is required: 1) to prevent potential replay
attacks of a previously recorded message with a valid MAC tag and 2) to take
into consideration subsequent rounds of authentication for legitimate broadcast
messages issued by the master station. Thus, for the replay attack if the index
of a given hash tag is not valid, then the outstations shall respond with an
error message. Otherwise, the outstations are required to perform the MAC
tag verification (line 13). If the MAC tags do not match, the outstations shall
respond with an error message. Otherwise, the outstations will have to verify the
status of the hash tag (line 14) before the broadcast request can be processed.
A successful hash tag verification will lead to discarding the old hash tag and
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storing the new hash as well as processing the broadcast request. A failure will
lead to an error message. This action or behaviour applies to multiple round of
authentication as well. Thus, since every hash tag is linked to its index, it implies
that every broadcast message will have a unique hash tag and its associated
index for every round of authentication required. Therefore, for all rounds of
authentication if the indexes are not valid, the outstations will respond with error
messages just as before in the replay attack. But, if the indexes are valid in each
round, then the outstations are required to perform the MAC tag verification (line
13). If the MAC tags verification do not match for each round, the outstations
will respond with error messages. Otherwise, the outstations will continue to
verify the status of all hash tags for each round (line 14) before the broadcast
request can be further processed. A successful hash tag verification in each of the
rounds will lead to discarding the old hash tag and storing the new hash, and
processing the broadcast request as expected. But failures in each round will lead
to an error message. Next, we present a detailed explanation of these steps.
In this scenario, it is assumed that the necessary algorithms and session key,
Skmo are pre-established between M and O, but the session key is outdated.
Therefore, M wishes to update the old session key to a new key. But before
M updates the key, it is required that M pre-creates a hash-chain for future
broadcast communication. In creating the chain, the master, M , is required to
choose an arbitrary number and creates a series of hash tag values with their
indexes using hash chains as illustrated in step 1 of Figure 5.7. Then, the master
station sends a key status request, KSR, to the outstations, O, to update the
session key of a particular user (step 2). At the receipt of KSR, all O reply with
key status message, KS, which contains challenge data (H, P and KSn, from
step 3). At the receipt of KS, M uses the pre-shared key, UpK, to encrypt the
new session key, Sk
0
mo, and the last hash tag of the hash chains, Sn, together
with its associated index, n (step 4). Furthermore, M uses H from KS, and the
existing (old) session key, Skmo, to keyed-hash KS and KSR in order to compute
the MAC tag, tag (step 5). Then, M sends KC, which contains ciphertext, C,
and the MAC tag, tag, to all O (step 6). On receipt of the message, all O first
computes its MAC tag, tag
0
by using the same computational elements used by
M , and then checks if the tags match (step 7). If the tags match, then all O
perform the second action by decrypting KC using UpK and storing the contents
(Sk
0
mo, Sn, n refer to step 8). At this point, all O can respond to M with KSC
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to indicate that the new session key (Sk
0
mo), as well as the last hash tag value of
the chain and its index are stored (step 9). Furthermore, KSC also includes a
new challenge message, KS
0
, that M uses to periodically re-authenticate itself to
all O in case a new session key and hash updates (new hash chain) are required
(i.e., step 1–9). It is important to note that at this point, all stations are now
set to communicate with normal DNP3 messages. It is worth noting that KS
0
is a variable of the DNP3-SA protocol and it is used for challenging the master
station in the DNP3-SA protocol. KS
0
is not used in SAB but it is maintained for
compatibility reasons with the DNP3-SA protocol. At this point, it is important
to note that all stations (M and all O) are now set to communicate with normal
DNP3 messages.
In the part labelled Continuation of New Scheme, we make use of the
AGM behaviour as explained in Section 5.1, Figure 5.1. That is, before any
broadcast message can be sent, the master station must first compute a MAC
tag based on the request about to be sent, a hash tag from the hash chain
and an index value. It is to be noted that the index is always linked to a
particular hash value chosen. In computing tagA, the master station uses the
agreed MAC scheme with the recent established key, Sk
0
mo, on the message
(Si, i, Req(FC,OH), UID). After tagA is obtained, the master station sends BM ,
which constitutes (Si, i, Req(FC,OH), UID) and tagA to the outstations. On the
receipt of the message, the outstations first check if i is valid (non-negative value);
and i is less than what is previously stored (Nstored). As previously stated, this
activity is carried out to 1) prevent the potential of replaying of a previously
recorded message with a valid MAC tag and 2) to considered multiple rounds of
authentication for legitimate broadcast messages. Therefore, if i is valid, then the
outstations continue to check for message authentication, otherwise the operation
is aborted. In checking for message authentication, the outstations compute tag
0
A
and verify it against tagA. A match implies success, which further leads the
outstations to check for freshness (the status of hash tag received). In checking
the hash tag, the outstations use i (Nreceived) to determine the number hash
iterations that must be performed on Si to in order to obtain the final hash tag
result, Scalc. Scalc is then compared with the stored hash tag, SStored. If the
hash tags match, then, Scalc is stored as the new hash tag value (SStored), and
the broadcast request (BM{Req(FC,OH)}) is processed. However, if the tags
do not match, then Scalc is discarded and an error response may be sent to the
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master station.
5.5 Formal analysis of SAB on Multi-drop
This section presents the CPN model of SAB integrated in the CPN broadcast
model such that our scheme can be formally analysed. SAB builds upon DNP3-
SA. We assume both master station and all outstations share a pre-shared
secret key called the update key (UpK) and a set of session keys (i.e. Skmo for
a particular user) used regularly for securing communication (authentication).
The session keys are always updated using the secret key after a certain period of
time (say every 15–25 minutes depending of the rate of communication). The
session keys together with the last hash tag from the hash chain and its index
values are securely exchanged between the master and the outstations using the
existing DNP3-SA key update process (refer to steps 2–9 in Figure 5.7). These
characteristics inherited from DNP3-SA help avoid the possibility of generating
large state space values and they reduce complexity.
5.5.1 CPN model of SAB
SAB CPN model has been divided into 2 parts; one part depicting the behaviour
of SAB on the master and the other part is SAB on the outstations. Figure 5.8
depicts the behaviour of SAB on the master station. The HashChain place presents
all the generated hash tag values and their respective indexes (the bottom-left
bubble in Figure 5.8) using one of the DNP3-SA hash function specified in its
standard. This behaviour represents step 1 in Figure 5.7. The MAC place
models the MAC token (values) obtained from the BSecure transition (refer
to the inputs of BSecure, representing step 10 in Figure 5.7). The BdRequest,
HValue and Index places respectively model the actual broadcast request about
to be sent, the hash tag from the hash chain and the index of the hash tag. These
tokens are grouped as a single broadcast message through the BPackA transition
and transmitted to the network through the SendRQ place. This captures the
behaviour (step 11) illustrated in Figure 5.7.
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Figure 5.8: The behaviour of SAB on the master station - Third-level page.
Figure 5.9: The behaviour of SAB on all the outstations - Third-level page.
Figure 5.9 presents the behaviour of SAB on the outstations. The Tsub Stored
Values models the storage area for valid hash tags and their indexes. This
includes the last hash tag from the hash chain, which is assumed to be securely
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established before the communication began between the stations (to the centre
of the Figure 5.9). The BrdCast Requests transition models the receipt of every
broadcast message from the network through the sendRq place (lower left of
the Figure 5.9). The Check Index Value transition models the behaviour for
checking whether the incoming index values of the hash tag are valid to avoid
replayed messages. If the received index of the hash tag is valid, then a token is
placed on the Trigger place to verify the authenticity of the broadcast message.
Otherwise, a token is placed on the AuthStatus place to signify an error (to the
centre-right of the Figure 5.9). This behaviour reflects the verification process
(step 12) in Figure 5.7. Moreover, the Tsub ECV models the behaviour, where the
received hash tag from the master station is extracted and hashed a number of
times to obtain a particular hash value. This behaviour represents step 14 in
Figure 5.7. The verification of MAC tags for message authentication and hash
tags for freshness is achieved through the Tagcheck transition; representing steps
13 and 14 in Figure 5.7.
Table 5.2: State space Analysis of SAB on Multi-drop
State Space Report for CPN SAB Model
Initial SAB CPN Model
Attack Models on SAB
Injection Modification Replay
State Space Nodes 13,829 23,831 821 44,789
State Space Arcs 50,117 50,120 1,045 89,056
SCC Graph Nodes 13,829 23,831 821 44,789
SCC Graph Arcs 50,117 50,120 1,045 89,056
Dead Markings 1 3 1 3
Dead Transitions 37 25 53 22
5.5.2 Validation of CPN SAB
This section presents the validation of SAB in the CPN broadcast model. Recall
that the parameters of SAB were initially set to false. As a result, Table 5.1 in
Section 5.3 presented a high value of dead transitions throughout the table. In
this section, SAB’s parameters are turned on to validate the model. This means
that less dead transitions will be expected. Table 5.2 presents the full state space
report of SAB. The report has two parts; Initial SAB CPN Model and Attack
Models on SAB. The Initial SAB CPN model presents the validation of the SAB
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model. Whilst the latter is the verification of SAB against the most common
attack models that have been previously used.
Table 5.2, Initial SAB CPN Model, shows a single dead marking and 37
dead transitions. A close inspection of these values, particularly the obtained
dead marking, shows that the dead marking reflects the termination point of
the initial state, (i.e. the broadcast message from the master station just as
before in Section 5.3.1). In other words, this behaviour is expected because the
model reveals the presence of the token value ‘3’ on each of the outstations;
implying that each of the outstations successfully authenticated the request from
the master before processing it. Furthermore, the investigation also showed that
the obtained dead transitions (37) are expected. This is because out of these 37
dead transitions, 5 of them represented inactive attack models that have been set
false for validation purposes. Moreover, 9 of the dead transitions represent other
transitions such as Errfback and Gen AuthError that model authentication
failures. It is to be noted that these transitions (Errfback and Gen AuthError)
could not execute as there are no attacks enabled. The remaining dead transitions
represent the behaviour of DNP3-SA that has not been used. In summary, these
behaviours are expected as SAB is enabled and no attack models have been
enabled.
5.5.3 Verification of CPN SAB
In this section, SAB is verified with attack models. In this section, we configure
the model to allow the attacker to inject more than one forged messages and also
replay the initial request from the master station more than once. This is to
determine the e↵ectiveness of SAB and also to make a clear distinction of the
result when compared to Table 5.1.
Table 5.2, Attacks Models on SAB, shows 3 dead markings for the injection
and replay attack models, and a single dead marking for the modification attack.
The model is simulated to investigate all dead markings obtained for all attack
models. The investigation of the modification attack revealed that the single
dead marking obtained represents the execution of transition Gen AuthError
and Errfback in all outstations; indicating an authentication failure for the
initial model state. This behaviour is expected because the attacker is actively
modifying the content of the packet since the message in the protocol is in
‘cleartext’. As a result, the initial request from the master station does not get
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executed because the initial message has been tampered with. Investigation
of the injection attack model revealed that one of the obtained dead markings
represented the successful execution of the SenSor transition on all the outstations;
leading to obtaining the token value ‘3’ on each of the outstations. This implies
that authentication for the initial broadcast message from the master station
was successful. This is expected. However, the remaining dead markings of the
injection attack represented incompleteness of the model and the execution of
transition Errfback and Gen AuthError. A further investigation showed that
the incompleteness of model occurred because the attacker could not provide all
the fields that SAB required or needed to verify the authenticity of the message
before any request could be processed. As a result, transition Errfback and Gen
AuthError executed to indicate an authentication failure.
Similarly, with the replay attack one of the dead markings indicated the
successful execution of the SenSor transition on all the outstations. This also
implies that the initial state of the model (request from the master station)
was successfully authenticated before processing. However, both remaining
dead transitions represented authentication failures, which lead to the execution
of transition Errfback and Gen AuthError. In the replay attack, transition
Errfback and Gen AuthError occurred because the replayed messages lacked
freshness; new hash tags and MAC tags. In summary, these behaviours indicate
that the attacker’s behaviours have been detected and dealt with in this current
model. As a result, unauthorised commands that were previously possible on the
CPN broadcast model were not allowed to be executed on the outstations in the
DNP3-SAB model.
5.6 Performance Analysis and Comparison
The DNP3 standards include a specification of broadcast communication. How-
ever, DNP3-SA standard only considers authenticating unicast communication,
particularly the one-to-one architecture. This creates a challenge for deploying
security controls for broadcast communication in SCADA systems. To our knowl-
edge, our scheme is the first attempt to secure DNP3 broadcast communication
in SCADA systems. In this section, we show that broadcast communication with
our presented lightweight security solution (DNP3-SAB), which only makes use
of cryptographic primitives specified by DNP3-SA, can improve performance and
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Table 5.3: Performance Analysis and Comparison
Communication
(#messages)
Processing
(# Crypto Operations C)
Storage
(# Parameters K)
Master N Outstations Master N Outstations
SAB 4N+n ⇡ O(N+n) 2n + 2 ⇡ O(n) 4Nn ⇡ O(Nn) 2n+2 ⇡ O(n) 8N ⇡ O(N)
NACR 4N(n+1) ⇡ O(Nn) Nn ⇡ O(Nn) Nn ⇡ O(Nn) 4 (Constant) 4N ⇡ O(N)
AGM 8N+2Nn ⇡ O(Nn) N(n+1) ⇡ O(Nn) Nn ⇡ O(Nn) 4 (Constant) 4N ⇡ O(N)
DAS nPa ⇡ O(n) nPa ⇡ O(n) NnPa ⇡ O(Nn) - -
DAN NnPa ⇡ O(Nn) NnPa ⇡ O(Nn) NnPa ⇡ O(Nn) - -
DAA NnPa ⇡ O(Nn) NnPa ⇡ O(Nn) NnPa ⇡ O(Nn) - -
MIRS nPa ⇡ O(n) nPa ⇡ O(n) nPa ⇡ O(n) - -
MIRN 2NnPa ⇡ O(Nn) NnPa ⇡ O(Nn) NnPa ⇡ O(Nn) - -
MIRA 2NnPa ⇡ O(Nn) NnPa ⇡ O(Nn) NnPa ⇡ O(Nn) - -
Table 5.4: Performance and Functionality of SAB using alternative methods
Functionality Performance
Schemes Mechanism Infrast. Sec. Properties Comm. Comp. Storage
Proposed
SAB
Hash-chain None
-Authentication
-Integrity
-Resistant to
dishonest
outstations*
1 Key update
per n message
n*HMAC
n*MAC
1*AES
1 Symmetric Key
1 Hash value per
outstation
SABSym
Message-based
key
establishment
None
-Authentication
-Integrity
-Require
honest
outstations
n Key update
per n message
n*HMAC
n*MAC
n*AES
1 Symmetric Key
1 nonce value
per outstation
SABAsym
Digital
signature
PKI
-Authentication
-Integrity
-Non-repuation
Public key
distribution
n*PKI
1 Public Key
1 nonce value per
outstation
*Abbreviation.
Infrast.=Infrastructure, Sec.=Security Properties, Comm.=Communication, Comp.= Computation.
reduce overheads in large scale control systems. Hence, DNP3-SAB is usable.
More specifically, this section provides comparison of storage, communication and
computation overheads of SAB against its unicast counterparts: DNP3-SA NACR
and AGM. The comparisons are based on the total headcount of messages within
the protocol as before in Chapter 4, Section 4.5.3. The following notations are
used in Table 5.3. Here, N represents the number of outstations a master station
is communicating with. Here n denotes the approximate number of commands
to be exchanged between the master station and its N outstations per user and
during a time interval between two key updates. Additionally, n also represents
the number of hash tags in a hash chain generated as part of SAB. SAB uses one
hash tag per request as illustrated in Figure 5.7. H denotes the hash function
used to compute the hash chains. E and D denote encryption and decryption
respectively. DAS, DAN and DAA denote the Drop attack on SAB, NACR and
AGM, respectively. In the drop attack, an adversary drops a request from the
master station with the probability Pa. MIRS, MIRN and MIRA denote the
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modification, injection and replay attacks on SAB, NACR and AGM respectively.
The probability that these attacks will target a request from the master station is
represented as Pa. For the sake of comparability, we have represented all crypto-
graphic transformations used in DNP3-SA and DNP3-SAB as C (i.e. C={H, E,
D, MAC}). Similarly, the stored parameters used in DNP3-SA and DNP3-SAB
are represented as K (i.e. K={Sn, n, UpK, Skmo, P , KSn}).
In order to understand the overheads analysis presented in Table 5.3, one must
note 3 things. First, there are multiple N outstations (N=3 in our CPN model)
communication with a single master station. Second, there exists a key update
process that occurs before the NACR or AGM operates. The key update process
has 4 headcount of messages per round and per user (refer to Figure 5.1). Third,
NACR is a prior requirement to AGM operation. This implies that the number
of communicated messages in NACR also will be considered in AGM operation.
Table 5.3 SAB shows that the total messages involved in SAB communication is
4N+ n. This value (4N+ n) is obtained because there are 4 messages exchanged
during the key update process to N outstations and a single (n) broadcast request
(refer to the exchanged messages in Figure 5.7). Asymptotically, this value
corresponds to O(N+n). In processing SAB, the master station needs to generate
a hash chain and a MAC tag. This is represented in the table as 2n+2 ⇡ O(n)
(including the key update set-up). Similarly, processing SAB on each outstation
requires 4Nn (including the keys update). This is because that each of the N
outstations compute a hash and MAC tag. Asymptotically, the value on the
outstations (2Nn) corresponds to O(Nn) while that of the master corresponds
to O(n). For SAB storage overhead, the table shows 2n+2 for the master station
and 8N for the outstations. The value 2n+2 on the master represents a hash
value (Si) with its index (i), and the storage of 2 keys (i.e. UpK and SKmo).
Similarly, 8N on the outstations imply that each of the N outstations stores 8
parameters consisting of 2 keys (UpK and SKmo), chalg, Sn, i, Scalc, Sstored and
Nstored. Asymptotically, 8N corresponds to O(N) and (2n+2) corresponds to
O(n).
In Chapter 4, the overheads of NACR and AGM were presented. Those
overhead values are the same with that of Table 5.3 NACR and AGM, except
that overheads here are considered with N outstations. This is done to compare
SAB to NACR and AGM. From Table 5.3, comparing the overheads of SAB
to the existing NACR and AGM overheads, the table shows that SAB has less
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communication overhead over its counterpart: NACR and AGM. This is because
in SAB operation, the master sends a single request to N outstations at once,
rather than sending a request to each and every of the N outstations (as this is
the case for NACR and AGM). However, the table shows a slight (minor) increase
in storage and processing overheads on the N outstations during SAB. This
slight increase is asymptotic insignificant because SAB is designed to run on large
systems rather than a small scale systems. In case NACR and AGM are to be used
on large scale, the processing and storage overheads will dramatically increase.
This is because both modes will have to individually exchange n of messages to N
outstations. To be more specific, the advantage of SAB communication overhead
becomes more clearer when attacks such as drop, modification, injection and
replay attacks are considered (refer to Table 5.3). That is in the attack models
(DAS and MIRS), SAB requires much less retransmission (nPa) for each request
attacked with probability Pa than its counterpart. In addition, SAB causes less
processing overhead on the master stations compared to NACR and AGM. The
extra processing caused on the master station due to an attacked request is much
less for SAB than for NACR and AGM.
Based on this analysis, we conclude and make it clear that there is always
a trade-o↵ of performance when providing security. Table 5.3 has shown that,
there exists the benefits in the entire communication overhead of SAB as well as
processing overhead on the master stations. But these benefits come at the cost
of an extra storage used on the master stations to store hash chains and their
indexes. Additionally, calculations on the outstations also cause a slight increase
in processing overheads by a constant term due to calculations on hash chains
in addition to message authentication. This slight di↵erence disappears in the
attack scenarios. SAB, NACR and AGM causes the same processing overhead on
outstations when a request message is attacked (i.e. drop, modification, injection
and replay) with a probability Pa. Furthermore, as SAB utilises only the existing
security primitives from NACR and AGM (refer step 2-6 of Figure 5.7), it
implies that there are no additional cryptographic updates required for devices
supporting DNP3-SAB. The existing devices that support DNP3-SA will have
su cient resources to support DNP3-SAB as well. Another advantage is that
the time it takes a master station to send a request to N outstations securely
using DNP3-SA is more than the time required for DNP3-SAB. This is because,
using in DNP3-SA, the master station has to contact N outstations individually
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in sequence, causing some outstations to receive the request later than others.
5.7 Discussion
As previously stated, broadcast mode of operation allows a single command or re-
quest from a master station to reach multiple outstations in a network. Broadcast
is usually used in domains where bandwidth management and performance can
be very crucial. Domains like SCADA may use broadcast communication in LAN
to reach many devices. But having said that, not all standard SCADA communi-
cation protocols support broadcast mode of communication. Some protocols do
not support broadcast because the delivery of a command to all the outstations
may not always be guaranteed. In addition, certain system requirements such
as data types and serial interfaces that have been in place for many decades
might hinder the use of broadcast amongst many protocols. The DNP3 protocol
happens to be one of the protocols that supports broadcast in its Multi-drop
architecture. This implies that for any complex architecture such as the hierarchi-
cal architecture that the DNP3 supports, DNP3 can also communicate through
broadcast. DNP3’s hierarchical architecture supports a mixture of the unicast
and Multi-drop architecture as previously stated in Chapter 2. In this hierarchical
architecture, a central master station can interact with multiple of outstations,
and at the same time, interacting with other sub-master stations that may also be
communicating with other outstations for data. The absence of a security scheme
for broadcast may leave the protocol vulnerable to a number of common attack
vectors in such a complex architecture. Moreover, the detection of attacks in such
a complex architecture may be very challenging to detect because of the nature
of the attacks and the architecture in place. The use of the DNP3-SA mechanism
alone is not self-su cient to secure the DNP3 broadcast mode. This is because
the HMAC mechanism will require a di↵erent key to compute a unique MAC tag
for each broadcast messages. The provision a security scheme like SAB will at
least prevent all attacks used in this chapter, if not all other attacks. Proposed
SAB uses a hash-chain to solve the problem of key management. Hash values
used for messages are linked together as a hash-chain. The usage of a single key
together with the hash-chain removes need for a key per message. Additionally,
because the hash-chains are also associated with indexes, it prevent potential
replay attacks from occurring. Using only the index without hash values would
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not be su cient because any compromised outstation that already has knowledge
of the symmetric key and the index can masquerade the master station and send
broadcast messages to its counterparts. The analysis of the SAB CPN model in
this chapter has shown and confirmed that the DNP3 broadcasts can be secured
against attack vectors such as modification, injection, spoofing and replay, attacks
listed by the DNP3 consortium in the protocol specification.
DNP3-SAB is not the only option to secure the DNP3 broadcast commu-
nication. Table 5.4 for instance presents and compares the performance and
functionality of SAB using two alternative methods: symmetric (SABSym) and
asymmetric key (SABAsym) cryptography. The table shows that while the pro-
posed SAB in this chapter uses hash-chains values to authenticate each broadcast
message, the SABSym with symmetric key requires a broadcast key established for
each broadcast message. SABAsym with asymmetric key can use a single public
key to authenticate all broadcast messages, but it requires an infrastructure to
distribute public keys. All three schemes provide authentication and integrity.
But the SABSym requires all outstations to be honest. This is because a com-
promised outstation with the knowledge of the symmetric key can masquerade
the master station. SABAsym can additionally be used for non-repudiation. In
terms of communication, SABAsym distributes one public key for authenticating
all broadcast messages, SAB requires a symmetric key and a hash-chain value
distribution once for n broadcast messages. SABSym distributes a symmetric
key for each broadcast message. Advantage of SABAsym comes at high compu-
tation requirements, which are not available for most master and outstations
on service today. SABSym requires more computation than SAB due to key
establishment requirements. All schemes require one key and random value per
message to be stored. Excluding SABAsym due to its high computation and
infrastructure requirements, SAB shows clear advantage over SABSym in security
and computation and communication overhead.
5.8 Conclusion
This chapter has presented a CPN model for the DNP3-SA behaviour in the Multi-
drop architecture. The model has been used to analyse the security behaviour
of the broadcast communication in large scale SCADA systems. This chapter
has presented a security scheme called SAB, that make use of the pre-existing
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cryptographic primitives in the DNP3-SA protocol and the hash chain concept
of the TESLA protocol. SAB is presented as a lightweight security scheme
that secures broadcast mode communication of the DNP3 protocol used within
large scale SCADA systems. The scheme does not require a major upgrade
in the existing platforms but it rather improves on performance and reduces
communication overheads in large scale industries. Analysis of our DNP3-SAB
CPN model has proven SAB to be safeguarding communication between a master
station and multiple outstations simultaneously from attacks such as injection,
modification and replay. Moreover, a comparable functionality, performance and
overhead analyses of SAB against DNP3-SA counterpart; NACR and AGM with
and without attacks scenarios and other cryptographic alternative methods have
been presented. The analysis shows that indeed SAB reduces the communication
and some computation overhead. In addition, it reduces the processing overhead
on the master stations and also reduces delay by sending a single request to all
outstations at once, rather than sending requests to each outstation one by one.
However, despite these benefits, SAB come at the cost of a minor (asymptotically
insignificant) processing overhead on the outstations and a minor storage overhead
on both the master and outstations.
In our next chapter, this thesis will present the summary and future work.
The summary will present the contributions of this thesis by outlining them
explicitly. The future work will consist of questions that came to light whist
doing this research as follow up PhD thesis topics.
Chapter 6
Conclusions And Future Work
This chapter presents a summary of the work in this thesis. Specifically, we present
a summary of how the research objectives of this thesis have been achieved as
detailed in Chapter 1. Additionally, this chapter provides future work in order to
address open research problems identified in this thesis.
6.1 Research Summary
DNP3 is one of the standard SCADA protocols used to facilitate data communi-
cations among substations, particularly in power grid automation. Standardised
interoperability among devices has made DNP3 more popular among other utility
industries such as water, sewage, and oil and gas refineries. The protocol provides
a unilateral authentication mechanism called DNP3-SA that operates in two dif-
ferent modes; NACR and AGM to secure DNP3 messages between interconnected
devices. Knowing that the DNP3 protocol is used in other utility industries
other than power, it is vitally important that the security mechanism (DNP3-SA)
operate correctly and does not present any weaknesses that compromise the
services of the protocol in all these industries. However, as far we are aware, there
has been no formal security analysis or published work to analyse the behavioural
correctness of the protocol, except for ours [ASCF14,ACF16,ACF15], which are
consolidated as well as expanded on in this thesis.
DNP3 specifications contains an informal description of the DNP3 protocol
and its security mechanism. This has made the protocol ambiguous, imprecise
141
142 Chapter 6. Conclusions And Future Work
and not easy to comprehend. Additionally, the DNP3-SA mechanism is intended
to provide 3 security goals: Integrity, Availability and Authentication to various
systems architecture supported by the DNP3 protocol, which has made it complex.
This thesis presents the three key results (objectives) about the formal specification
and verification of DNP3 and its security mechanism, DNP3-SA by using the
formalism, Coloured Petri Nets. Thus, below we conclude this thesis with a
summary of how we have achieved our research objectives stated in Chapter 1.
Objective 1: The provision of formal specification models to perform security
analysis of the DNP3 Non-aggressive protocol mode (DNP3-NACR). This research
objective is satisfied with the provision of a formal model for the DNP3 protocol
and its security mechanism, DNP3-SA, which detailed in chapter 3. In that
chapter, a formal model of one of the two communication modes in DNP3-SA
called the NACR was modelled. This model was used to perform security analysis
of the DNP3-NACR protocol mode. The security analysis was performed to
determine whether the protocol provided data integrity and the availability
property. We carried out the analysis through the CPN’s supported state space
tool to verify these properties through a modification attack model. The outcome
of the analysis revealed that data integrity and the availability of certain services
can not always be guaranteed as the properties can both be compromised. This is
because messages communicated within the protocol are in ‘cleartext’. As a result,
it becomes easy for any attacker to flip bits of various messages and compromise
the properties provided. Hence, the attacker can cause a DoS attack. A set of
solutions have been provided to fix the flaw identified. The first solution proposes
the use of digital signature and the second solution proposes to generalise the
DNP3-SA protocol such that the DNP3-NACR protocol mode can secure all
communicated messages instead of securing specific messages.
Objective 2: To provide a security analysis of the authentication property
provided by the DNP3-SA protocol. We have achieved this objective by providing
a single CPN model that covered the two communication modes of the DNP3-SA
protocol: NACR and AGM. The model was used to capture the two separate
authentication behaviours in the DNP3-SA protocol such that we can verify the
behavioural correctness of the DNP3-AGM protocol mode, which is detailed in
chapter 4. The security analysis on the model was to verify the authentication
property of the protocol. This analysis was achieved through the state space
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analysis tool. Results from the analysis showed that, the authentication property
of DNP3-AGM protocol mode can be compromise through the challenge sequence
number used in the DNP3-NACR protocol mode. As a result, AGM of the
DNP3-SA protocol could be bypassed to launch a successful replay attack on the
outstation and execute previously issued commands. A set of solutions required
to remove the identified flaw were provided. One of the solutions uses MAC
tag on challenge messages. The other solution restricts the use of the challenge
sequence number in the DNP3-SA mechanism to the aggressive mode only. Both
of these updates were modelled, validated and verified to prove that the flaw
identify can be fixed at the cost of a minor increased in processing.
Objective 3: To provide a security scheme that extended DNP3-SA to secure
large scale SCADA systems using the DNP3 protocol over broadcast communication.
We have achieved this objective by providing a DNP3-SA CPN model that is based
on the Multi-drop architecture, which is detailed in chapter 5. In that chapter,
a scalable DNP3-SA CPN model was created for the Multi-drop architecture.
The model was used to perform security analysis of DNP3-SA on large scale
systems and determine whether the mechanism can conduct broadcast mode
communication. It turned out that DNP3-SA is e↵ective in securing the unicast
mode of communication, which is typically communication between one master
station and an outstation but not broadcast communication. As a result, this
chapter proposed a lightweight security scheme for broadcast communication
called Secure Authentication for Broadcast (SAB). The scheme is lightweight to
ensure that devices that support the DNP3-SA protocol will not require a major
update in deploying SAB for Multi-drop architectures.
SAB was modelled, validated and verified through CPN and its state space
analysis tool to prove the correctness of the protocol. The model was evaluated
through the set of attack vectors stated within the DNP3 protocol specifications to
show that the protocol can successfully secure DNP3 messages communicated over
broadcast. Results from the analysis confirmed that SAB can secures messages at
the cost of an increased but constant term in processing and storage overheads.
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6.2 Future Work
This thesis has left some research problems open during this work. These open
problems could be useful to explore, and study for future work. The following
are some possible areas that can be extended;
Since this thesis has focused solely on DNP3 because of 1) its wider acceptance
in the utility industry and 2) its Secure Authentication mechanism because DNP3
is one of the first standardised SCADA protocol that provides an embedded
cryptographic security mechanism, one promising future work will be to extend
our formal security analysis to other standardised SCADA protocols. The open
network specifications in utility industry has made many previously known
proprietary protocols to became standards protocols (non-proprietary). Few of
these standard protocols have been formally analysed and verified, while the
problem of security in SCADA protocols is almost entirely unexplored.
Though many of today’s non-proprietary SCADA protocols are used for
di↵erent purposes, a majority of them have similar layer structure and almost the
same functionality. But since most of these protocols were previously designed
without a security mindset, and there are no formal models to analyse the
correctness of those protocols, many of them may be vulnerable to common
network attacks. One approach to guarantee both functional and behavioural
correctness is the application of a formalism as it has been shown in this thesis.
The formal analysis of the DNP3-SA in the DNP3 protocol has shown how flaws
can be identified through formal model and how the flaw can be resolved as well.
An area relevant to explore as a future work will be to use the DNP3-SA concept
in other standardised SCADA protocols to determine how well the cryptographic
mechanism can secure messages of other protocols.
Chapter 2, describes the various DNP3 protocol system architectures. However,
Chapter 5 only presents the security analysis of the DNP3-SA protocol on the
Multi-drop architecture. The hierarchical or data concentrator architecture, which
can facilitates communication between a centralised master station and multiple
outstations, but at the same time the centralised master can be interacting with
another sub-master station that is also communication with other outstations for
data could not be analysed due time constraints. Further work is required to verify
the security correctness of DNP3-SA on the data concentrator. This is because
the data concentrator architecture is usually suitable for non-DNP3 supported
devices that prefer to communicate through protocols converters. Moreover,
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the nature of the data concentrator architecture may introduce other forms of
communication modes such as multicast communication through other SCADA
protocols like the GOOSE protocol. The absence of a formal model to analyse
the DNP3-SA protocol on this architecture may lead to sophisticated attacks
that may not be easy to identify.
The security analysis performed on the DNP3 protocol and DNP3-SA mecha-
nism were all evaluated using specified attacks from the DNP3 specifications only.
The attacks used in this thesis have been limited and very specific to the DNP3
protocol. Further work in verifying the model will have to analyse the model
using other forms of attacks that are outside the specification of the protocol.
This is because there is also the need to verify the correctness of DNP3-SA in the
presence of other attacks vectors to further improve the protocol if any previously
unidentified flaws are detected. There is also the need to develop generic attack
models using CPN that can be used to verify various SCADA protocols; but
at the same specific enough to analyse security properties of a protocol (the
Dolev-Yao attack is an example [DY83]).
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Chapter 7
Appendix
7.1 CPN Colour sets declarations
This section of this thesis presents the details of the CPN declarations for the
DNP3-SA and DNP3-SAB CPN model to interested readers. Table 7.1 presents
detailed of CPN declarations of DNP3, DNP3-SA and DNP3-SAB CPN model.
The table has three columns; Remarks, Components and CPN declarations.
Remarks in the table presents the various types of messages exchanged between
master stations and outstations. Components show the elements or fields of DNP3
fragments that form the various DNP3 messages. CPN declarations present the
translation or conversion of all DNP3 messages into the CPN language. It is
to be noted that all descriptions in the table that are not indicated as NACR,
AGM or SAB imply that they have been used throughout out the model, unless
otherwise specified.
Table 7.1 is self explanatory due the Remarks column provided. However, we
will like to present an example due to the detail on how a request is modelled or
translated into the CPN language. Thus, under the Remarks column, the requests
row shows that a DNP3 request in this table is composed of two components: FC,
OH. The content of the FC component can be any of the represented 3 values:
1‘(“0x01”)@1++ 1‘(“0x02”)@2++ 1‘(“0x03”)@3. Each of these 3 values represent
a token in our model. These tokens are modelled through the colour set fcode,
which is of a string data type. The tokens are assigned with a discrete time,
which only allows the tokens to fire at a certain time. To move any of the tokens
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from one place to another of the same fcode colour set, we use the variable f
on arc inscription (refer to Var f:fcode in Table 7.1). Similarly, the content of
the OH component can also be any of the 3 represented string data type values
(i.e., 1‘(“g20v1”)@1++ 1‘(“g20v7”)@2++, 1‘(“g20v5”)@3) of the oheader colour
set. The oheader colour set is timed as well. We use CPN’s timing mechanism
in these values (FC and OH tokens) to reduce the tendency of obtaining a large
space state value.
In summary, the combination FC and OH creates a complete CPN request
mimicking a request message from the DNP3 protocol (refer to CPN NACR
Request in Table 7.1). This is also similar to the CPN AGM Request, which
requires an addition component (i.e. the colour set hmac) to mimic AGM requests
for the DNP3-AGM protocol mode.
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Table 7.1: CPN Declarations for DNP3, DNP3-SA, DNP3-SAB CPN Model
Remarks Components CPN Declarations
Requests
FC
Val allrqfc = 1‘(“0x01”)@1++ 1‘(“0x02”)@2++ 1‘(“0x03”)@3;
Colset fcode = string timed; var f,sf:fcode;
OH
Val alloh = 1‘(“g20v1”)@1++ 2‘(“g20v7”)@2; Colset oheader =
string timed; Var oh:oheader
CPN NACR Request Colset Request = product fcode*oheader
CPN AGM Request Colset AGrequest = product Request*hmac
Addressed
Requests
colset Ostation=int; colset VReq=union RqA:Request+RqB:Brq;
colset AdPack=product Ostation*VReq; vr:VReq;
All Requests
colset ASDUX=union NACR:Request+AGM:AGrequest+
TAG:allHMAC+BD:BData; colset Packet=product
Ostation*ASDUX; var DataA:ASDUX; var Pack:Packet;
Responses
FC
Val allrspfc =1‘(“0x81”)++ 1‘(“0x83”); Colset fcode = string;
Var f:fcode
OH Colset oheader = string; Var oh:oheader
IIN Colset IIN = string; Var i:IIN
CPN Response Colset Response = product fcode * oheader * IIN
All Response
colset ASDUZ=union RSP:Response+CHD:chlgdata;
colset PacketRsp=product Ostation*ASDUZ; var DataB:PacketRsp;
Dynamic
States
Eg: Master “waiting”
for response
Colset states = with Ready|WaitRq|WaitRsp|Authpass
|Authfail|Processing|Critical|Trigger|Terminate|SecInit|Broadcast;
Challenge
Data
MAC Algorithm
Val allalg = 1‘(“HMAC-SHA-256”);
Colset algorithm = string; Var alg:algorithm
Sequence Number Colset seq = int; Var sn:seq
Pseudo Random
fun PRandom(p:PsedudoRand)=let val(pp) in if p=3 then 1‘70
else if p=70 then 1‘100 else p =100 then 1‘153 else if p= 153
then 1‘1000 else if p= 1000 then 1‘10 else if p=10 then 1‘6364 else
empty end; var p:PseudoRand;
CPN challenge Data
Colset chlgdata = product seq*algorithm*PseudoRand;
Var cd:chlgdata
HMAC
Tag
Session key Colset seskey = int; Var sk:session;
MAC algorithm Colset algorithm = string; var alg:algorithm
Challenge Data
Colset chlgdata = product seq*algorithm*PseudoRand;
var cd:chlgdata
UserID Val allid =1‘1; Colset userid = int; var u:userid
Request Colset Request = product fcode*oheader
MAC tag Colset mac = record ↵:fcode*cdc:chlgdata*uu:useid
HMAC tag
Colset Hmac = product algorithm*session*mac;
var Mmtag, omtag:Hmac
Hash tag
colset Shash=product algorithm*PseudoRand;
var Rhash, Chash, NewHash:Shash;
Hash Index colset InDex= int timed; var InStored,InRecv:InDex;
Hash tag and Index colset HnI= product Shash *InDex timed; var HI:HnI;
BrD MAC tag colset HB=record label:Request*H:Shash*IN:InDex;
BrD HMAC tag
colset HkB=product algorithm*seskey*userid*HB;
var Btag:HkB;
All HMAC tags
colset allHMAC=union h1:Hmac+h2:HkB+h3:Shash;
var AH,OH:allHMAC;
Parameters
Replay val Replay = true;
Modification val MoDAttack1=true;
Injection val INJAttack1=true;
Spoofing val spoof=true;
Broadcast val BRD=true;
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Table 7.2: Continuation of CPN Declarations for DNP3, DNP3-SA, DNP3-SAB
CPN Model
Remarks Components CPN Declarations
Tag
Verification
HMAC
Tags
fun Verifytags(Mtag:hmac,Otag:hmac) = let val(tagM)=Mtag val(tagO)
=Otag in if Mtag=Otag then 1‘Authpass else 1‘ Authfail end;
BrD HMAC
tag
fun Verifytag(AH:allHMAC, OH:allHMAC)=let val(tagM)=AH
val(tagO)=OH in if AH=OH then 1‘Authpass else 1‘Authfail end;
CPN Functions
Responses FC
OH
fun Vresp(f:fcode,oh:oheader)= let val(↵)=f val(ohh)=oh in if f >=“0x02”
andalso oh=“g20v1” then 1‘(“10—01—10”) else if f>=“0x02” andalso
oh=“g20v7” then 1‘(“11—00—11”) else empty end;
Responses
IIN
fun OutIIN(f:fcode,oh:oheader)= let val(↵) =f val(ohh)= oh in if f=“0x01”
then 1‘(“00 IIN 1”) else if f >=“0x02” then 1‘(“01 IIN 2”) else empty end;
Response OH
fun Rresp(oh:oheader)= let val(ohh)=oh in if
oh=“10-01-10” orelse oh=“11-00-11” then 1‘(“gWritten”) else if
oh=“11-11-11” orelse oh=“00-11-11” then 1‘(“NewValue”) else empty end;
SAB Responses
FC OH
fun Vresp(f:fcode, oh:oheader)= let val(↵)=f val(ohh)=oh in if
f=”0x02” andalso oh=”g20v1” then 1‘(”10-11-11”) else if f=”0x022”
andalso oh=”g20v1” then 1‘(”10-11-11”) else if f=”0x02” andalso
oh=”g20v5” then 1‘(”11-00-11”) else if f=”0x022” andalso oh=”g20v5”
then 1‘(”11-00-11”) else if f=”0x02” andalso oh=”g20v7” then
1‘(”OpenSysValve”) else if f=”0x022” andalso oh=”g20v7” then
1‘(”OpenSysValve”) else if f=”0x03” andalso oh=”g20v7” then
1‘(“STOP VALVE”) else if f=”0xAA” andalso oh=”g20v1” then
1‘(”0-10-01-10”) else if f=”0xB” andalso oh>=”g20v5” then 1‘(”0-11-00-11”)
else if f=”0xBB” andalso oh>=”g20v5” then 1‘(”0-11-00-11”) else
if f=”0xC” andalso oh>=”g20v1” then 1‘(”0-00-00-00”) else if
f=”0xCC” andalso oh>=”g20v1” then 1‘(”0-00-00-00”) else empty end;
SAB Response
IIN
fun OutIIN(f:fcode, oh:oheader)=let val(↵)=f val(ohh)=oh in if f=”0x01”
andalso oh>=”g20v1” then 1‘(”IIN 1.1”) else if f =”0x011” then 1‘(”IINB 1.1”)
else if f=”0x02” then 1‘(”IIN 1.2”) else if f=”0x022” then 1‘(”IINB 1.2”) else
if f=”0xA” then 1‘(”IIN 1.3”) else if f>=”0xAA” then = 1‘(”IIN 1.3”)
else if f>=”0xB” then 1‘(”DVC RSTD”) else if f>=”0xBB” then
1‘(”DVC RSTD”) else if f>=”0xC” then 1‘(”01 IIN 2”)
else if f>=”0xCC” then 1‘(”IINB 2”) else empty end;
SAB Response
OH
fun Rresp(oh:oheader)= let val(ohh)=oh in if oh=”10-11-11” orelse
oh=”11-00-11” then 1‘”gWritten” else if oh=”0-10-01-10” orelse
oh=”0-11-00-11” then 1‘”CMD EXEC” else if oh=”00-00-00” then
1‘(”SYS RSTED”) else if oh=”CloseSysValve” then 1‘(”0 Sys”) else
if oh=”–/–/–” then 1‘(”CONF F DEL”) else empty end;
Hash value On
Outstation
fun HashO(Ind:InDex,Inp:Shash)=,let,val(h↵)=Ind val (Hh)=Inp in if Ind=1
andalso Inp=980382 then 1‘802828 else if Ind=2 andalso Inp=380519
then 1‘802828 else if Ind=3 andalso Inp=703008 then 1‘802828 else if
Ind=4 andalso Inp=479028 then 1‘802828 else if Ind=5 andalso
Inp=913828 then 1‘802828,else if Ind=1 andalso Inp=980382 then
1‘913828 else if Ind=2 andalso Inp=380519 then 1‘913828 else if Ind=3 andalso
Inp=703008 then 1‘913828,else if Ind=4 andalso Inp=479028 then
1‘913828,else empty end;
Modification
Attack function
fun Mattack1(n:Ostation, D:ASDUX)=let val(nn)=n val(dd)=D in
if n=4 then 3‘(4,BD((((”0x03”,”g20v7”),980382,9),(”SHA-256”,14603258,3,
{label=(”0x02”,”g20v7”), H=980382,IN=9})))) else empty end;
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